Uri Eran
Biographic Data
| ID | 4391972 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Uri Eran |
| GIVEN NAMES | Uri |
| FAMILY NAME | Eran |
| SIGNATURE | ERAN U |
| AFFILIATIONS | Technion – Israel Institute of Technology |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-4261-1091 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 5 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 0 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 5 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2020 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2025 |
| H-INDEX | 0 |
Revenge Wars
In the wake of widescale deadly attacks, desire and support for military revenge are prevalent. Rather than dismissing it as due to ignorance, moral depravity or heat of the moment, I propose that support for military revenge is more charitably understood as support for a “retributive revenge war,” aimed at inflicting deserved harms on the enemy without punitive authority. Revising McMahan's conception of just cause, I argue that a retributive re…
More Than a Feeling: Kant’s Tripartite Account of Pleasure
Traditionally, pleasure has been understood in three different ways: as a simple feeling or phenomenological quality, as a behavioral disposition, and as an evaluation. While versions of these accounts – and combinations of two of them – have been attributed to Kant, I argue that Kant successfully combines all three. Pleasure, on this view, is an evaluation of an object’s agreement with a particular subject’s ability or intention to act. Because …
Are Kantian Emotions Feelings
According to Alix Cohen, Kant defines emotions as ‘feelings’. Although I find her account of Kantian feelings compelling, I provide three reasons to doubt that it is an account of emotions: (1) it is unclear why Cohen identifies emotions with Kantian feelings; (2) some Kantian feelings are not emotions; (3) some Kantian desires may be emotions. I propose, however, that with some qualifications Cohen’s account may be upheld, provided its extra-tex…
Are Kantian Emotions Feelings? – Addendum
An abstract is not available for this content so a preview has been provided. Please use the Get access link above for information on how to access this content
Which Emotions Should Kantians Cultivate (and Which Ones Should they Discipline)
Commentators disagree about Kant’s view on the proper treatment of emotions. In contrast to a tendency in this literature to treat them uniformly, I argue that, according to Kant, feelings (but not affects) require cultivation, and inclinations – although they can and perhaps may be cultivated – generally require discipline. The appropriate treatment for emotions depends on their susceptibility to rational constraint and on the threat they pose t…
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Which Emotions Should Kantians Cultivate (and Which Ones Should they Discipline)
Commentators disagree about Kant’s view on the proper treatment of emotions. In contrast to a tendency in this literature to treat them uniformly, I argue that, according to Kant, feelings (but not affects) require cultivation, and inclinations – although they can and perhaps may be cultivated – generally require discipline. The appropriate treatment for emotions depends on their susceptibility to rational constraint and on the threat they pose t…
Are Kantian Emotions Feelings
According to Alix Cohen, Kant defines emotions as ‘feelings’. Although I find her account of Kantian feelings compelling, I provide three reasons to doubt that it is an account of emotions: (1) it is unclear why Cohen identifies emotions with Kantian feelings; (2) some Kantian feelings are not emotions; (3) some Kantian desires may be emotions. I propose, however, that with some qualifications Cohen’s account may be upheld, provided its extra-tex…
Are Kantian Emotions Feelings? – Addendum
An abstract is not available for this content so a preview has been provided. Please use the Get access link above for information on how to access this content
More Than a Feeling: Kant’s Tripartite Account of Pleasure
Traditionally, pleasure has been understood in three different ways: as a simple feeling or phenomenological quality, as a behavioral disposition, and as an evaluation. While versions of these accounts – and combinations of two of them – have been attributed to Kant, I argue that Kant successfully combines all three. Pleasure, on this view, is an evaluation of an object’s agreement with a particular subject’s ability or intention to act. Because …
Revenge Wars
In the wake of widescale deadly attacks, desire and support for military revenge are prevalent. Rather than dismissing it as due to ignorance, moral depravity or heat of the moment, I propose that support for military revenge is more charitably understood as support for a “retributive revenge war,” aimed at inflicting deserved harms on the enemy without punitive authority. Revising McMahan's conception of just cause, I argue that a retributive re…
Emotions and Moral Behavior (4 works) · Feeling (4 works) · Philosophy (4 works) · Psychology (4 works) · Social Psychology (4 works) · Epistemology (3 works) · Linguistics (3 works) · Political science (2 works) · War, Ethics, and Justification (2 works) · Academic and Historical Perspectives in Psychology (1 works)