Sidak Yntiso
Biographic Data
| ID | 4393445 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Sidak Yntiso |
| GIVEN NAMES | Sidak |
| FAMILY NAME | Yntiso |
| SIGNATURE | YNTISO S |
| AFFILIATIONS | New York University |
| VERIFIED | No |
| TOTAL WORKS | 3 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 4 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 3 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2021 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2022 |
| H-INDEX | 1 |
Bridging the Grade Gap: Reducing Assessment Bias in a Multi-Grader Class
Many large survey courses rely on multiple professors or teaching assistants to judge student responses to open-ended questions. Even following best practices, students with similar levels of conceptual understanding can receive widely varying assessments from different graders. We detail how this can occur and argue that it is an example of differential item functioning (or interpersonal incomparability), where graders interpret the same possibl…
Incentive Effects of Recall Elections: Evidence from Criminal Sentencing in California Courts
Thirty-nine US states authorize recall elections, but the incentives they create are not well understood. We examine how changes in the perceived threat of recall alter the behavior of one set of officials: judges. In 2016, outrage over the sentence imposed on a Stanford athlete following his sexual assault conviction sparked a drive to recall the presiding judge. Using disposition data from six California counties and arrest records for a subset…
Judicial Accountability and Racial Disparity in Criminal Appeals
Existing research indicates that retention through election induces larger effects on judicial votes in criminal cases than retention through appointment. Yet such research has addressed neither case selection effects across retention institutions nor heterogeneous treatment effects by defendants’ and judges’ race. Leveraging the unique retention institutions governing New York State’s intermediate appellate judges, we report the first within-jus…
Incentive Effects of Recall Elections: Evidence from Criminal Sentencing in California Courts
Thirty-nine US states authorize recall elections, but the incentives they create are not well understood. We examine how changes in the perceived threat of recall alter the behavior of one set of officials: judges. In 2016, outrage over the sentence imposed on a Stanford athlete following his sexual assault conviction sparked a drive to recall the presiding judge. Using disposition data from six California counties and arrest records for a subset…
Bridging the Grade Gap: Reducing Assessment Bias in a Multi-Grader Class
Many large survey courses rely on multiple professors or teaching assistants to judge student responses to open-ended questions. Even following best practices, students with similar levels of conceptual understanding can receive widely varying assessments from different graders. We detail how this can occur and argue that it is an example of differential item functioning (or interpersonal incomparability), where graders interpret the same possibl…
Judicial Accountability and Racial Disparity in Criminal Appeals
Existing research indicates that retention through election induces larger effects on judicial votes in criminal cases than retention through appointment. Yet such research has addressed neither case selection effects across retention institutions nor heterogeneous treatment effects by defendants’ and judges’ race. Leveraging the unique retention institutions governing New York State’s intermediate appellate judges, we report the first within-jus…
Bridging the Grade Gap: Reducing Assessment Bias in a Multi-Grader Class
Many large survey courses rely on multiple professors or teaching assistants to judge student responses to open-ended questions. Even following best practices, students with similar levels of conceptual understanding can receive widely varying assessments from different graders. We detail how this can occur and argue that it is an example of differential item functioning (or interpersonal incomparability), where graders interpret the same possibl…
Incentive Effects of Recall Elections: Evidence from Criminal Sentencing in California Courts
Thirty-nine US states authorize recall elections, but the incentives they create are not well understood. We examine how changes in the perceived threat of recall alter the behavior of one set of officials: judges. In 2016, outrage over the sentence imposed on a Stanford athlete following his sexual assault conviction sparked a drive to recall the presiding judge. Using disposition data from six California counties and arrest records for a subset…
Political science (3 works) · Economics (2 works) · Incentive (2 works) · Law (2 works) · Law, Economics, and Judicial Systems (2 works) · Legal and Constitutional Studies (2 works) · Psychology (2 works) · Accountability (1 works) · Artificial Intelligence (1 works) · Best practice (1 works)