Rena Beatrice Goldstein
Biographic Data
| ID | 4460184 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Rena Beatrice Goldstein |
| GIVEN NAMES | Rena Beatrice |
| FAMILY NAME | Goldstein |
| SIGNATURE | GOLDSTEIN R B |
| AFFILIATIONS | Flagler College |
| ORCID | 0000-0001-9183-9917 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 3 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 0 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 3 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2024 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2026 |
| H-INDEX | 0 |
“Epistemic Disadvantage in Open Science Practices”
Open science advocates aim to address epistemic injustice and global power asymmetries in research infrastructures yet underestimate structural vulnerabilities and risks embedded in data sharing practices. Drawing on an ethnographic study of the GCRF South–South Migration Inequality and Development Hub’s (MIDEQ), we argue that even well-intentioned systems, such as the MIDEQ hub, do not reach these vulnerabilities. To capture these overlooked har…
Epistemic disadvantage and looping breaks
While Gauld et al. correctly argue that warranted clinical exclusion of patient narratives need not constitute epistemic injustice, this paper introduces epistemic disadvantage, a coextensive but distinct category of harm. Drawing on its three conditions, I show how epistemic harm persists even when exclusions are non-prejudicial and justified, contributing to clinical ethical obligations
Epistemic Injustice in the Medical Context
No prominent works on this page.
Epistemic Injustice in the Medical Context
“Epistemic Disadvantage in Open Science Practices”
Open science advocates aim to address epistemic injustice and global power asymmetries in research infrastructures yet underestimate structural vulnerabilities and risks embedded in data sharing practices. Drawing on an ethnographic study of the GCRF South–South Migration Inequality and Development Hub’s (MIDEQ), we argue that even well-intentioned systems, such as the MIDEQ hub, do not reach these vulnerabilities. To capture these overlooked har…
Epistemic disadvantage and looping breaks
While Gauld et al. correctly argue that warranted clinical exclusion of patient narratives need not constitute epistemic injustice, this paper introduces epistemic disadvantage, a coextensive but distinct category of harm. Drawing on its three conditions, I show how epistemic harm persists even when exclusions are non-prejudicial and justified, contributing to clinical ethical obligations
Feminist Epistemology and Gender Studies (3 works) · Disadvantage (2 works) · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics (2 works) · Context (archaeology (1 works) · Episteme (1 works) · Epistemology (1 works) · Ethics and Social Impacts of AI (1 works) · Ethics in medical practice (1 works) · Ethnography (1 works) · Global Health and Surgery (1 works)