Congyi Zhou
Biographic Data
| ID | 4396156 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Congyi Zhou |
| GIVEN NAMES | Congyi |
| FAMILY NAME | Zhou |
| SIGNATURE | ZHOU C |
| AFFILIATIONS | New York University |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-2687-9661 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 4 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 5 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 4 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2021 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2026 |
| H-INDEX | 1 |
To fight or to govern? Political capital and electoral competition
We examine the endogenous development of specialized political capital and its use, by both governing and opposition parties, within a model of policymaking and electoral competition. The opposition party can use political capital to impede the governing party's policy agenda—to throw sand in the gears—but may make itself less electorally desirable in the process. We characterize conditions that give rise to different equilibrium patterns of poli…
Interactions among simultaneous elections
In this study, we examine the interactions among elections by considering two parties competing in simultaneous elections, where each party fields candidates in every election. We model these interactions through voters’ utility functions, influenced not just by the policies proposed in a specific election but also by those in concurrent elections. The benchmark result indicates that all candidates adopt positions more polarized than those predic…
Last step to the throne
I model the dynamic between ruler and successor. The ruler cultivates a successor for a smooth power transition but fears being ousted by him, while the successor fears being removed by the ruler. The successor accumulates power while not threatening the ruler, and he prolongs their relationship by maintaining a low profile. The ruler gradually becomes more intolerant of the successor's growing power but, as his life nears its end, has less incen…
Optimal Size of Rebellions
This paper studies a model of regime change in which a rebel leader seeking to mobilize supporters faces a trade-off between increasing the rebel group’s size and risking information leaks. I find that repressing a rebellion via collective punishment — whereby not only rebel participants but also those individuals who knew about (but did not report) the rebellion are punished — may result in a smaller-sized rebel group than in the case of targete…
Last step to the throne
I model the dynamic between ruler and successor. The ruler cultivates a successor for a smooth power transition but fears being ousted by him, while the successor fears being removed by the ruler. The successor accumulates power while not threatening the ruler, and he prolongs their relationship by maintaining a low profile. The ruler gradually becomes more intolerant of the successor's growing power but, as his life nears its end, has less incen…
Optimal Size of Rebellions
This paper studies a model of regime change in which a rebel leader seeking to mobilize supporters faces a trade-off between increasing the rebel group’s size and risking information leaks. I find that repressing a rebellion via collective punishment — whereby not only rebel participants but also those individuals who knew about (but did not report) the rebellion are punished — may result in a smaller-sized rebel group than in the case of targete…
Last step to the throne
I model the dynamic between ruler and successor. The ruler cultivates a successor for a smooth power transition but fears being ousted by him, while the successor fears being removed by the ruler. The successor accumulates power while not threatening the ruler, and he prolongs their relationship by maintaining a low profile. The ruler gradually becomes more intolerant of the successor's growing power but, as his life nears its end, has less incen…
Interactions among simultaneous elections
In this study, we examine the interactions among elections by considering two parties competing in simultaneous elections, where each party fields candidates in every election. We model these interactions through voters’ utility functions, influenced not just by the policies proposed in a specific election but also by those in concurrent elections. The benchmark result indicates that all candidates adopt positions more polarized than those predic…
To fight or to govern? Political capital and electoral competition
We examine the endogenous development of specialized political capital and its use, by both governing and opposition parties, within a model of policymaking and electoral competition. The opposition party can use political capital to impede the governing party's policy agenda—to throw sand in the gears—but may make itself less electorally desirable in the process. We characterize conditions that give rise to different equilibrium patterns of poli…
Economics (3 works) · Law (3 works) · Law (3 works) · Political science (3 works) · Politics (3 works) · Culture, Economy, and Development Studies (2 works) · Electoral Systems and Political Participation (2 works) · Fiscal Policies and Political Economy (2 works) · Mathematics (2 works) · Physics (2 works)