Peter Juslin
Biographic Data
| ID | 4436743 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Peter Juslin |
| GIVEN NAMES | Peter |
| FAMILY NAME | Juslin |
| SIGNATURE | JUSLIN P |
| AFFILIATIONS | Uppsala University |
| ORCID | 0000-0001-9594-2153 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 15 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 10 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 14 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 1 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 1997 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2025 |
| H-INDEX | 2 |
Enriching Psychological Research by Exploring the Source and Nature of Noise
In psychological research, noise is often considered a nuisance that obscures rather than contributes information. This simplification overlooks that noise can be informative and that by exploring the nature of the noise one can often draw additional conclusions concerning the underlying psychological processes. It is arguably only in recent years that the mainstream of researchers has taken this idea to heart and demonstrated that it can lead to…
Further perceptions of probability
To adapt to an uncertain world, humans must learn event probabilities. These probabilities may be stationary, such as that of rolling a 6 on a die, or changing over time, like the probability of rainfall over the year. Research on how people estimate and track changing probabilities has recently reopened an old epistemological issue. A small, mostly recent literature finds that people accurately track the probability and change their estimates on…
Preceding Options Affect Subsequent Listwise but Not Pairwise Choice, Even for Experts
Recent theories of decision‐making, such as Decision by Sampling, suggest that people lack stable preferences. Instead, preferences are malleable and constructed in the moment by comparisons of target attributes to small samples of attribute values active in working memory. Manipulating the distribution of attribute values observed before a choice has therefore been suggested to affect subsequent choices. In a series of four experiments, we inves…
Is numerical information always beneficial? Verbal and numerical cue-integration in additive and non-additive tasks
When people use rule-based integration of abstracted cues to make multiple-cue judgments they tend to default to linear additive integration of the cues, which may interfere with efficient learning in non-additive tasks. We hypothesize that this effect becomes especially pronounced when cues are presented numerically rather than verbally, because numbers elicit expectations about a task with a simple numerical solution that can be appropriately a…
Sampling in Judgment and Decision Making
Sampling approaches to judgment and decision making are distinct from traditional accounts in psychology and neuroscience. While these traditional accounts focus on limitations of the human mind as a major source of bounded rationality, the sampling approach originates in a broader cognitive-ecological perspective. It starts from the fundamental assumption that in order to understand intra-psychic cognitive processes one first has to understand t…
Getting the signal – Do electricity users meet the preconditions for making informed decisions on demand response
Demand response refers to changes in power consumption by electricity users in response to certain conditions on the electricity market. Anticipated to play a major role in the energy transition, demand response is conventionally exercised through network tariffs, which serve as a medium for price signals intended to incentivize and guide electricity users on how to best behave. Considerable attention has been devoted to the unresolved question o…
Sampling in Judgment and Decision Making
On the generality and cognitive basis of base-rate neglect
Base rate neglect refers to people's apparent tendency to underweight or even ignore base rate information when estimating posterior probabilities for events, such as the probability that a person with a positive cancer-test outcome actually does have cancer. While often replicated, almost all evidence for the phenomenon comes from studies that used problems with extremely low base rates, high hit rates, and low false alarm rates. It is currently…
Precise/not precise (PNP)
In 1956, Brunswik proposed a definition of what he called intuitive and analytic cognitive processes, not in terms of verbally specified properties, but operationally based on the observable error distributions. In the decades since, the diagnostic value of error distributions has generally been overlooked, arguably because of a long tradition to consider the error as exogenous (and irrelevant) to the process. Based on Brunswik’s ideas, we develo…
Neurocognitive processes underlying heuristic and normative probability judgments
Different strokes for different folks? Comparing pro-environmental intentions between electricity consumers and solar prosumers in Sweden
