Kimiko Terai
Biographic Data
| ID | 4386260 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Kimiko Terai |
| GIVEN NAMES | Kimiko |
| FAMILY NAME | Terai |
| SIGNATURE | TERAI K |
| AFFILIATIONS | Keio University, Tokyo, Japan |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-3309-175X |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 2 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 1 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 2 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2017 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2018 |
| H-INDEX | 1 |
Rivalry among agents seeking large budgets
An agent competing for resources from a principal may benefit from having the principal believe that the agent shares his preferences, whereas the principal may prefer that agents reveal their types, inducing a separating equilibrium. Such incentives are explored in a model with a principal who sets a budget in two separate periods, and two different agents allocate that budget among services. In the second period, the principal allocates a large…
Rewarding Successes Discourages Experimentation
Consider a principal who allocates a fixed budget among risk-averse agents. Each agent first chooses a policy or project. After observing the outcomes of their choices, the principal allocates a larger budget to the agents who had adopted the policy with the superior outcome. A subgame perfect Nash equilibrium may have all agents make the same choice, though the principal would prefer that they experiment. If the number of agents is large, or if …
Rivalry among agents seeking large budgets
An agent competing for resources from a principal may benefit from having the principal believe that the agent shares his preferences, whereas the principal may prefer that agents reveal their types, inducing a separating equilibrium. Such incentives are explored in a model with a principal who sets a budget in two separate periods, and two different agents allocate that budget among services. In the second period, the principal allocates a large…
Rewarding Successes Discourages Experimentation
Consider a principal who allocates a fixed budget among risk-averse agents. Each agent first chooses a policy or project. After observing the outcomes of their choices, the principal allocates a larger budget to the agents who had adopted the policy with the superior outcome. A subgame perfect Nash equilibrium may have all agents make the same choice, though the principal would prefer that they experiment. If the number of agents is large, or if …
Rivalry among agents seeking large budgets
An agent competing for resources from a principal may benefit from having the principal believe that the agent shares his preferences, whereas the principal may prefer that agents reveal their types, inducing a separating equilibrium. Such incentives are explored in a model with a principal who sets a budget in two separate periods, and two different agents allocate that budget among services. In the second period, the principal allocates a large…
Economic theories and models (2 works) · Economics (2 works) · Banking stability, regulation, efficiency (1 work) · Business (1 work) · Computer Science (1 work) · Computer security (1 work) · Economic Policies and Impacts (1 work) · Finance (1 work) · Incentive (1 work) · Local Government Finance and Decentralization (1 work)