Maarten Van Doorn
Biographic Data
| ID | 4460183 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Maarten Van Doorn |
| GIVEN NAMES | Maarten |
| FAMILY NAME | Van Doorn |
| SIGNATURE | VAN DOORN M |
| AFFILIATIONS | Taal & Communicatie, Radboud University, Nijmegen, The Netherlands |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-6943-462X |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 4 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 0 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 4 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2023 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2025 |
| H-INDEX | 0 |
Misinformation, observational equivalence and the possibility of rationality
In vice epistemology, bad epistemic outcomes, such as maintaining false beliefs, are interpreted as indicators of blameworthy irrationality. Conversely, a growing trend in philosophical psychology advocates for environmentalist explanations, suggesting these outcomes emerge because rational cognitive processes of faultless individuals falter due to polluted environmental inputs. Building on concrete examples, I first offer a systematic analysis o…
The skeptical import of motivated reasoning: A closer look at the evidence
Central to many discussions of motivated reasoning is the idea that it runs afoul of epistemic normativity. Reasoning differently about information supporting our prior beliefs versus information contradicting those beliefs, is frequently equated with motivated irrationality. By analyzing the normative status of belief polarization, selective scrutiny, biased assimilation and the myside bias, I show this inference is often not adequately supporte…
How Partisanship Can Moderate the Influence of Communicated Information on the Beliefs of Agents Aiming to Form True Beliefs
Contains fulltext : 309671.pdf (Publisher’s version ) (Open Access
Advancing the debate on the consequences of misinformation: Clarifying why it’s not (just) about false beliefs
The debate on whether and why misinformation is bad primarily focuses on the spread of false beliefs as its main harm. From the assumption that misinformation primarily causes harm through the spread of false beliefs as a starting point, it has been contended that the problem of misinformation has been exaggerated. Its tendency to generate false beliefs appears to be limited. However, the near-exclusive focus on whether or not misinformation dupe…
No prominent works on this page.
Advancing the debate on the consequences of misinformation: Clarifying why it’s not (just) about false beliefs
The debate on whether and why misinformation is bad primarily focuses on the spread of false beliefs as its main harm. From the assumption that misinformation primarily causes harm through the spread of false beliefs as a starting point, it has been contended that the problem of misinformation has been exaggerated. Its tendency to generate false beliefs appears to be limited. However, the near-exclusive focus on whether or not misinformation dupe…
The skeptical import of motivated reasoning: A closer look at the evidence
Central to many discussions of motivated reasoning is the idea that it runs afoul of epistemic normativity. Reasoning differently about information supporting our prior beliefs versus information contradicting those beliefs, is frequently equated with motivated irrationality. By analyzing the normative status of belief polarization, selective scrutiny, biased assimilation and the myside bias, I show this inference is often not adequately supporte…
How Partisanship Can Moderate the Influence of Communicated Information on the Beliefs of Agents Aiming to Form True Beliefs
Contains fulltext : 309671.pdf (Publisher’s version ) (Open Access
Misinformation, observational equivalence and the possibility of rationality
In vice epistemology, bad epistemic outcomes, such as maintaining false beliefs, are interpreted as indicators of blameworthy irrationality. Conversely, a growing trend in philosophical psychology advocates for environmentalist explanations, suggesting these outcomes emerge because rational cognitive processes of faultless individuals falter due to polluted environmental inputs. Building on concrete examples, I first offer a systematic analysis o…
Misinformation and Its Impacts (4 works) · Psychology (4 works) · Epistemology (3 works) · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics (3 works) · Misinformation (3 works) · Philosophy (3 works) · Social Psychology (3 works) · Cognitive psychology (2 works) · Inference (2 works) · Law (2 works)