Hakan Günaydın
Biographic Data
| ID | 4418723 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Hakan Günaydın |
| GIVEN NAMES | Hakan |
| FAMILY NAME | Günaydın |
| SIGNATURE | GUNAYDIN H |
| AFFILIATIONS | University of Konstanz |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-7068-524X |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 4 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 101 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 4 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2018 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2023 |
| H-INDEX | 4 |
Sovereignty Intrusion
The global populist backlash is considered threatening to the multilateral order, but its impact on individual attitudes toward international organizations, like the International Monetary Fund (IMF), is understudied. We bridge insights from research on the IMF and populism to develop a theoretical framework centered on three propositions. We argue that populist individuals should be more prone to blame the IMF for economic problems than non-popu…
When Technocratic Appointments Signal Credibility
How do prime ministers manage investors’ expectations during financial crises? We take a novel approach to this question by investigating ministerial appointments. When prime ministers appoint technocrats, defined as non-partisan experts, they forgo political benefits and can credibly signal their willingness to pay down their debt obligations. This reduces bond yields, but only at times when the market is sensitive to expected repayments—that is…
Commitment or expertise? Technocratic appointments as political responses to economic crises
Why do prime ministers or presidents appoint non‐elected experts, also known as technocrats, during economic crises? Do they appoint them for their expertise or for their commitment to pro‐market reforms? Answering this question is crucial for understanding and predicting the longer‐term role of technocrats in democracies. With the aid of unique data on the political and personal background of finance ministers in 13 parliamentary and semi‐presid…
Who Can Reform the Labor Market? IMF Conditionality, Partisanship, and Labor Unions
Labor market reforms are critical for economic growth. Yet, they are politically contentious, and governments, more often than not, are faced with strong opposition from interest groups. Scholarly work shows that governments often rely on external intervention to implement politically difficult reforms. This is the case with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) that typically conditions its financing on the implementation of required reforms. Do…
Commitment or expertise? Technocratic appointments as political responses to economic crises
Why do prime ministers or presidents appoint non‐elected experts, also known as technocrats, during economic crises? Do they appoint them for their expertise or for their commitment to pro‐market reforms? Answering this question is crucial for understanding and predicting the longer‐term role of technocrats in democracies. With the aid of unique data on the political and personal background of finance ministers in 13 parliamentary and semi‐presid…
When Technocratic Appointments Signal Credibility
How do prime ministers manage investors’ expectations during financial crises? We take a novel approach to this question by investigating ministerial appointments. When prime ministers appoint technocrats, defined as non-partisan experts, they forgo political benefits and can credibly signal their willingness to pay down their debt obligations. This reduces bond yields, but only at times when the market is sensitive to expected repayments—that is…
Sovereignty Intrusion
The global populist backlash is considered threatening to the multilateral order, but its impact on individual attitudes toward international organizations, like the International Monetary Fund (IMF), is understudied. We bridge insights from research on the IMF and populism to develop a theoretical framework centered on three propositions. We argue that populist individuals should be more prone to blame the IMF for economic problems than non-popu…
Who Can Reform the Labor Market? IMF Conditionality, Partisanship, and Labor Unions
Labor market reforms are critical for economic growth. Yet, they are politically contentious, and governments, more often than not, are faced with strong opposition from interest groups. Scholarly work shows that governments often rely on external intervention to implement politically difficult reforms. This is the case with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) that typically conditions its financing on the implementation of required reforms. Do…
Who Can Reform the Labor Market? IMF Conditionality, Partisanship, and Labor Unions
Labor market reforms are critical for economic growth. Yet, they are politically contentious, and governments, more often than not, are faced with strong opposition from interest groups. Scholarly work shows that governments often rely on external intervention to implement politically difficult reforms. This is the case with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) that typically conditions its financing on the implementation of required reforms. Do…
Commitment or expertise? Technocratic appointments as political responses to economic crises
Why do prime ministers or presidents appoint non‐elected experts, also known as technocrats, during economic crises? Do they appoint them for their expertise or for their commitment to pro‐market reforms? Answering this question is crucial for understanding and predicting the longer‐term role of technocrats in democracies. With the aid of unique data on the political and personal background of finance ministers in 13 parliamentary and semi‐presid…
When Technocratic Appointments Signal Credibility
How do prime ministers manage investors’ expectations during financial crises? We take a novel approach to this question by investigating ministerial appointments. When prime ministers appoint technocrats, defined as non-partisan experts, they forgo political benefits and can credibly signal their willingness to pay down their debt obligations. This reduces bond yields, but only at times when the market is sensitive to expected repayments—that is…
Sovereignty Intrusion
The global populist backlash is considered threatening to the multilateral order, but its impact on individual attitudes toward international organizations, like the International Monetary Fund (IMF), is understudied. We bridge insights from research on the IMF and populism to develop a theoretical framework centered on three propositions. We argue that populist individuals should be more prone to blame the IMF for economic problems than non-popu…
Economics (4 works) · Law (4 works) · Law (4 works) · Political economy (4 works) · Political science (4 works) · Politics (4 works) · Social Policy and Reform Studies (3 works) · Finance (2 works) · Finance (2 works) · International Development and Aid (2 works)