Skip to main content

ETHNOS_APP

Home • Search • Journals • List 0

Ian Ayres

Biographic Data

ID4405078
NAMEIan Ayres
GIVEN NAMESIan
FAMILY NAMEAyres
SIGNATUREAYRES I
AFFILIATIONSYale University
ORCID0000-0001-6516-6763
VERIFIEDYes
TOTAL WORKS22
TOTAL CITATIONS54
WORKS AS AUTHOR22
WORKS AS EDITOR0
FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR1987
LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR2024
H-INDEX3
  • An economic rationale for the different methods of feeding enslaved people in the antebellum South and British West Indies

    Open Access•Eleanor Brown, Ian Ayres•ARTICLE•International Review of Law and…•2024

  • Affirmative action still hasn’t been shown to reduce the number of black lawyers

    Open Access•Ian Ayres, Richard Brooks et al.•ARTICLE•International Review of Law and…•2022

  • Voting with Dollars

    Bruce Ackerman, Bruce A Ackerman et al.•BOOK•Voting with Dollars•2017

    In this provocative book, two leading law professors challenge the existing campaign reform agenda and present a new initiative that avoids the mistakes of the past. Bruce Ackerman and Ian Ayres build on the example of the secret ballot and propose a system of secret donation booths” for campaign contributions. They unveil a plan in which the government provides each voter with a special credit card account containing fifty Patriot dollars” for p…

  • Evidence from Two Large Field Experiments that Peer Comparison Feedback Can Reduce Residential Energy Usage

    Ian Ayres, Sophie Raseman et al.•ARTICLE•The Journal of Law Economics and…•2013

    By providing feedback to customers on home electricity and natural gas usage with a focus on peer comparisons, utilities can reduce energy consumption at a low cost. We analyze data from two large-scale, random-assignment field experiments conducted by utility companies providing electricity (the Sacramento Municipal Utility District [SMUD]) and electricity and natural gas (Puget Sound Energy [PSE]), in partnership with a private company, Opower,…

  • Responsive regulation

    Open Access•Ian Ayres•ARTICLE•Regulation & Governance•2013•Cited by: 2•References: 9

    In this comment, I try to do three things: (i) set the record straight about the disproportionate contributions of my co‐author; (ii) briefly comment on the excellent articles byEtienne,Ford, andWesterman in this special issue; and (iii) describe how theResponsiveRegulationconcept of partial‐industry regulation might usefully be extended to tradable licenses and randomized regulation experiments

  • Straightforward

    Ian Ayres, Jennifer Gerarda Brown•BOOK•Straightforward•2011

    What can straight people do to support gay rights? How much work or sacrifice must allies take on to do their share? Ian Ayres and Jennifer Brown--law professors, activists, husband and wife--propose practical strategies for helping straight men and women advocate for and with the gay community. Straightforward advances a thesis that is at once simple and groundbreaking: to make real progress at the central flashpoints of controversy--marriage ri…

  • Insincere Promises

    Gregory Klass, Ian Ayres•BOOK•Insincere Promises•2008

  • On Options & Epidemics

    Open Access•Ian Ayres•ARTICLE•Daedalus•2008

  • Three Tests for Measuring Unjustified Disparate Impacts in Organ Transplantation

    Ian Ayres•ARTICLE•Perspectives in biology and…•2005

    Civil rights statutes often prohibit two distinct types of discrimination, referred to as "disparate treatment" and "disparate impact." Disparate treatment is race-contingent decision making. But even decision making that is not affected by people's race may still produce an unjustified disparate impact. For example, a race-neutral transplantation preference for allografts with partial antigen matches might produce an unjustified disparate impact…

  • Substitutes for Insider Trading

    Ian Ayres, Joe Bankman•ARTICLE•Stanford Law Review•2001

    When insider trading prohibitions limit the ability of insiders (or of a corporation itself) to use material non-public information to trade a particular firm's stock, there may be incentive to use the information to trade instead on the stock of that firm's rivals, suppliers, customers, or the manufacturers of complementary products. We refer to this form of trading as trading in stock substitutes. Stock substitute trading by a firm is legal. In…

