Daiki Kishishita
Biographic Data
| ID | 4386068 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Daiki Kishishita |
| GIVEN NAMES | Daiki |
| FAMILY NAME | Kishishita |
| SIGNATURE | KISHISHITA D |
| AFFILIATIONS | Tokyo University of Science |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-2462-0728 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 8 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 0 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 8 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2022 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2026 |
| H-INDEX | 0 |
Welfare state and natives’ preferences for immigrants’ types
When natives realize that their country’s welfare system includes immigrants, they may prefer high-income immigrants to low-income ones because the former will contribute more to the system because of its redistributive nature. We examine this causal effect using a novel survey experiment. In the experiment, we randomly assign half of the respondents to receive information designed to increase their perception that the national healthcare insuran…
Inequality, conspiracy theories, and redistribution
Despite a rapid increase in inequality, redistribution does not necessarily expand. I address this paradox by emphasizing a novel effect of inequality on the acceptance of conspiracy theories. For this purpose, I develop an electoral competition model in which voters are divided into rich and poor. Each voter weighs the desire to maintain their self-image against the need for accurate beliefs, leading to varied endorsements of conspiracy theories…
Self-benefits, fiscal risk, and political support for the public healthcare system
The rapid aging of the population has become increasingly challenging for public healthcare systems. To ensure sustainability, governments must persuade their citizens to accept a larger burden, which is a difficult task. This study explored whether informing individuals of self-benefits from the healthcare system could be a solution. We first constructed a two-period overlapping generations model and hypothesized that doing so could facilitate p…
Does Informative Opposition Influence Electoral Accountability
In majoritarian legislatures, minority parties cannot directly influence policymaking. However, they may serve as whistleblowers against the majority parties’ harmful policymaking. This study aims to explore whether a minority party’s monitoring mitigates a political agency problem in a majoritarian legislature. For this purpose, we construct a two-period election model in which voters face information asymmetries regarding each party’s type and …
Overconfidence, income-ability gap, and preferences for income equality
Endogenous Political Trust and Electoral Accountability
This study examines how an endogenous change in political trust affects the performance of a representative democracy. To this end, we construct a two-period political agency model in which voters face uncertainty about the distribution of politicians' types (trust uncertainty) as well as each individual politician's type. Such trust uncertainty allows political trust to endogenously change over time. In its presence, the incumbent's action has a…
Informative campaigning in multidimensional politics
This paper aims to investigate the possibility that electoral campaigning transmits truthful information in a situation where campaigning has a direct persuasive effect on a subset of the electorate called “naïve voters.” To this end, we construct a multi-sender signaling game in which an incumbent and a challenger decide whether to focus on policy or ability in electoral campaigning, and a media outlet then decides whether to gather news. Voters…
Do supermajority rules really deter extremism? the role of electoral competition
This study investigates how supermajority rules in a legislature affect electoral competition. We construct an extensive-form game wherein parties choose policy platforms in an election. Post election, the policy is determined based on a legislative voting rule. At symmetric equilibrium, supermajority rules induce divergence of policy platforms if and only if the parties are sufficiently attached to their preferred platform. Thus, supermajority r…
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Informative campaigning in multidimensional politics
This paper aims to investigate the possibility that electoral campaigning transmits truthful information in a situation where campaigning has a direct persuasive effect on a subset of the electorate called “naïve voters.” To this end, we construct a multi-sender signaling game in which an incumbent and a challenger decide whether to focus on policy or ability in electoral campaigning, and a media outlet then decides whether to gather news. Voters…
Do supermajority rules really deter extremism? the role of electoral competition
This study investigates how supermajority rules in a legislature affect electoral competition. We construct an extensive-form game wherein parties choose policy platforms in an election. Post election, the policy is determined based on a legislative voting rule. At symmetric equilibrium, supermajority rules induce divergence of policy platforms if and only if the parties are sufficiently attached to their preferred platform. Thus, supermajority r…
Overconfidence, income-ability gap, and preferences for income equality
Endogenous Political Trust and Electoral Accountability
This study examines how an endogenous change in political trust affects the performance of a representative democracy. To this end, we construct a two-period political agency model in which voters face uncertainty about the distribution of politicians' types (trust uncertainty) as well as each individual politician's type. Such trust uncertainty allows political trust to endogenously change over time. In its presence, the incumbent's action has a…
Self-benefits, fiscal risk, and political support for the public healthcare system
The rapid aging of the population has become increasingly challenging for public healthcare systems. To ensure sustainability, governments must persuade their citizens to accept a larger burden, which is a difficult task. This study explored whether informing individuals of self-benefits from the healthcare system could be a solution. We first constructed a two-period overlapping generations model and hypothesized that doing so could facilitate p…
Does Informative Opposition Influence Electoral Accountability
In majoritarian legislatures, minority parties cannot directly influence policymaking. However, they may serve as whistleblowers against the majority parties’ harmful policymaking. This study aims to explore whether a minority party’s monitoring mitigates a political agency problem in a majoritarian legislature. For this purpose, we construct a two-period election model in which voters face information asymmetries regarding each party’s type and …
Inequality, conspiracy theories, and redistribution
Despite a rapid increase in inequality, redistribution does not necessarily expand. I address this paradox by emphasizing a novel effect of inequality on the acceptance of conspiracy theories. For this purpose, I develop an electoral competition model in which voters are divided into rich and poor. Each voter weighs the desire to maintain their self-image against the need for accurate beliefs, leading to varied endorsements of conspiracy theories…
Welfare state and natives’ preferences for immigrants’ types
When natives realize that their country’s welfare system includes immigrants, they may prefer high-income immigrants to low-income ones because the former will contribute more to the system because of its redistributive nature. We examine this causal effect using a novel survey experiment. In the experiment, we randomly assign half of the respondents to receive information designed to increase their perception that the national healthcare insuran…
Politics (8 works) · Political science (7 works) · Economics (6 works) · Law (5 works) · Law (4 works) · Accountability (2 works) · Business (2 works) · Computer Science (2 works) · Construct (python library (2 works) · Democracy (2 works)