Hideo Konishi
Biographic Data
| ID | 4396185 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Hideo Konishi |
| GIVEN NAMES | Hideo |
| FAMILY NAME | Konishi |
| SIGNATURE | KONISHI H |
| AFFILIATIONS | Boston College |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-9700-8476 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 12 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 22 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 12 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 1997 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2026 |
| H-INDEX | 4 |
Formation of teams in contests
We consider a team contest in which players make efforts to compete with other teams for a prize, and players of the winning team divide the prize according to a prize-sharing rule. Assuming that players differ in their abilities and their abilities are observable, we analyze which team structure realizes by allowing players to move across teams. A team structure is stable if there is no successful head-hunting opportunity. We show that if all te…
The best at the top? Candidate ranking strategies under closed list proportional representation
Under closed-list proportional representation, a party's electoral list determines the order in which legislative seats are allocated to candidates. When candidates differ in their ability, parties face a trade-off between competence and incentives. Ranking candidates in decreasing order of competence ensures that elected politicians are most competent. Yet, party lists create incentives for candidates that may lead parties not to place their bes…
Effort complementarity and sharing rules in group contests
Silent promotion of agendas
Entrepreneurial land developers
Concentration of competing retail stores
Salience
Anchor stores
Formation of Hub Cities
Equilibrium in a Finite Local Public Goods Economy
Equilibria in a Model with Partial Rivalry
Pure Strategy Nash Equilibrium in a Group Formation Game with Positive Externalities
Formation of Hub Cities
Salience
Concentration of competing retail stores
Anchor stores
The best at the top? Candidate ranking strategies under closed list proportional representation
Under closed-list proportional representation, a party's electoral list determines the order in which legislative seats are allocated to candidates. When candidates differ in their ability, parties face a trade-off between competence and incentives. Ranking candidates in decreasing order of competence ensures that elected politicians are most competent. Yet, party lists create incentives for candidates that may lead parties not to place their bes…
Entrepreneurial land developers
Equilibria in a Model with Partial Rivalry
Pure Strategy Nash Equilibrium in a Group Formation Game with Positive Externalities
Equilibrium in a Finite Local Public Goods Economy
Formation of Hub Cities
Anchor stores
Concentration of competing retail stores
Salience
Entrepreneurial land developers
Silent promotion of agendas
Effort complementarity and sharing rules in group contests
The best at the top? Candidate ranking strategies under closed list proportional representation
Under closed-list proportional representation, a party's electoral list determines the order in which legislative seats are allocated to candidates. When candidates differ in their ability, parties face a trade-off between competence and incentives. Ranking candidates in decreasing order of competence ensures that elected politicians are most competent. Yet, party lists create incentives for candidates that may lead parties not to place their bes…
Formation of teams in contests
We consider a team contest in which players make efforts to compete with other teams for a prize, and players of the winning team divide the prize according to a prize-sharing rule. Assuming that players differ in their abilities and their abilities are observable, we analyze which team structure realizes by allowing players to move across teams. A team structure is stable if there is no successful head-hunting opportunity. We show that if all te…
Economics (10 works) · Microeconomics (9 works) · Mathematical economics (6 works) · Mathematics (5 works) · Business (4 works) · Computer Science (4 works) · Economic theories and models (4 works) · Game Theory and Voting Systems (4 works) · Law (4 works) · Political science (4 works)