Arkadii Slinko

Biographic Data

ID	4386236
NAME	Arkadii Slinko
GIVEN NAMES	Arkadii
FAMILY NAME	Slinko
SIGNATURE	SLINKO A
AFFILIATIONS	University of Auckland
ORCID	0000-0002-0397-6290
VERIFIED	Yes
TOTAL WORKS	13
TOTAL CITATIONS	11
AUTHOR COUNT	13
EDITOR COUNT	0
FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR	2004
LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR	2026
H-INDEX	2

Participatory budgeting with cumulative votes
Open AccessPiotr Skowron, Arkadii Slinko et al.ARTICLETheory and Decision2026
In participatory budgeting a group of decision makers is given a set of projects—each with a cost—and has to decide which projects should be funded within the constraints of an available budget. Each decision maker, in some form, expresses their preference over the projects. The goal of an aggregation procedure is to select—based on voter preferences—a subset of projects whose total cost does not exceed the budget and optimal in some sense. We pr…
A family of condorcet domains that are single-peaked on a circle
Open AccessArkadii SlinkoARTICLESocial Choice and Welfare2024
Fishburn’s alternating scheme domains occupy a special place in the theory of Condorcet domains. Karpov (2023) generalised these domains and made an interesting observation proving that all of them are single-peaked on a circle. However, an important point that all generalised Fishburn domains are maximal Condorcet domain remained unproved. We fill this gap and suggest a new combinatorial interpretation of generalised Fishburn’s domains which pro…
Note on “A classification of peak-pit maximal Condorcet domains” by Guanhao Li, Mathematical Social Sciences 125 (2023), 42–57
Open AccessClemens Puppe, Arkadii SlinkoARTICLEMathematical Social Sciences2024References: 1
The note presents a counter example to Li (2023)
Constructing large peak-pit Condorcet domains
Open AccessAlexander Karpov, Arkadii SlinkoARTICLETheory and Decision2023
We present a new method of constructing Condorcet domains from pairs of Condorcet domains of smaller sizes (concatenation + shuffle scheme). The concatenation + shuffle scheme provides maximal, connected, copious, peak-pit domains whenever the original domains have these properties. It allows to construct maximal peak-pit Condorcet domains that are larger than those obtained by the Fishburn’s alternating scheme for all $$n\ge 13$$ n ≥ 13 alternat…
Towards a classification of maximal peak-pit Condorcet domains
Open AccessGuanhao Li, Clemens Puppe et al.ARTICLEMathematical Social Sciences2021Cited by: 1References: 11
Cognitive hierarchy and voting manipulation in k -approval voting
Open AccessEdith Elkind, Umberto Grandi et al.ARTICLEMathematical Social Sciences2020References: 42
Gibbard–Satterthwaite games for k -approval voting rules
Open AccessUmberto Grandi, Daniel Hughes et al.ARTICLEMathematical Social Sciences2019Cited by: 3References: 18
Mixing discount functions
Open AccessNina Anchugina, Matthew Ryan et al.ARTICLEMathematical Social Sciences2019References: 29
Growth of dimension in complete simple games
Open AccessLiam O’Dwyer, Arkadii SlinkoARTICLEMathematical Social Sciences2017Cited by: 1References: 15
Weightedness and structural characterization of hierarchical simple games
Open AccessTatiana Gvozdeva, Ali Hameed et al.ARTICLEMathematical Social Sciences2013Cited by: 1References: 12
Weighted and roughly weighted simple games
Open AccessTatiana Gvozdeva, Arkadii SlinkoARTICLEMathematical Social Sciences2011Cited by: 1References: 14
Proportional Representation and Strategic Voters
Open AccessArkadii Slinko, Shaun WhiteARTICLEJournal of Theoretical Politics2010Cited by: 4References: 27
The goal of this paper is to examine the incentives to vote insincerely, other than those created by rounding, faced by voters in systems of proportional representation (PR). We rigorously investigate two models of voter behaviour. The first model assumes that a voter is primarily interested in the distribution of seats in the post-election parliament (seat maximizer) while the second considers a voter who is concerned with the distribution of po…
How large should a coalition be to manipulate an election
Open AccessArkadii SlinkoARTICLEMathematical Social Sciences2004References: 10

