Giuseppe Di Liddo
Biographic Data
| ID | 4386918 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Giuseppe Di Liddo |
| GIVEN NAMES | Giuseppe |
| FAMILY NAME | Di Liddo |
| SIGNATURE | DI LIDDO G |
| AFFILIATIONS | University of Bari Aldo Moro |
| ORCID | 0000-0001-5552-0087 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 7 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 6 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 7 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2016 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2026 |
| H-INDEX | 2 |
Yardstick competition under fiscal and administrative asymmetries: Rent‐seeking and local cooperation
This paper develops a two‐period model to investigate how fiscal and bureaucratic asymmetries shape yardstick competition (YC), inter‐municipal cooperation (IMC), and rent‐seeking in local public service provision. Unlike previous approaches, we allow incumbents to invest in bureaucratic efficiency, influencing both service quality and delivery time. Voters observe outputs but not rents, creating electoral incentives that interact with structural…
Strategic voting on tax policy: Direct vs representative democracy in the laboratory
This paper aims to distinctly demonstrate the prevalence and impact of strategic voting within representative democratic systems as compared to direct democracy, focusing on tax policy decisions. Through a comparative analysis, we explore how the structure of the voting system influences the strategic behaviour of voters concerning their taxable income. Our findings indicate that representative democracy inherently encourages strategic voting mor…
Quality of institutions, rent-seeking, and inter-jurisdictional cooperation
The differing fiscal needs of municipalities introduce bias into yardstick competition among local administrators driven by pure rent-seeking motives. The influence of institutional quality on this bias varies across cases, sometimes alleviating it, while in other instances exacerbating it. Inter-municipal cooperation provides incumbents with control over political yardstick competition. However, this alliance compromises the quality of public se…
Local income inequality, rent-seeking detection, and equalization: A laboratory experiment
Centralized standards and local taxation in municipal waste management
In the EU, standards for municipal waste sorting and recycling are established by the European central institutions, being mostly based on the available estimates of recyclable materials. In a simple model of co‐production in municipal waste management with local taxation, we assess that central bodies enjoy more discretion and can set more ambitious targets in jurisdictions with stronger environmental preferences and/or lower expenditure needs. …
The political economy of municipal consortia and municipal mergers
Measuring horizontal fiscal imbalance: The case of Italian municipalities
In the literature on fiscal federalism, vertical fiscal imbalance has been widely studied, while the theme of horizontal fiscal imbalance and inequality among local governments, due to differences in their fiscal capacities, has been less explored. This article contributes to fill the gap. A new method to compute fiscal capacities based on regression analysis is proposed, which can overcome some of the drawbacks of traditional methods such as the…
Local income inequality, rent-seeking detection, and equalization: A laboratory experiment
The political economy of municipal consortia and municipal mergers
Measuring horizontal fiscal imbalance: The case of Italian municipalities
In the literature on fiscal federalism, vertical fiscal imbalance has been widely studied, while the theme of horizontal fiscal imbalance and inequality among local governments, due to differences in their fiscal capacities, has been less explored. This article contributes to fill the gap. A new method to compute fiscal capacities based on regression analysis is proposed, which can overcome some of the drawbacks of traditional methods such as the…
Measuring horizontal fiscal imbalance: The case of Italian municipalities
In the literature on fiscal federalism, vertical fiscal imbalance has been widely studied, while the theme of horizontal fiscal imbalance and inequality among local governments, due to differences in their fiscal capacities, has been less explored. This article contributes to fill the gap. A new method to compute fiscal capacities based on regression analysis is proposed, which can overcome some of the drawbacks of traditional methods such as the…
The political economy of municipal consortia and municipal mergers
Centralized standards and local taxation in municipal waste management
In the EU, standards for municipal waste sorting and recycling are established by the European central institutions, being mostly based on the available estimates of recyclable materials. In a simple model of co‐production in municipal waste management with local taxation, we assess that central bodies enjoy more discretion and can set more ambitious targets in jurisdictions with stronger environmental preferences and/or lower expenditure needs. …
Local income inequality, rent-seeking detection, and equalization: A laboratory experiment
Quality of institutions, rent-seeking, and inter-jurisdictional cooperation
The differing fiscal needs of municipalities introduce bias into yardstick competition among local administrators driven by pure rent-seeking motives. The influence of institutional quality on this bias varies across cases, sometimes alleviating it, while in other instances exacerbating it. Inter-municipal cooperation provides incumbents with control over political yardstick competition. However, this alliance compromises the quality of public se…
Strategic voting on tax policy: Direct vs representative democracy in the laboratory
This paper aims to distinctly demonstrate the prevalence and impact of strategic voting within representative democratic systems as compared to direct democracy, focusing on tax policy decisions. Through a comparative analysis, we explore how the structure of the voting system influences the strategic behaviour of voters concerning their taxable income. Our findings indicate that representative democracy inherently encourages strategic voting mor…
Yardstick competition under fiscal and administrative asymmetries: Rent‐seeking and local cooperation
This paper develops a two‐period model to investigate how fiscal and bureaucratic asymmetries shape yardstick competition (YC), inter‐municipal cooperation (IMC), and rent‐seeking in local public service provision. Unlike previous approaches, we allow incumbents to invest in bureaucratic efficiency, influencing both service quality and delivery time. Voters observe outputs but not rents, creating electoral incentives that interact with structural…
Economics (6 works) · Local Government Finance and Decentralization (5 works) · Fiscal Policy and Economic Growth (4 works) · Political science (4 works) · Business (3 works) · Politics (3 works) · Public economics (3 works) · Computer Science (2 works) · Corporate Taxation and Avoidance (2 works) · Incentive (2 works)