Gaile Pohlhaus
Biographic Data
| ID | 4397337 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Gaile Pohlhaus |
| GIVEN NAMES | Gaile |
| FAMILY NAME | Pohlhaus |
| SIGNATURE | POHLHAUS G |
| AFFILIATIONS | Miami University |
| VERIFIED | No |
| TOTAL WORKS | 11 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 146 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 10 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 1 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2002 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2024 |
| H-INDEX | 3 |
Navigating Double Binds, Horizontal Attention, and Epistemic Self-Defense
Intersectional Epistemologies: The Ethics and Politics of Epistemic Practice
An abstract is not available for this content so a preview has been provided. Please use the Get access link above for information on how to access this content
Epistemic Oppression, Ignorance, and Resistance
This chapter offers an account of how feminist philosophers have understood the function of ignorance, in terms of epistemic oppression and epistemic resistance, with particular attention to how different forms of ignorance operate in relation to epistemic agency and epistemic autonomy. It analyzes three ways in which ignorance has been conceived in relation to epistemic oppression and resistance: ignorance as absence of knowledge, ignorance as a…
Epistemic Agency Under Oppression
The literature on epistemic injustice has been helpful for highlighting some of the epistemic harms that have long troubled those working in area studies that concern oppressed populations. Nonetheless, a good deal of this literature is oriented toward those in a position to perpetrate injustices, rather than those who historically have been harmed by them. This orientation, I argue, is ill-suited to the work of epistemic decolonization. In this …
Gaslighting and Echoing, or Why Collective Epistemic Resistance is not a “Witch Hunt”
This essay reflects on some of the problems with characterizing collective epistemic resistance to oppression as “unthinking” or antithetical to reason by highlighting the epistemic labor involved in contending with and resisting epistemic oppression. To do so, I develop a structural notion of epistemic gaslighting in order to highlight structural features of contexts within which collective epistemic resistance to oppression occurs. I consider t…
Varieties of Epistemic Injustice 1
The idea of "epistemic injustice" draws together three branches of philosophy - political philosophy, ethics, and epistemology - to consider how epistemic practices and institutions may be deployed and structured in ways that are simultaneously infelicitous toward certain epistemic values (such as truth, aptness, and understanding) and unjust with regard to particular knowers. This chapter seeks to convey knowledge concerning the varieties of epi…
The Routledge Handbook of Epistemic Injustice
Discerning the Primary Epistemic Harm in Cases of Testimonial Injustice
This article examines the primary epistemic harm of testimonial injustice, or, as defined by Miranda Fricker, the injustice of perceiving another epistemic agent as less credible due to an identity prejudice. I first analyze Fricker’s account of the harm, which she posits in terms of a subject/object relation as “epistemic objectification.” My analysis, however, shows that (1) testimonial injustice does not render its victim to an object-like sta…
Wrongful Requests and Strategic Refusals to Understand
Relational Knowing and Epistemic Injustice: Toward a Theory of Willful Hermeneutical Ignorance
I distinguish between two senses in which feminists have argued that the knower is social: 1. situated or socially positioned and 2. interdependent. I argue that these two aspects of the knower work in cooperation with each other in a way that can produce willful hermeneutical ignorance, a type of epistemic injustice absent from Miranda Fricker's Epistemic Injustice. Analyzing the limitations of Fricker's analysis of the trial of Tom Robinson in …
Using Wittgenstein Critically: A Political Approach to Philosophy
Abordant Wittgenstein d'un point de vue cavellien, en reference a S. Lovibond, l'A. se demande dans quelle mesure le philosophe du langage ordinaire ouvre la voie a une critique sociale. En reponse au scepticisme, l'A. montre que Wittgenstein concoit la possibilite d'une contestation politique qui met en evidence la responsabilite cognitive de l'individu au sein de la societe civile actuelle
Relational Knowing and Epistemic Injustice: Toward a Theory of Willful Hermeneutical Ignorance
I distinguish between two senses in which feminists have argued that the knower is social: 1. situated or socially positioned and 2. interdependent. I argue that these two aspects of the knower work in cooperation with each other in a way that can produce willful hermeneutical ignorance, a type of epistemic injustice absent from Miranda Fricker's Epistemic Injustice. Analyzing the limitations of Fricker's analysis of the trial of Tom Robinson in …
Gaslighting and Echoing, or Why Collective Epistemic Resistance is not a “Witch Hunt”