When households invest in photovoltaics, they change from being electricity consumers to solar prosumers, a change that is often implied to also positively affect other pro-environmental behaviours. This article presents a comparison between Swedish consumers and prosumers (N = 460), concerning (i) whether consumers and prosumers engage in pro-environmental behaviours for different reasons, and (ii) whether prosumers and consumers differ in their…
Preference or ability
Key issues in the behavioral sciences are if there exist stable risk preferences that generalize across domains and if these are best measured by revealed risk preference (RRP) in behavioral decision tasks or by surveys eliciting stated risk preference (SRP). We applied network analysis to data from a representative Swedish sample to investigate the relations between RRP, SRP, personality characteristics, and cognitive abilities, using in total o…
Individuals and dyads in a multiple-cue judgment task
Brunswikian and Thurstonian Origins of Bias in Probability Assessment
Uppsala University, SwedenABSTRACTIn this paper the Brunswikian framework provided by the theory of ProbabilisticMental Models (PMM), and other theoretical stances inspired by probabilisticfunctionalism, is combined with the Thurstonian notion of a stochastic com-ponent of judgment. We review data from 25 tasks with representative selection ofitems collected in our laboratory. Over/underconfidence is close to zero in mostdomains, but there is a m…
Brunswikian and Thurstonian Origins of Bias in Probability Assessment
In this paper the Brunswikian framework provided by the theory of Probabilistic Mental Models (PMM), and other theoretical stances inspired by probabilistic functionalism, is combined with the Thurstonian notion of a stochastic component of judgment. We review data from 25 tasks with representative selection of items collected in our laboratory. Over/underconfidence is close to zero in most domains, but there is a moderate hard–easy effect across…
Different strokes for different folks? Comparing pro-environmental intentions between electricity consumers and solar prosumers in Sweden
When households invest in photovoltaics, they change from being electricity consumers to solar prosumers, a change that is often implied to also positively affect other pro-environmental behaviours. This article presents a comparison between Swedish consumers and prosumers (N = 460), concerning (i) whether consumers and prosumers engage in pro-environmental behaviours for different reasons, and (ii) whether prosumers and consumers differ in their…
Getting the signal – Do electricity users meet the preconditions for making informed decisions on demand response
Demand response refers to changes in power consumption by electricity users in response to certain conditions on the electricity market. Anticipated to play a major role in the energy transition, demand response is conventionally exercised through network tariffs, which serve as a medium for price signals intended to incentivize and guide electricity users on how to best behave. Considerable attention has been devoted to the unresolved question o…
Preference or ability
Key issues in the behavioral sciences are if there exist stable risk preferences that generalize across domains and if these are best measured by revealed risk preference (RRP) in behavioral decision tasks or by surveys eliciting stated risk preference (SRP). We applied network analysis to data from a representative Swedish sample to investigate the relations between RRP, SRP, personality characteristics, and cognitive abilities, using in total o…
Brunswikian and Thurstonian Origins of Bias in Probability Assessment
Uppsala University, SwedenABSTRACTIn this paper the Brunswikian framework provided by the theory of ProbabilisticMental Models (PMM), and other theoretical stances inspired by probabilisticfunctionalism, is combined with the Thurstonian notion of a stochastic com-ponent of judgment. We review data from 25 tasks with representative selection ofitems collected in our laboratory. Over/underconfidence is close to zero in mostdomains, but there is a m…
Brunswikian and Thurstonian Origins of Bias in Probability Assessment
In this paper the Brunswikian framework provided by the theory of Probabilistic Mental Models (PMM), and other theoretical stances inspired by probabilistic functionalism, is combined with the Thurstonian notion of a stochastic component of judgment. We review data from 25 tasks with representative selection of items collected in our laboratory. Over/underconfidence is close to zero in most domains, but there is a moderate hard–easy effect across…
Individuals and dyads in a multiple-cue judgment task
Neurocognitive processes underlying heuristic and normative probability judgments
Different strokes for different folks? Comparing pro-environmental intentions between electricity consumers and solar prosumers in Sweden
When households invest in photovoltaics, they change from being electricity consumers to solar prosumers, a change that is often implied to also positively affect other pro-environmental behaviours. This article presents a comparison between Swedish consumers and prosumers (N = 460), concerning (i) whether consumers and prosumers engage in pro-environmental behaviours for different reasons, and (ii) whether prosumers and consumers differ in their…