  • Majoritarian vs. Minoritarian Defaults

    Ian Ayres, Robert Gertner•ARTICLE•Stanford Law Review•1999•Cited by: 1

    Recent theoretical analysis of contract default rules has devoted significant attention to the use of penalty default rules as a way to induce a contractor to reveal private information. Penalty default rules demonstrate how efficient rules cannot be derived by simply asking what most parties would have contracted for had they written a complete contract. Such "majoritarian" default rules derive from an implicit assumption about the reason why a …

  • The Donation Booth

    Ian Ayres, Jeremy Bulow•ARTICLE•Stanford Law Review•1998•Cited by: 3

    In this article, Professors Ayres and Bulow argue that, instead of mandating disclosure of all campaign contributions, we should instead consider mandating that all contributions be anonymous.Just as the secret ballot makes it more difficult for candidates to buy votes, mandating anonymous donations can make it more difficult for candidates to sell access or influence.Forcing donors to funnel campaign contributions through blind trusts can discou…

  • Deficit Reduction Through Diversity

    Ian Ayres, Peter Cramton•ARTICLE•Stanford Law Review•1996•Cited by: 4

    INTRODUCTION 2 I. THEORY 4 A. Set-Asides Can Enhance Intragroup Competition Among Strong Bidders 6 B. Bidding Credits Can Create Effective Set-Asides 7 C. Bidding Credits Can Create Intergroup Competition 7 D. Affirmative Action Can Increase Expected Revenue When the Government Is Imperfectly Informed About Bidder Valuations 7 E. Affirmative Action Can Destabilize Tacit Collusion 9 II. EMPIRICISM 9 A. Describing the Licenses and the Auction Rules…

  • Overcoming Law

    Ian Ayres, Richard A Posner•ARTICLE•American Journal of Legal History•1996

    Journal Article Overcoming Law Get access Posner Richard A., Overcoming Law. Cambridge, MA.: Harvard University Press, 1995. x, 580 pp. $39.95. Ian Ayres Ian Ayres Yale Law School Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar American Journal of Legal History, Volume 40, Issue 3, July 1996, Pages 371–373, https://doi.org/10.2307/845630 Published: 01 July 1996

  • A Market Test for Race Discrimination in Bail Setting

    Ian Ayres, Joel Waldfogel•ARTICLE•Stanford Law Review•1994•Cited by: 13

    Regression analysis, a common method of attempting to demonstrate racial and gender discrimination in hiring and other contexts, suffers from a number of shortcomings that invariably cast doubt on any incriminating results it produces. Most notably, regression models may fail to account for variables which correlate both with legitimate goals of a decisionmaker and with race! gender categories. In this article, Professors Ayres and Waldfogel offe…

  • Responsive Regulation

    Joel Rogers, Ian Ayres et al.•ARTICLE•Contemporary Sociology A Journal…•1993•Cited by: 1

    This book transcends current debate on government regulation by lucidly outlining how regulations can be a fruitful combination of persuasion and sanctions. The regulation of business by the United States government is often ineffective despite being more adversarial in tone than in other nations. The authors draw on both empirical studies of regulation from around the world and modern game theory to illustrate innovative solutions to this proble…

  • Responsive Regulation

    Ian Ayres, John Braithwaite•BOOK•Responsive regulation•1992

    Drawing extensively on empirical studies from the US, UK, Australia, and New Zealand, John Braithwaite and Ian Ayres offer an well-argued addition to the comparative literature on government regulation. In an effort to transcend the ongoing debate between those who favour strong state regulation and those who call for deregulation, they argue that regulation does not have to proceed with an adversarial tone, nor does it have to be `soft’ or `hard…