This essay reflects on some of the problems with characterizing collective epistemic resistance to oppression as “unthinking” or antithetical to reason by highlighting the epistemic labor involved in contending with and resisting epistemic oppression. To do so, I develop a structural notion of epistemic gaslighting in order to highlight structural features of contexts within which collective epistemic resistance to oppression occurs. I consider t…
Using Wittgenstein Critically: A Political Approach to Philosophy
Abordant Wittgenstein d'un point de vue cavellien, en reference a S. Lovibond, l'A. se demande dans quelle mesure le philosophe du langage ordinaire ouvre la voie a une critique sociale. En reponse au scepticisme, l'A. montre que Wittgenstein concoit la possibilite d'une contestation politique qui met en evidence la responsabilite cognitive de l'individu au sein de la societe civile actuelle
Using Wittgenstein Critically: A Political Approach to Philosophy
Abordant Wittgenstein d'un point de vue cavellien, en reference a S. Lovibond, l'A. se demande dans quelle mesure le philosophe du langage ordinaire ouvre la voie a une critique sociale. En reponse au scepticisme, l'A. montre que Wittgenstein concoit la possibilite d'une contestation politique qui met en evidence la responsabilite cognitive de l'individu au sein de la societe civile actuelle
Wrongful Requests and Strategic Refusals to Understand
Relational Knowing and Epistemic Injustice: Toward a Theory of Willful Hermeneutical Ignorance
I distinguish between two senses in which feminists have argued that the knower is social: 1. situated or socially positioned and 2. interdependent. I argue that these two aspects of the knower work in cooperation with each other in a way that can produce willful hermeneutical ignorance, a type of epistemic injustice absent from Miranda Fricker's Epistemic Injustice. Analyzing the limitations of Fricker's analysis of the trial of Tom Robinson in …
Discerning the Primary Epistemic Harm in Cases of Testimonial Injustice
This article examines the primary epistemic harm of testimonial injustice, or, as defined by Miranda Fricker, the injustice of perceiving another epistemic agent as less credible due to an identity prejudice. I first analyze Fricker’s account of the harm, which she posits in terms of a subject/object relation as “epistemic objectification.” My analysis, however, shows that (1) testimonial injustice does not render its victim to an object-like sta…
Varieties of Epistemic Injustice 1
The idea of "epistemic injustice" draws together three branches of philosophy - political philosophy, ethics, and epistemology - to consider how epistemic practices and institutions may be deployed and structured in ways that are simultaneously infelicitous toward certain epistemic values (such as truth, aptness, and understanding) and unjust with regard to particular knowers. This chapter seeks to convey knowledge concerning the varieties of epi…
The Routledge Handbook of Epistemic Injustice
Epistemic Agency Under Oppression
The literature on epistemic injustice has been helpful for highlighting some of the epistemic harms that have long troubled those working in area studies that concern oppressed populations. Nonetheless, a good deal of this literature is oriented toward those in a position to perpetrate injustices, rather than those who historically have been harmed by them. This orientation, I argue, is ill-suited to the work of epistemic decolonization. In this …
Gaslighting and Echoing, or Why Collective Epistemic Resistance is not a “Witch Hunt”
This essay reflects on some of the problems with characterizing collective epistemic resistance to oppression as “unthinking” or antithetical to reason by highlighting the epistemic labor involved in contending with and resisting epistemic oppression. To do so, I develop a structural notion of epistemic gaslighting in order to highlight structural features of contexts within which collective epistemic resistance to oppression occurs. I consider t…
Epistemic Oppression, Ignorance, and Resistance
This chapter offers an account of how feminist philosophers have understood the function of ignorance, in terms of epistemic oppression and epistemic resistance, with particular attention to how different forms of ignorance operate in relation to epistemic agency and epistemic autonomy. It analyzes three ways in which ignorance has been conceived in relation to epistemic oppression and resistance: ignorance as absence of knowledge, ignorance as a…
Intersectional Epistemologies: The Ethics and Politics of Epistemic Practice
An abstract is not available for this content so a preview has been provided. Please use the Get access link above for information on how to access this content
Navigating Double Binds, Horizontal Attention, and Epistemic Self-Defense
Epistemology (11 works) · Philosophy (11 works) · Feminist Epistemology and Gender Studies (9 works) · Sociology (9 works) · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics (7 works) · Political Philosophy and Ethics (7 works) · Law (6 works) · Political science (6 works) · Psychology (5 works) · Social Psychology (5 works)