Joel S Hellman
Biographic Data
| ID | 4409951 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Joel S Hellman |
| GIVEN NAMES | Joel S |
| FAMILY NAME | Hellman |
| SIGNATURE | HELLMAN J S |
| AFFILIATIONS | World Bank |
| VERIFIED | No |
| TOTAL WORKS | 5 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 394 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 5 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 1998 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2004 |
| H-INDEX | 1 |
Anticorruption in Transition 2
No AccessStand Alone Books1 Feb 2013Anticorruption in Transition 2Corruption in Enterprise-State Interactions in Europe and Central Asia 1999 - 2002Authors/Editors: Cheryl Gray, Joel Hellman, Randi RytermanCheryl Gray, Joel Hellman, Randi Rytermanhttps://doi.org/10.1596/0-8213-5808-1SectionsAboutPDF (0.8 MB) ToolsAdd to favoritesDownload CitationsTrack Citations ShareFacebookTwitterLinked In Abstract:Controlling corruption is an essential part of…
Seize the state, seize the day
Measuring Governance, Corruption, and State Capture
April 2000 - In a new approach to measuring typically subjective variables, BEEPS - the 1999 Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey, the transition economies component of the World Business Environment Survey - quantitatively assesses governance from the perspective of about 3,000 firms in 20 countries. Unbundling the measurement of governance and corruption empirically suggests the importance of grand corruption in some countries…
Seize the State, Seize the Day
The main challenge of the transition has been to redefine how the state interacts with firms, but little attention has been paid to the flip side of the relationship : how firms influence the state - especially how they exert influence on, and collude with public officials to extract advantages. Some firms in transition economies have been able to shape the rules of the game to their own advantage, at considerable social cost, creating what the a…
Winners Take All
Conventional models of the politics of economic reform tend to be based on an assumption about the costs and benefits of reform, known informally as the J-curve. Reforms are expected to make things worse before they get better. This presents a classic time inconsistency dilemma for reformist governments forced to demand severe sacrifices from the public in the short term for the mere promise of future gains. In response, political economy models …
Winners Take All
Conventional models of the politics of economic reform tend to be based on an assumption about the costs and benefits of reform, known informally as the J-curve. Reforms are expected to make things worse before they get better. This presents a classic time inconsistency dilemma for reformist governments forced to demand severe sacrifices from the public in the short term for the mere promise of future gains. In response, political economy models …
Winners Take All
Conventional models of the politics of economic reform tend to be based on an assumption about the costs and benefits of reform, known informally as the J-curve. Reforms are expected to make things worse before they get better. This presents a classic time inconsistency dilemma for reformist governments forced to demand severe sacrifices from the public in the short term for the mere promise of future gains. In response, political economy models …
Measuring Governance, Corruption, and State Capture
April 2000 - In a new approach to measuring typically subjective variables, BEEPS - the 1999 Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey, the transition economies component of the World Business Environment Survey - quantitatively assesses governance from the perspective of about 3,000 firms in 20 countries. Unbundling the measurement of governance and corruption empirically suggests the importance of grand corruption in some countries…
Seize the State, Seize the Day
The main challenge of the transition has been to redefine how the state interacts with firms, but little attention has been paid to the flip side of the relationship : how firms influence the state - especially how they exert influence on, and collude with public officials to extract advantages. Some firms in transition economies have been able to shape the rules of the game to their own advantage, at considerable social cost, creating what the a…
Seize the state, seize the day
Anticorruption in Transition 2
No AccessStand Alone Books1 Feb 2013Anticorruption in Transition 2Corruption in Enterprise-State Interactions in Europe and Central Asia 1999 - 2002Authors/Editors: Cheryl Gray, Joel Hellman, Randi RytermanCheryl Gray, Joel Hellman, Randi Rytermanhttps://doi.org/10.1596/0-8213-5808-1SectionsAboutPDF (0.8 MB) ToolsAdd to favoritesDownload CitationsTrack Citations ShareFacebookTwitterLinked In Abstract:Controlling corruption is an essential part of…
Economics (5 works) · Market economy (5 works) · Business (4 works) · Corruption and Economic Development (4 works) · Finance (4 works) · Finance (3 works) · Language change (3 works) · Political science (3 works) · Corporate Finance and Governance (2 works) · Corporate governance (2 works)