  • Tripartism

    Open Access•Ian Ayres, John Braithwaite•ARTICLE•Law & Social Inquiry•1991•Cited by: 29•References: 7

    The features of regulatory encounters that foster the evolution of cooperation often also encourage the evolution of capture and corruption. Solutions to the problems of capture and corruption—limiting discretion, multiple-industry rather than single-industry agency jurisdiction, and rotating personnel—inhibit the evolution of cooperation. Tripartism—empowering public interest groups—is advanced as a way to solve this policy dilemma. A game-theor…

  • Playing Games with the Law

    Ian Ayres, Eric Rasmusen•ARTICLE•Stanford Law Review•1990•Cited by: 1

    In the last two decades, the theory of games has increasingly dominated microeconomic theory. Frank Fisher recently asserted that game theory has become "the premier fashionable tool of microtheorists":\nThat ascendancy appears fairly complete. Bright young theorists today tend to think of every problem in game-theoretic terms .... Every department feels it needs at least one game theorist or at least one theorist who thinks in game-theoretic ter…

  • Halfway Home

    Open Access•Ian Ayres•ARTICLE•Law & Social Inquiry•1988

  • Halfway Home

    Open Access•Ian Ayres•ARTICLE•Law & Social Inquiry•1988•References: 2

    An abstract is not available for this content so a preview has been provided. Please use the Get access link above for information on how to access this content

  • Posner's Symphony No. 3

    John J Donohue, John J Donohue Iii et al.•ARTICLE•Stanford Law Review•1987

    In the 100th year following the death of Franz Liszt, Richard Posner has published the third edition of his own classic work, The Economic Analysis of Law. This coincidence is in some sense fitting, for, in many respects, what Liszt was to the piano and musical composition, Posner is to legal scholarship and public policy. Just as Liszt was the dominant figure in the creation of the modem pianist, Posner has presided over the rise of law and econ…

  • Tripartism

    Open Access•Ian Ayres, John Braithwaite•ARTICLE•Law & Social Inquiry•1991•Cited by: 29•References: 7

    The features of regulatory encounters that foster the evolution of cooperation often also encourage the evolution of capture and corruption. Solutions to the problems of capture and corruption—limiting discretion, multiple-industry rather than single-industry agency jurisdiction, and rotating personnel—inhibit the evolution of cooperation. Tripartism—empowering public interest groups—is advanced as a way to solve this policy dilemma. A game-theor…

  • A Market Test for Race Discrimination in Bail Setting

    Ian Ayres, Joel Waldfogel•ARTICLE•Stanford Law Review•1994•Cited by: 13

    Regression analysis, a common method of attempting to demonstrate racial and gender discrimination in hiring and other contexts, suffers from a number of shortcomings that invariably cast doubt on any incriminating results it produces. Most notably, regression models may fail to account for variables which correlate both with legitimate goals of a decisionmaker and with race! gender categories. In this article, Professors Ayres and Waldfogel offe…

  • Deficit Reduction Through Diversity

    Ian Ayres, Peter Cramton•ARTICLE•Stanford Law Review•1996•Cited by: 4

    INTRODUCTION 2 I. THEORY 4 A. Set-Asides Can Enhance Intragroup Competition Among Strong Bidders 6 B. Bidding Credits Can Create Effective Set-Asides 7 C. Bidding Credits Can Create Intergroup Competition 7 D. Affirmative Action Can Increase Expected Revenue When the Government Is Imperfectly Informed About Bidder Valuations 7 E. Affirmative Action Can Destabilize Tacit Collusion 9 II. EMPIRICISM 9 A. Describing the Licenses and the Auction Rules…

  • The Donation Booth

    Ian Ayres, Jeremy Bulow•ARTICLE•Stanford Law Review•1998•Cited by: 3

    In this article, Professors Ayres and Bulow argue that, instead of mandating disclosure of all campaign contributions, we should instead consider mandating that all contributions be anonymous.Just as the secret ballot makes it more difficult for candidates to buy votes, mandating anonymous donations can make it more difficult for candidates to sell access or influence.Forcing donors to funnel campaign contributions through blind trusts can discou…

