Lukas Hohendorf
Biographic Data
| ID | 4386448 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Lukas Hohendorf |
| GIVEN NAMES | Lukas |
| FAMILY NAME | Hohendorf |
| SIGNATURE | HOHENDORF L |
| AFFILIATIONS | University of Bamberg |
| ORCID | 0000-0001-9849-5686 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 3 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 18 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 3 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2021 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2024 |
| H-INDEX | 2 |
Recorded Votes as Attention Booster: How Opposition Parties use Roll Calls and Nonrecorded Votes for Position Taking in the German Bundestag, 2017–21
The article investigates roll‐call request and its effects on opposition‐voting behavior. It argues that parties use roll‐call votes (RCVs) as a position‐taking instrument to boost public attention for issues they care about. This argument implies that RCVs are requested strategically but opposition behavior should not differ systematically between recorded and nonrecorded votes. Studying all voting activities of the 19th German Bundestag (2017–2…
Loyal lists, distinctive districts: How Dissent-Shirking and Leisure-Shirking Affect Mixed-Candidate Selection
In parliamentary systems, party leaderships accomplish party unity by promising positive incentives to their members of parliament (MP) and threatening them with negative incentives. Regarding reselection, ‘loyal’ and active MPs should be rewarded with promising list positions, while rebellious and ‘slacking’ MPs should be punished with worse list positions or even denied renomination. Although this assumption is central to explaining party unity…
Veto power fosters cooperative behaviour: Institutional incentives and government-opposition voting in the German Bundestag
This article argues that opposition veto power in institutional arenas such as second chambers can foster a more consensual relationship between government and opposition parties in parliament. This theoretical claim is supported in the article using data on legislative voting behaviour in the German Bundestag. The statistical analysis shows that opposition and government parties are much more likely to vote the same way, if the opposition contro…
Veto power fosters cooperative behaviour: Institutional incentives and government-opposition voting in the German Bundestag
This article argues that opposition veto power in institutional arenas such as second chambers can foster a more consensual relationship between government and opposition parties in parliament. This theoretical claim is supported in the article using data on legislative voting behaviour in the German Bundestag. The statistical analysis shows that opposition and government parties are much more likely to vote the same way, if the opposition contro…
Loyal lists, distinctive districts: How Dissent-Shirking and Leisure-Shirking Affect Mixed-Candidate Selection
In parliamentary systems, party leaderships accomplish party unity by promising positive incentives to their members of parliament (MP) and threatening them with negative incentives. Regarding reselection, ‘loyal’ and active MPs should be rewarded with promising list positions, while rebellious and ‘slacking’ MPs should be punished with worse list positions or even denied renomination. Although this assumption is central to explaining party unity…
Recorded Votes as Attention Booster: How Opposition Parties use Roll Calls and Nonrecorded Votes for Position Taking in the German Bundestag, 2017–21
The article investigates roll‐call request and its effects on opposition‐voting behavior. It argues that parties use roll‐call votes (RCVs) as a position‐taking instrument to boost public attention for issues they care about. This argument implies that RCVs are requested strategically but opposition behavior should not differ systematically between recorded and nonrecorded votes. Studying all voting activities of the 19th German Bundestag (2017–2…
Veto power fosters cooperative behaviour: Institutional incentives and government-opposition voting in the German Bundestag
This article argues that opposition veto power in institutional arenas such as second chambers can foster a more consensual relationship between government and opposition parties in parliament. This theoretical claim is supported in the article using data on legislative voting behaviour in the German Bundestag. The statistical analysis shows that opposition and government parties are much more likely to vote the same way, if the opposition contro…
Loyal lists, distinctive districts: How Dissent-Shirking and Leisure-Shirking Affect Mixed-Candidate Selection
In parliamentary systems, party leaderships accomplish party unity by promising positive incentives to their members of parliament (MP) and threatening them with negative incentives. Regarding reselection, ‘loyal’ and active MPs should be rewarded with promising list positions, while rebellious and ‘slacking’ MPs should be punished with worse list positions or even denied renomination. Although this assumption is central to explaining party unity…
Recorded Votes as Attention Booster: How Opposition Parties use Roll Calls and Nonrecorded Votes for Position Taking in the German Bundestag, 2017–21
The article investigates roll‐call request and its effects on opposition‐voting behavior. It argues that parties use roll‐call votes (RCVs) as a position‐taking instrument to boost public attention for issues they care about. This argument implies that RCVs are requested strategically but opposition behavior should not differ systematically between recorded and nonrecorded votes. Studying all voting activities of the 19th German Bundestag (2017–2…
Economics (3 works) · Electoral Systems and Political Participation (3 works) · German (3 works) · Law (3 works) · Parliament (3 works) · Political economy (3 works) · Political science (3 works) · Politics (3 works) · Voting (3 works) · Incentive (2 works)