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Adam Graham-Squire

Biographic Data

ID4405445
NAMEAdam Graham-Squire
GIVEN NAMESAdam
FAMILY NAMEGraham-Squire
SIGNATUREGRAHAM-SQUIRE A
AFFILIATIONSHigh Point University
ORCID0000-0003-2302-4411
VERIFIEDYes
TOTAL WORKS4
TOTAL CITATIONS8
AUTHOR COUNT4
EDITOR COUNT0
FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR2021
LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR2026
H-INDEX2
  • New fairness criteria for truncated ballots in multi-winner ranked-choice elections

    Open Access•Adam Graham-Squire, Matthew I Jones et al.•ARTICLE•Mathematical Social Sciences•2026•References: 25

  • An Examination of Ranked-Choice Voting in the United States, 2004–2022

    Adam Graham-Squire, David Mccune•ARTICLE•Representation•2025•Cited by: 3•References: 16

    From the perspective of social choice theory, ranked-choice voting (RCV) is known to have many flaws. RCV can fail to elect a Condorcet winner and is susceptible to monotonicity paradoxes and the spoiler effect, for example. We use a database of 185 American ranked-choice elections for political office from the years 2004 to 2022 to investigate empirically how frequently RCV's deficiencies manifest in practice. Our general finding is that RCV's w…

  • Monotonicity anomalies in Scottish local government elections

    Open Access•David Mccune, Adam Graham-Squire•ARTICLE•Social Choice and Welfare•2024

    The single transferable vote (STV) voting method is used to elect multiple candidates in ranked-choice elections. One weakness of STV is that it fails multiple fairness criteria related to monotonicity and no-show paradoxes. We analyze 1079 local government STV elections in Scotland to estimate the frequency of such monotonicity anomalies in real-world elections, and compare our results with prior empirical and theoretical research about the rate…

  • Lack of Monotonicity Anomalies in Empirical Data of Instant-runoff Elections

    Adam Graham-Squire, N Zayatz•ARTICLE•Representation•2021•Cited by: 5•References: 9

    The instant runoff voting (IRV) method fails the monotonicity criterion. This means in an IRV election it is theoretically possible for a winning candidate to lose an election if certain ballots are changed to raise the otherwise winning candidate higher on the ballot. We analysed data from over 100 real-world IRV elections to ascertain if any demonstrated a monotonicity anomaly. Despite theoretical research indicating potentially high incidence …

  • Lack of Monotonicity Anomalies in Empirical Data of Instant-runoff Elections

    Adam Graham-Squire, N Zayatz•ARTICLE•Representation•2021•Cited by: 5•References: 9

    The instant runoff voting (IRV) method fails the monotonicity criterion. This means in an IRV election it is theoretically possible for a winning candidate to lose an election if certain ballots are changed to raise the otherwise winning candidate higher on the ballot. We analysed data from over 100 real-world IRV elections to ascertain if any demonstrated a monotonicity anomaly. Despite theoretical research indicating potentially high incidence …

  • An Examination of Ranked-Choice Voting in the United States, 2004–2022

    Adam Graham-Squire, David Mccune•ARTICLE•Representation•2025•Cited by: 3•References: 16

    From the perspective of social choice theory, ranked-choice voting (RCV) is known to have many flaws. RCV can fail to elect a Condorcet winner and is susceptible to monotonicity paradoxes and the spoiler effect, for example. We use a database of 185 American ranked-choice elections for political office from the years 2004 to 2022 to investigate empirically how frequently RCV's deficiencies manifest in practice. Our general finding is that RCV's w…

  • Lack of Monotonicity Anomalies in Empirical Data of Instant-runoff Elections

    Adam Graham-Squire, N Zayatz•ARTICLE•Representation•2021•Cited by: 5•References: 9

    The instant runoff voting (IRV) method fails the monotonicity criterion. This means in an IRV election it is theoretically possible for a winning candidate to lose an election if certain ballots are changed to raise the otherwise winning candidate higher on the ballot. We analysed data from over 100 real-world IRV elections to ascertain if any demonstrated a monotonicity anomaly. Despite theoretical research indicating potentially high incidence …

  • Monotonicity anomalies in Scottish local government elections

    Open Access•David Mccune, Adam Graham-Squire•ARTICLE•Social Choice and Welfare•2024

    The single transferable vote (STV) voting method is used to elect multiple candidates in ranked-choice elections. One weakness of STV is that it fails multiple fairness criteria related to monotonicity and no-show paradoxes. We analyze 1079 local government STV elections in Scotland to estimate the frequency of such monotonicity anomalies in real-world elections, and compare our results with prior empirical and theoretical research about the rate…

  • An Examination of Ranked-Choice Voting in the United States, 2004–2022

    Adam Graham-Squire, David Mccune•ARTICLE•Representation•2025•Cited by: 3•References: 16

    From the perspective of social choice theory, ranked-choice voting (RCV) is known to have many flaws. RCV can fail to elect a Condorcet winner and is susceptible to monotonicity paradoxes and the spoiler effect, for example. We use a database of 185 American ranked-choice elections for political office from the years 2004 to 2022 to investigate empirically how frequently RCV's deficiencies manifest in practice. Our general finding is that RCV's w…

  • New fairness criteria for truncated ballots in multi-winner ranked-choice elections

    Open Access•Adam Graham-Squire, Matthew I Jones et al.•ARTICLE•Mathematical Social Sciences•2026•References: 25

Electoral Systems and Political Participation (4 works) · Game Theory and Voting Systems (4 works) · Economics (3 works) · Law (3 works) · Political science (3 works) · Voting (3 works) · Ballot (2 works) · Econometrics (2 works) · Law (2 works) · Mathematics (2 works)

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