  • Responsive regulation

    Open Access•Ian Ayres•ARTICLE•Regulation & Governance•2013•Cited by: 2•References: 9

    In this comment, I try to do three things: (i) set the record straight about the disproportionate contributions of my co‐author; (ii) briefly comment on the excellent articles byEtienne,Ford, andWesterman in this special issue; and (iii) describe how theResponsiveRegulationconcept of partial‐industry regulation might usefully be extended to tradable licenses and randomized regulation experiments

  • Majoritarian vs. Minoritarian Defaults

    Ian Ayres, Robert Gertner•ARTICLE•Stanford Law Review•1999•Cited by: 1

    Recent theoretical analysis of contract default rules has devoted significant attention to the use of penalty default rules as a way to induce a contractor to reveal private information. Penalty default rules demonstrate how efficient rules cannot be derived by simply asking what most parties would have contracted for had they written a complete contract. Such "majoritarian" default rules derive from an implicit assumption about the reason why a …

  • Responsive Regulation

    Joel Rogers, Ian Ayres et al.•ARTICLE•Contemporary Sociology A Journal…•1993•Cited by: 1

    This book transcends current debate on government regulation by lucidly outlining how regulations can be a fruitful combination of persuasion and sanctions. The regulation of business by the United States government is often ineffective despite being more adversarial in tone than in other nations. The authors draw on both empirical studies of regulation from around the world and modern game theory to illustrate innovative solutions to this proble…

  • Playing Games with the Law

    Ian Ayres, Eric Rasmusen•ARTICLE•Stanford Law Review•1990•Cited by: 1

    In the last two decades, the theory of games has increasingly dominated microeconomic theory. Frank Fisher recently asserted that game theory has become "the premier fashionable tool of microtheorists":\nThat ascendancy appears fairly complete. Bright young theorists today tend to think of every problem in game-theoretic terms .... Every department feels it needs at least one game theorist or at least one theorist who thinks in game-theoretic ter…

  • Posner's Symphony No. 3

    John J Donohue, John J Donohue Iii et al.•ARTICLE•Stanford Law Review•1987

    In the 100th year following the death of Franz Liszt, Richard Posner has published the third edition of his own classic work, The Economic Analysis of Law. This coincidence is in some sense fitting, for, in many respects, what Liszt was to the piano and musical composition, Posner is to legal scholarship and public policy. Just as Liszt was the dominant figure in the creation of the modem pianist, Posner has presided over the rise of law and econ…

  • Halfway Home

    Open Access•Ian Ayres•ARTICLE•Law & Social Inquiry•1988

  • Halfway Home

    Open Access•Ian Ayres•ARTICLE•Law & Social Inquiry•1988•References: 2

    An abstract is not available for this content so a preview has been provided. Please use the Get access link above for information on how to access this content

  • Playing Games with the Law

    Ian Ayres, Eric Rasmusen•ARTICLE•Stanford Law Review•1990•Cited by: 1

    In the last two decades, the theory of games has increasingly dominated microeconomic theory. Frank Fisher recently asserted that game theory has become "the premier fashionable tool of microtheorists":\nThat ascendancy appears fairly complete. Bright young theorists today tend to think of every problem in game-theoretic terms .... Every department feels it needs at least one game theorist or at least one theorist who thinks in game-theoretic ter…

  • Tripartism

    Open Access•Ian Ayres, John Braithwaite•ARTICLE•Law & Social Inquiry•1991•Cited by: 29•References: 7

    The features of regulatory encounters that foster the evolution of cooperation often also encourage the evolution of capture and corruption. Solutions to the problems of capture and corruption—limiting discretion, multiple-industry rather than single-industry agency jurisdiction, and rotating personnel—inhibit the evolution of cooperation. Tripartism—empowering public interest groups—is advanced as a way to solve this policy dilemma. A game-theor…