Preference or ability
Key issues in the behavioral sciences are if there exist stable risk preferences that generalize across domains and if these are best measured by revealed risk preference (RRP) in behavioral decision tasks or by surveys eliciting stated risk preference (SRP). We applied network analysis to data from a representative Swedish sample to investigate the relations between RRP, SRP, personality characteristics, and cognitive abilities, using in total o…
Precise/not precise (PNP)
In 1956, Brunswik proposed a definition of what he called intuitive and analytic cognitive processes, not in terms of verbally specified properties, but operationally based on the observable error distributions. In the decades since, the diagnostic value of error distributions has generally been overlooked, arguably because of a long tradition to consider the error as exogenous (and irrelevant) to the process. Based on Brunswik’s ideas, we develo…
On the generality and cognitive basis of base-rate neglect
Base rate neglect refers to people's apparent tendency to underweight or even ignore base rate information when estimating posterior probabilities for events, such as the probability that a person with a positive cancer-test outcome actually does have cancer. While often replicated, almost all evidence for the phenomenon comes from studies that used problems with extremely low base rates, high hit rates, and low false alarm rates. It is currently…
Is numerical information always beneficial? Verbal and numerical cue-integration in additive and non-additive tasks
When people use rule-based integration of abstracted cues to make multiple-cue judgments they tend to default to linear additive integration of the cues, which may interfere with efficient learning in non-additive tasks. We hypothesize that this effect becomes especially pronounced when cues are presented numerically rather than verbally, because numbers elicit expectations about a task with a simple numerical solution that can be appropriately a…
Sampling in Judgment and Decision Making
Sampling approaches to judgment and decision making are distinct from traditional accounts in psychology and neuroscience. While these traditional accounts focus on limitations of the human mind as a major source of bounded rationality, the sampling approach originates in a broader cognitive-ecological perspective. It starts from the fundamental assumption that in order to understand intra-psychic cognitive processes one first has to understand t…
Getting the signal – Do electricity users meet the preconditions for making informed decisions on demand response
Demand response refers to changes in power consumption by electricity users in response to certain conditions on the electricity market. Anticipated to play a major role in the energy transition, demand response is conventionally exercised through network tariffs, which serve as a medium for price signals intended to incentivize and guide electricity users on how to best behave. Considerable attention has been devoted to the unresolved question o…
Sampling in Judgment and Decision Making
Enriching Psychological Research by Exploring the Source and Nature of Noise
In psychological research, noise is often considered a nuisance that obscures rather than contributes information. This simplification overlooks that noise can be informative and that by exploring the nature of the noise one can often draw additional conclusions concerning the underlying psychological processes. It is arguably only in recent years that the mainstream of researchers has taken this idea to heart and demonstrated that it can lead to…
Further perceptions of probability
To adapt to an uncertain world, humans must learn event probabilities. These probabilities may be stationary, such as that of rolling a 6 on a die, or changing over time, like the probability of rainfall over the year. Research on how people estimate and track changing probabilities has recently reopened an old epistemological issue. A small, mostly recent literature finds that people accurately track the probability and change their estimates on…
Preceding Options Affect Subsequent Listwise but Not Pairwise Choice, Even for Experts
Recent theories of decision‐making, such as Decision by Sampling, suggest that people lack stable preferences. Instead, preferences are malleable and constructed in the moment by comparisons of target attributes to small samples of attribute values active in working memory. Manipulating the distribution of attribute values observed before a choice has therefore been suggested to affect subsequent choices. In a series of four experiments, we inves…
Psychology (12 works) · Computer Science (10 works) · Cognitive psychology (9 works) · Decision-Making and Behavioral Economics (8 works) · Artificial Intelligence (7 works) · Cognition (6 works) · Social Psychology (6 works) · Mathematics (5 works) · Statistics (4 works) · Artificial Intelligence (3 works)