Ae Sil Woo
Biographic Data
| ID | 4386274 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Ae Sil Woo |
| GIVEN NAMES | Ae Sil |
| FAMILY NAME | Woo |
| SIGNATURE | WOO A S |
| AFFILIATIONS | Gettysburg College |
| ORCID | 0000-0003-2193-1843 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 3 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 27 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 3 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2019 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2025 |
| H-INDEX | 1 |
Legalistic autocrats
This study examines how chamber-level voting rules influence compliance with presidential term limits in third-wave democratizers. Using a novel dataset on constitutional amendment voting rules, we analyze how joint voting and split voting shape leaders’ ability to evade term limits, particularly in anocratic regimes. The findings reveal that joint voting facilitates term-limit evasion by aggregating votes across chambers and projecting elite con…
Legislative configuration and strength through the idea of Ends Independence
Prior approaches to evaluating legislative strength cross-nationally have focused on the idea of Means Independence, defined as the procedural autonomy of a legislature. However, expanded Means Independence might not necessarily effect policy effects outside the chief executive’s preference, referred to as Ends Independence. Spatial models estimate the influence of different configurations of legislative processes on Ends Independence. Findings s…
The Differential Effects of “Democratic” Institutions on Dissent in Dictatorships
Why do some dictatorships face dissent while others do not? In this article, we argue that nominally democratic institutions created to co-opt the dictatorial opposition have different effects on the likelihood of elite and collective dissent. By providing concessions through the creation of parties and legislatures, dictators reduce the probability of elite mobilization (via a coup) against the regime. For everyday citizens, the creation of nomi…
The Differential Effects of “Democratic” Institutions on Dissent in Dictatorships
Why do some dictatorships face dissent while others do not? In this article, we argue that nominally democratic institutions created to co-opt the dictatorial opposition have different effects on the likelihood of elite and collective dissent. By providing concessions through the creation of parties and legislatures, dictators reduce the probability of elite mobilization (via a coup) against the regime. For everyday citizens, the creation of nomi…
Legislative configuration and strength through the idea of Ends Independence
Prior approaches to evaluating legislative strength cross-nationally have focused on the idea of Means Independence, defined as the procedural autonomy of a legislature. However, expanded Means Independence might not necessarily effect policy effects outside the chief executive’s preference, referred to as Ends Independence. Spatial models estimate the influence of different configurations of legislative processes on Ends Independence. Findings s…
The Differential Effects of “Democratic” Institutions on Dissent in Dictatorships
Why do some dictatorships face dissent while others do not? In this article, we argue that nominally democratic institutions created to co-opt the dictatorial opposition have different effects on the likelihood of elite and collective dissent. By providing concessions through the creation of parties and legislatures, dictators reduce the probability of elite mobilization (via a coup) against the regime. For everyday citizens, the creation of nomi…
Legislative configuration and strength through the idea of Ends Independence
Prior approaches to evaluating legislative strength cross-nationally have focused on the idea of Means Independence, defined as the procedural autonomy of a legislature. However, expanded Means Independence might not necessarily effect policy effects outside the chief executive’s preference, referred to as Ends Independence. Spatial models estimate the influence of different configurations of legislative processes on Ends Independence. Findings s…
Legalistic autocrats
This study examines how chamber-level voting rules influence compliance with presidential term limits in third-wave democratizers. Using a novel dataset on constitutional amendment voting rules, we analyze how joint voting and split voting shape leaders’ ability to evade term limits, particularly in anocratic regimes. The findings reveal that joint voting facilitates term-limit evasion by aggregating votes across chambers and projecting elite con…
Law (3 works) · Law (3 works) · Legislature (3 works) · Political science (3 works) · Economics (2 works) · Law and economics (2 works) · Mathematics (2 works) · Political Conflict and Governance (2 works) · Business (1 work) · Collective action (1 work)