Benoît S Y Crutzen
Biographic Data
| ID | 4396184 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Benoît S Y Crutzen |
| GIVEN NAMES | Benoît S Y |
| FAMILY NAME | Crutzen |
| SIGNATURE | CRUTZEN B S Y |
| AFFILIATIONS | Tinbergen Institute |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-5671-7612 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 6 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 6 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 6 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2010 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2024 |
| H-INDEX | 2 |
Left Behind Voters, Anti-Elitism and Popular Will
Populists are often anti-elitist and advocate for popular will over expertise. We show that these two populist characteristics are responses to mainstream parties leaving behind the majority of voters, the common people. Our model highlights two forces behind electoral success: numbers, which favor the common people, and knowledge, which favors the elite. Electoral competition may lead parties to cater to the elite. We identify conditions under w…
The best at the top? Candidate ranking strategies under closed list proportional representation
Under closed-list proportional representation, a party's electoral list determines the order in which legislative seats are allocated to candidates. When candidates differ in their ability, parties face a trade-off between competence and incentives. Ranking candidates in decreasing order of competence ensures that elected politicians are most competent. Yet, party lists create incentives for candidates that may lead parties not to place their bes…
Comparative politics with intraparty candidate selection
Politicians respond to incentives when they decide how to allocate their campaigning time and effort. The literature suggests electoral rules impact politicians’ incentives. We argue that the candidate selection process is an equally important source of incentives. We develop a two-stage model in which parties select candidates before the election. Elections are under first past the post (FPTP) or closed list proportional representation (PR). Sel…
Leaders, factions and the determinants of electoral success
We model the internal game between the leader and the factions of a party, to study the effect of party leadership on the determinants of electoral success. Factions are of interest or of principle. The probability of winning the election is increasing in how close the party is to the median voter, the leader’s charisma, party coherence and the factions’ contributions. The leader offers both types of factions their favourite rewards in exchange f…
Uncontested Primaries
Direct primary elections were introduced in the United States to limit the power of parties, to favor entry of new candidates, and to foster competition. However, a majority of incumbents faces no competition in their primary. We propose a formal model of primaries to rationalise this fact and analyse its welfare consequences. The party of the incumbent can influence the challenger’s entry cost in the primaries. Primary challengers choose strateg…
The Impact of Party Organization on Electoral Outcomes
Nous proposons un modèle de concurrence électorale dans lequel les partis fonctionnent comme des « marques » et peuvent exploiter la concurrence à l’intérieur du parti pour améliorer leur image. Nous démontrons que la concurrence entre les candidats des partis et les candidats indépendants permet d’expliquer la corrélation positive entre inégalités économiques et polarisation politique telle que documentée par McCarty, Poole et Rosenthal [2006] p…
The Impact of Party Organization on Electoral Outcomes
Nous proposons un modèle de concurrence électorale dans lequel les partis fonctionnent comme des « marques » et peuvent exploiter la concurrence à l’intérieur du parti pour améliorer leur image. Nous démontrons que la concurrence entre les candidats des partis et les candidats indépendants permet d’expliquer la corrélation positive entre inégalités économiques et polarisation politique telle que documentée par McCarty, Poole et Rosenthal [2006] p…
Uncontested Primaries
Direct primary elections were introduced in the United States to limit the power of parties, to favor entry of new candidates, and to foster competition. However, a majority of incumbents faces no competition in their primary. We propose a formal model of primaries to rationalise this fact and analyse its welfare consequences. The party of the incumbent can influence the challenger’s entry cost in the primaries. Primary challengers choose strateg…
The best at the top? Candidate ranking strategies under closed list proportional representation
Under closed-list proportional representation, a party's electoral list determines the order in which legislative seats are allocated to candidates. When candidates differ in their ability, parties face a trade-off between competence and incentives. Ranking candidates in decreasing order of competence ensures that elected politicians are most competent. Yet, party lists create incentives for candidates that may lead parties not to place their bes…
The Impact of Party Organization on Electoral Outcomes
Nous proposons un modèle de concurrence électorale dans lequel les partis fonctionnent comme des « marques » et peuvent exploiter la concurrence à l’intérieur du parti pour améliorer leur image. Nous démontrons que la concurrence entre les candidats des partis et les candidats indépendants permet d’expliquer la corrélation positive entre inégalités économiques et polarisation politique telle que documentée par McCarty, Poole et Rosenthal [2006] p…
Uncontested Primaries
Direct primary elections were introduced in the United States to limit the power of parties, to favor entry of new candidates, and to foster competition. However, a majority of incumbents faces no competition in their primary. We propose a formal model of primaries to rationalise this fact and analyse its welfare consequences. The party of the incumbent can influence the challenger’s entry cost in the primaries. Primary challengers choose strateg…
Comparative politics with intraparty candidate selection
Politicians respond to incentives when they decide how to allocate their campaigning time and effort. The literature suggests electoral rules impact politicians’ incentives. We argue that the candidate selection process is an equally important source of incentives. We develop a two-stage model in which parties select candidates before the election. Elections are under first past the post (FPTP) or closed list proportional representation (PR). Sel…
Leaders, factions and the determinants of electoral success
We model the internal game between the leader and the factions of a party, to study the effect of party leadership on the determinants of electoral success. Factions are of interest or of principle. The probability of winning the election is increasing in how close the party is to the median voter, the leader’s charisma, party coherence and the factions’ contributions. The leader offers both types of factions their favourite rewards in exchange f…
Left Behind Voters, Anti-Elitism and Popular Will
Populists are often anti-elitist and advocate for popular will over expertise. We show that these two populist characteristics are responses to mainstream parties leaving behind the majority of voters, the common people. Our model highlights two forces behind electoral success: numbers, which favor the common people, and knowledge, which favors the elite. Electoral competition may lead parties to cater to the elite. We identify conditions under w…
The best at the top? Candidate ranking strategies under closed list proportional representation
Under closed-list proportional representation, a party's electoral list determines the order in which legislative seats are allocated to candidates. When candidates differ in their ability, parties face a trade-off between competence and incentives. Ranking candidates in decreasing order of competence ensures that elected politicians are most competent. Yet, party lists create incentives for candidates that may lead parties not to place their bes…
Electoral Systems and Political Participation (5 works) · Political science (5 works) · Law (4 works) · Politics (4 works) · Economics (3 works) · Media Influence and Politics (3 works) · Microeconomics (3 works) · Political economy (3 works) · Competence (human resources (2 works) · Competition (biology (2 works)