Sebastian Thieme
Dados Biográficos
| ID | 4386620 |
|---|---|
| NOME | Sebastian Thieme |
| PRENOMES | Sebastian |
| SOBRENOME | Thieme |
| ASSINATURA | THIEME S |
| AFILIAÇÕES | Princeton University |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-8153-9379 |
| VERIFICADO | Sim |
| TOTAL DE OBRAS | 10 |
| TOTAL DE CITAÇÕES | 18 |
| TOTAL COMO AUTOR | 10 |
| TOTAL COMO EDITOR | 0 |
| PRIMEIRO ANO DE PUBLICAÇÃO | 2013 |
| ANO MAIS RECENTE DE PUBLICAÇÃO | 2025 |
| ÍNDICE H | 2 |
Fundraising Events and Non-Ideological Donation Motivations
(When) are lobbying expenditures a good proxy for lobbying activity
Lobbying expenditures are widely used as a proxy variable for measuring lobbying activity. However, the validity of this approach has rarely been examined and existing justifications do not account for heterogeneity in expenditure formats across types of lobbyists. I address the question using unique lobbying disclosure data from Wisconsin, where lobbying organizations report both expenditures on lobbying-related activities and lobbyists’ hours w…
Institutional constraints on the executive, investment, and elections
In recent years, a variety of countries worldwide have experienced an increase in executive power. Long‐standing concerns about this concentration include reduced property rights protection. Particularly for developing democracies, scholars theorize that a lack of institutional constraints on the executive may impede long‐term investment. Analyzing this question empirically has proven difficult, however, because economic activity can affect polit…
A Direct Test of Legislative Gatekeeping
Tests of legislative gatekeeping theories have been hampered by the absence of status quo estimates, making these tests vulnerable to selection bias. I overcome this problem with a novel data set on positions by private interests in Iowa, Nebraska, and Wisconsin because these states’ legislatures record organizations’ positions on lobbied bills irrespective of whether the bills receive floor consideration. This permits an estimation of the ideolo…
Moderation or Strategy? Political Giving by Corporations and Trade Groups
Do bipartisan contributions by corporations and trade associations reflect strategic considerations or ideological moderation? In this article, I leverage lobbying disclosures in Iowa, Nebraska, and Wisconsin to provide a new measure of ideology that allows me to adjudicate between the two accounts. These states' legislatures permit or require lobbyists to declare their principals' positions on lobbied bills. I combine these data with roll call v…
Graduate Students & Special Programs Funded
An abstract is not available for this content. As you have access to this content, full HTML content is provided on this page. A PDF of this content is also available in through the ‘Save PDF’ action button
Menschengerechtes Wirtschaften?
Das Ende der Heterodoxie?
Das Ende der Heterodoxie
Der Ökonom als Menschenfeind?
Moderation or Strategy? Political Giving by Corporations and Trade Groups
Do bipartisan contributions by corporations and trade associations reflect strategic considerations or ideological moderation? In this article, I leverage lobbying disclosures in Iowa, Nebraska, and Wisconsin to provide a new measure of ideology that allows me to adjudicate between the two accounts. These states' legislatures permit or require lobbyists to declare their principals' positions on lobbied bills. I combine these data with roll call v…
A Direct Test of Legislative Gatekeeping
Tests of legislative gatekeeping theories have been hampered by the absence of status quo estimates, making these tests vulnerable to selection bias. I overcome this problem with a novel data set on positions by private interests in Iowa, Nebraska, and Wisconsin because these states’ legislatures record organizations’ positions on lobbied bills irrespective of whether the bills receive floor consideration. This permits an estimation of the ideolo…
Fundraising Events and Non-Ideological Donation Motivations
Der Ökonom als Menschenfeind?
Das Ende der Heterodoxie?
Das Ende der Heterodoxie
Menschengerechtes Wirtschaften?
Graduate Students & Special Programs Funded
An abstract is not available for this content. As you have access to this content, full HTML content is provided on this page. A PDF of this content is also available in through the ‘Save PDF’ action button
Moderation or Strategy? Political Giving by Corporations and Trade Groups
Do bipartisan contributions by corporations and trade associations reflect strategic considerations or ideological moderation? In this article, I leverage lobbying disclosures in Iowa, Nebraska, and Wisconsin to provide a new measure of ideology that allows me to adjudicate between the two accounts. These states' legislatures permit or require lobbyists to declare their principals' positions on lobbied bills. I combine these data with roll call v…
A Direct Test of Legislative Gatekeeping
Tests of legislative gatekeeping theories have been hampered by the absence of status quo estimates, making these tests vulnerable to selection bias. I overcome this problem with a novel data set on positions by private interests in Iowa, Nebraska, and Wisconsin because these states’ legislatures record organizations’ positions on lobbied bills irrespective of whether the bills receive floor consideration. This permits an estimation of the ideolo…
Institutional constraints on the executive, investment, and elections
In recent years, a variety of countries worldwide have experienced an increase in executive power. Long‐standing concerns about this concentration include reduced property rights protection. Particularly for developing democracies, scholars theorize that a lack of institutional constraints on the executive may impede long‐term investment. Analyzing this question empirically has proven difficult, however, because economic activity can affect polit…
(When) are lobbying expenditures a good proxy for lobbying activity
Lobbying expenditures are widely used as a proxy variable for measuring lobbying activity. However, the validity of this approach has rarely been examined and existing justifications do not account for heterogeneity in expenditure formats across types of lobbyists. I address the question using unique lobbying disclosure data from Wisconsin, where lobbying organizations report both expenditures on lobbying-related activities and lobbyists’ hours w…
Fundraising Events and Non-Ideological Donation Motivations
Political science (6 obras) · Law (4 obras) · Law (4 obras) · Politics (4 obras) · Business (3 obras) · Economics (3 obras) · Economics (3 obras) · Electoral Systems and Political Participation (3 obras) · Ideology (3 obras) · Legislature (3 obras)