  • Responsive Regulation

    Ian Ayres, John Braithwaite•BOOK•Responsive regulation•1992

    Drawing extensively on empirical studies from the US, UK, Australia, and New Zealand, John Braithwaite and Ian Ayres offer an well-argued addition to the comparative literature on government regulation. In an effort to transcend the ongoing debate between those who favour strong state regulation and those who call for deregulation, they argue that regulation does not have to proceed with an adversarial tone, nor does it have to be `soft’ or `hard…

  • Responsive Regulation

    Joel Rogers, Ian Ayres et al.•ARTICLE•Contemporary Sociology A Journal…•1993•Cited by: 1

    This book transcends current debate on government regulation by lucidly outlining how regulations can be a fruitful combination of persuasion and sanctions. The regulation of business by the United States government is often ineffective despite being more adversarial in tone than in other nations. The authors draw on both empirical studies of regulation from around the world and modern game theory to illustrate innovative solutions to this proble…

  • A Market Test for Race Discrimination in Bail Setting

    Ian Ayres, Joel Waldfogel•ARTICLE•Stanford Law Review•1994•Cited by: 13

    Regression analysis, a common method of attempting to demonstrate racial and gender discrimination in hiring and other contexts, suffers from a number of shortcomings that invariably cast doubt on any incriminating results it produces. Most notably, regression models may fail to account for variables which correlate both with legitimate goals of a decisionmaker and with race! gender categories. In this article, Professors Ayres and Waldfogel offe…

  • Deficit Reduction Through Diversity

    Ian Ayres, Peter Cramton•ARTICLE•Stanford Law Review•1996•Cited by: 4

    INTRODUCTION 2 I. THEORY 4 A. Set-Asides Can Enhance Intragroup Competition Among Strong Bidders 6 B. Bidding Credits Can Create Effective Set-Asides 7 C. Bidding Credits Can Create Intergroup Competition 7 D. Affirmative Action Can Increase Expected Revenue When the Government Is Imperfectly Informed About Bidder Valuations 7 E. Affirmative Action Can Destabilize Tacit Collusion 9 II. EMPIRICISM 9 A. Describing the Licenses and the Auction Rules…

  • Overcoming Law

    Ian Ayres, Richard A Posner•ARTICLE•American Journal of Legal History•1996

    Journal Article Overcoming Law Get access Posner Richard A., Overcoming Law. Cambridge, MA.: Harvard University Press, 1995. x, 580 pp. $39.95. Ian Ayres Ian Ayres Yale Law School Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar American Journal of Legal History, Volume 40, Issue 3, July 1996, Pages 371–373, https://doi.org/10.2307/845630 Published: 01 July 1996

  • The Donation Booth

    Ian Ayres, Jeremy Bulow•ARTICLE•Stanford Law Review•1998•Cited by: 3

    In this article, Professors Ayres and Bulow argue that, instead of mandating disclosure of all campaign contributions, we should instead consider mandating that all contributions be anonymous.Just as the secret ballot makes it more difficult for candidates to buy votes, mandating anonymous donations can make it more difficult for candidates to sell access or influence.Forcing donors to funnel campaign contributions through blind trusts can discou…

  • Majoritarian vs. Minoritarian Defaults

    Ian Ayres, Robert Gertner•ARTICLE•Stanford Law Review•1999•Cited by: 1

    Recent theoretical analysis of contract default rules has devoted significant attention to the use of penalty default rules as a way to induce a contractor to reveal private information. Penalty default rules demonstrate how efficient rules cannot be derived by simply asking what most parties would have contracted for had they written a complete contract. Such "majoritarian" default rules derive from an implicit assumption about the reason why a …