How large should a coalition be to manipulate an election
Open AccessArkadii SlinkoARTICLEMathematical Social Sciences2004References: 10
Proportional Representation and Strategic Voters
Open AccessArkadii Slinko, Shaun WhiteARTICLEJournal of Theoretical Politics2010Cited by: 4References: 27
The goal of this paper is to examine the incentives to vote insincerely, other than those created by rounding, faced by voters in systems of proportional representation (PR). We rigorously investigate two models of voter behaviour. The first model assumes that a voter is primarily interested in the distribution of seats in the post-election parliament (seat maximizer) while the second considers a voter who is concerned with the distribution of po…
Weighted and roughly weighted simple games
Open AccessTatiana Gvozdeva, Arkadii SlinkoARTICLEMathematical Social Sciences2011Cited by: 1References: 14
Weightedness and structural characterization of hierarchical simple games
Open AccessTatiana Gvozdeva, Ali Hameed et al.ARTICLEMathematical Social Sciences2013Cited by: 1References: 12
Growth of dimension in complete simple games
Open AccessLiam O’Dwyer, Arkadii SlinkoARTICLEMathematical Social Sciences2017Cited by: 1References: 15
Gibbard–Satterthwaite games for k -approval voting rules
Open AccessUmberto Grandi, Daniel Hughes et al.ARTICLEMathematical Social Sciences2019Cited by: 3References: 18
Mixing discount functions
Open AccessNina Anchugina, Matthew Ryan et al.ARTICLEMathematical Social Sciences2019References: 29
Cognitive hierarchy and voting manipulation in k -approval voting
Open AccessEdith Elkind, Umberto Grandi et al.ARTICLEMathematical Social Sciences2020References: 42
Towards a classification of maximal peak-pit Condorcet domains
Open AccessGuanhao Li, Clemens Puppe et al.ARTICLEMathematical Social Sciences2021Cited by: 1References: 11
Constructing large peak-pit Condorcet domains
Open AccessAlexander Karpov, Arkadii SlinkoARTICLETheory and Decision2023
We present a new method of constructing Condorcet domains from pairs of Condorcet domains of smaller sizes (concatenation + shuffle scheme). The concatenation + shuffle scheme provides maximal, connected, copious, peak-pit domains whenever the original domains have these properties. It allows to construct maximal peak-pit Condorcet domains that are larger than those obtained by the Fishburn’s alternating scheme for all $$n\ge 13$$ n ≥ 13 alternat…
A family of condorcet domains that are single-peaked on a circle
Open AccessArkadii SlinkoARTICLESocial Choice and Welfare2024
Fishburn’s alternating scheme domains occupy a special place in the theory of Condorcet domains. Karpov (2023) generalised these domains and made an interesting observation proving that all of them are single-peaked on a circle. However, an important point that all generalised Fishburn domains are maximal Condorcet domain remained unproved. We fill this gap and suggest a new combinatorial interpretation of generalised Fishburn’s domains which pro…
Note on “A classification of peak-pit maximal Condorcet domains” by Guanhao Li, Mathematical Social Sciences 125 (2023), 42–57
Open AccessClemens Puppe, Arkadii SlinkoARTICLEMathematical Social Sciences2024References: 1
The note presents a counter example to Li (2023)
Participatory budgeting with cumulative votes
Open AccessPiotr Skowron, Arkadii Slinko et al.ARTICLETheory and Decision2026
In participatory budgeting a group of decision makers is given a set of projects—each with a cost—and has to decide which projects should be funded within the constraints of an available budget. Each decision maker, in some form, expresses their preference over the projects. The goal of an aggregation procedure is to select—based on voter preferences—a subset of projects whose total cost does not exceed the budget and optimal in some sense. We pr…