Daniel Spiro
Biographic Data
| ID | 4453611 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Daniel Spiro |
| GIVEN NAMES | Daniel |
| FAMILY NAME | Spiro |
| SIGNATURE | SPIRO D |
| AFFILIATIONS | Uppsala University |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-6819-832X |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 2 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 1 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 2 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2025 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2025 |
| H-INDEX | 1 |
The dynamics of revolutions
This paper answers two questions: 1) Why do revolutions sometimes start with moderate opponents of the regime, like in the Egyptian Arab Spring in 2011 and in the USSR in 1989-1991? 2) Why does the implementation of popular policies, such as Perestroika, sometimes trigger a revolution? Existing theories invariably predict that none of this should happen. We show that answers can be provided by extending Kuran’s (1989) dynamic model of mass protes…
Winners and losers of a Russian oil-export restriction
Russia has on several occasions threatened to limit its oil exports as part of its energy-economic warfare. Using a quantifiable short-run model of oil trade and detailed production and consumption data, this paper evaluates the winners and losers of potential Russian oil-export reductions and connects these to the potential interests of the Russian regime, including Russia’s oil producers and consumers and its international friends and foes. We …
Winners and losers of a Russian oil-export restriction
Russia has on several occasions threatened to limit its oil exports as part of its energy-economic warfare. Using a quantifiable short-run model of oil trade and detailed production and consumption data, this paper evaluates the winners and losers of potential Russian oil-export reductions and connects these to the potential interests of the Russian regime, including Russia’s oil producers and consumers and its international friends and foes. We …
The dynamics of revolutions
This paper answers two questions: 1) Why do revolutions sometimes start with moderate opponents of the regime, like in the Egyptian Arab Spring in 2011 and in the USSR in 1989-1991? 2) Why does the implementation of popular policies, such as Perestroika, sometimes trigger a revolution? Existing theories invariably predict that none of this should happen. We show that answers can be provided by extending Kuran’s (1989) dynamic model of mass protes…
Winners and losers of a Russian oil-export restriction
Russia has on several occasions threatened to limit its oil exports as part of its energy-economic warfare. Using a quantifiable short-run model of oil trade and detailed production and consumption data, this paper evaluates the winners and losers of potential Russian oil-export reductions and connects these to the potential interests of the Russian regime, including Russia’s oil producers and consumers and its international friends and foes. We …
Economics (2 works) · Communism (1 works) · Democracy (1 works) · Development economics (1 works) · Dissent (1 works) · Economic history (1 works) · Global Energy Security and Policy (1 works) · History (1 works) · International economics (1 works) · International trade (1 works)