  • Substitutes for Insider Trading

    Ian Ayres, Joe Bankman•ARTICLE•Stanford Law Review•2001

    When insider trading prohibitions limit the ability of insiders (or of a corporation itself) to use material non-public information to trade a particular firm's stock, there may be incentive to use the information to trade instead on the stock of that firm's rivals, suppliers, customers, or the manufacturers of complementary products. We refer to this form of trading as trading in stock substitutes. Stock substitute trading by a firm is legal. In…

  • Three Tests for Measuring Unjustified Disparate Impacts in Organ Transplantation

    Ian Ayres•ARTICLE•Perspectives in biology and…•2005

    Civil rights statutes often prohibit two distinct types of discrimination, referred to as "disparate treatment" and "disparate impact." Disparate treatment is race-contingent decision making. But even decision making that is not affected by people's race may still produce an unjustified disparate impact. For example, a race-neutral transplantation preference for allografts with partial antigen matches might produce an unjustified disparate impact…

  • Insincere Promises

    Gregory Klass, Ian Ayres•BOOK•Insincere Promises•2008

  • On Options & Epidemics

    Open Access•Ian Ayres•ARTICLE•Daedalus•2008

  • Straightforward

    Ian Ayres, Jennifer Gerarda Brown•BOOK•Straightforward•2011

    What can straight people do to support gay rights? How much work or sacrifice must allies take on to do their share? Ian Ayres and Jennifer Brown--law professors, activists, husband and wife--propose practical strategies for helping straight men and women advocate for and with the gay community. Straightforward advances a thesis that is at once simple and groundbreaking: to make real progress at the central flashpoints of controversy--marriage ri…

  • Evidence from Two Large Field Experiments that Peer Comparison Feedback Can Reduce Residential Energy Usage

    Ian Ayres, Sophie Raseman et al.•ARTICLE•The Journal of Law Economics and…•2013

    By providing feedback to customers on home electricity and natural gas usage with a focus on peer comparisons, utilities can reduce energy consumption at a low cost. We analyze data from two large-scale, random-assignment field experiments conducted by utility companies providing electricity (the Sacramento Municipal Utility District [SMUD]) and electricity and natural gas (Puget Sound Energy [PSE]), in partnership with a private company, Opower,…

  • Responsive regulation

    Open Access•Ian Ayres•ARTICLE•Regulation & Governance•2013•Cited by: 2•References: 9

    In this comment, I try to do three things: (i) set the record straight about the disproportionate contributions of my co‐author; (ii) briefly comment on the excellent articles byEtienne,Ford, andWesterman in this special issue; and (iii) describe how theResponsiveRegulationconcept of partial‐industry regulation might usefully be extended to tradable licenses and randomized regulation experiments

  • Voting with Dollars

    Bruce Ackerman, Bruce A Ackerman et al.•BOOK•Voting with Dollars•2017

    In this provocative book, two leading law professors challenge the existing campaign reform agenda and present a new initiative that avoids the mistakes of the past. Bruce Ackerman and Ian Ayres build on the example of the secret ballot and propose a system of secret donation booths” for campaign contributions. They unveil a plan in which the government provides each voter with a special credit card account containing fifty Patriot dollars” for p…

  • Affirmative action still hasn’t been shown to reduce the number of black lawyers

    Open Access•Ian Ayres, Richard Brooks et al.•ARTICLE•International Review of Law and…•2022

  • An economic rationale for the different methods of feeding enslaved people in the antebellum South and British West Indies

    Open Access•Eleanor Brown, Ian Ayres•ARTICLE•International Review of Law and…•2024

Political science (17 works) · Law (13 works) · Economics (9 works) · Computer Science (8 works) · Law (8 works) · Law and economics (8 works) · Sociology (7 works) · Business (5 works) · Law, Economics, and Judicial Systems (5 works) · Engineering (4 works)

Ethnos_APP • Open Source Project • MIT License • Frontend v2.0.0 • Privacy and Cookies • API Documentation: api.ethnos.app/docs • API Source Code: GitHub • DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.17049435 • Frontend Source Code: GitHub • DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.17050053 • cruz.rio.br • Expectantes Misericordiae