Patricio A Fernández
Biographic Data
| ID | 4500612 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Patricio A Fernández |
| GIVEN NAMES | Patricio A |
| FAMILY NAME | Fernández |
| SIGNATURE | FERNÁNDEZ P A |
| AFFILIATIONS | Department of Philosophy, University of California Santa Barbara USA |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-1666-9249 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 7 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 8 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 6 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 1 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2014 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2024 |
| H-INDEX | 1 |
Aristotle on the Perfections of Virtuous Action
In Nicomachean Ethics 2.4 Aristotle distinguishes between virtuous action and acting virtuously: a virtuous action counts as virtuously performed if done with knowledge, chosen for its own sake, and from a stable character. Since the ‘same’ action can be performed virtuously or non-virtuously, interpreters have concluded that these ‘agential conditions’ are indifferent incidental features with no bearing on the virtuous character of the action. I…
Ways of Being Bound: Perspectives from post-Kantian Philosophy and Relational Sociology
Ways of Being Bound: Perspectives from Post-Kantian Philosophy and Relational Sociology
The Doing of Justice and the Priority of Acting from Virtue
Aristotle famously distinguishes between merely doing a virtuous action and acting in the way in which a virtuous person would. Against an interpretation prominent in recent scholarship, I argue that ‘acting virtuously,’ in the sense of exercising a virtue actually possessed, is prior to ‘virtuous action,’ understood generically. I propose that the latter notion is best understood as a derivative abstraction from the former, building upon a readi…
Ἡ Κίνησις Τῆς Τέχνης: Crafts and Souls as Principles of Change
Aristotle’s soul is a first principle (an ‘efficient cause’) of every vital change in an animal, in the way that a craft is a cause of its product’s coming-to-be. We argue that the soul’s causal efficacy cannot therefore be reduced to the formal constitution of vital phenomena, or to discrete interventions into independently constituted processes, but involves the exercise of vital powers. This reading does better justice to Aristotle’s conceptio…
Practical Reasoning: Where the Action Is
Widespread conceptions of practical reasoning confront us with a choice between its practicality and its objectivity: between its efficacious, world-changing character and its accountability to objective rational standards. This choice becomes unnecessary, I argue, on an alternative view embodied by the thesis that the conclusion of practical reasoning is an action. I lay bare and challenge the assumptions underlying the rejection of that thesis …
Reasoning and the Unity of Aristotle’s Account of Animal Motion
This chapter starts with an introduction to the notion of animal motion. Our actions are those of an animal, it states. It asks the following questions: are we the sort of animal that can think about what to do? What difference does that capability make when our actions are compared with those of the other animals that act? Aristotle has important things to teach us on these questions. The chapter starts its examination of these questions with a …
Practical Reasoning: Where the Action Is
Widespread conceptions of practical reasoning confront us with a choice between its practicality and its objectivity: between its efficacious, world-changing character and its accountability to objective rational standards. This choice becomes unnecessary, I argue, on an alternative view embodied by the thesis that the conclusion of practical reasoning is an action. I lay bare and challenge the assumptions underlying the rejection of that thesis …
The Doing of Justice and the Priority of Acting from Virtue
Aristotle famously distinguishes between merely doing a virtuous action and acting in the way in which a virtuous person would. Against an interpretation prominent in recent scholarship, I argue that ‘acting virtuously,’ in the sense of exercising a virtue actually possessed, is prior to ‘virtuous action,’ understood generically. I propose that the latter notion is best understood as a derivative abstraction from the former, building upon a readi…
Ἡ Κίνησις Τῆς Τέχνης: Crafts and Souls as Principles of Change
Aristotle’s soul is a first principle (an ‘efficient cause’) of every vital change in an animal, in the way that a craft is a cause of its product’s coming-to-be. We argue that the soul’s causal efficacy cannot therefore be reduced to the formal constitution of vital phenomena, or to discrete interventions into independently constituted processes, but involves the exercise of vital powers. This reading does better justice to Aristotle’s conceptio…
Reasoning and the Unity of Aristotle’s Account of Animal Motion
This chapter starts with an introduction to the notion of animal motion. Our actions are those of an animal, it states. It asks the following questions: are we the sort of animal that can think about what to do? What difference does that capability make when our actions are compared with those of the other animals that act? Aristotle has important things to teach us on these questions. The chapter starts its examination of these questions with a …
Practical Reasoning: Where the Action Is
Widespread conceptions of practical reasoning confront us with a choice between its practicality and its objectivity: between its efficacious, world-changing character and its accountability to objective rational standards. This choice becomes unnecessary, I argue, on an alternative view embodied by the thesis that the conclusion of practical reasoning is an action. I lay bare and challenge the assumptions underlying the rejection of that thesis …
Ἡ Κίνησις Τῆς Τέχνης: Crafts and Souls as Principles of Change
Aristotle’s soul is a first principle (an ‘efficient cause’) of every vital change in an animal, in the way that a craft is a cause of its product’s coming-to-be. We argue that the soul’s causal efficacy cannot therefore be reduced to the formal constitution of vital phenomena, or to discrete interventions into independently constituted processes, but involves the exercise of vital powers. This reading does better justice to Aristotle’s conceptio…
The Doing of Justice and the Priority of Acting from Virtue
Aristotle famously distinguishes between merely doing a virtuous action and acting in the way in which a virtuous person would. Against an interpretation prominent in recent scholarship, I argue that ‘acting virtuously,’ in the sense of exercising a virtue actually possessed, is prior to ‘virtuous action,’ understood generically. I propose that the latter notion is best understood as a derivative abstraction from the former, building upon a readi…
Ways of Being Bound: Perspectives from post-Kantian Philosophy and Relational Sociology
Ways of Being Bound: Perspectives from Post-Kantian Philosophy and Relational Sociology
Aristotle on the Perfections of Virtuous Action
In Nicomachean Ethics 2.4 Aristotle distinguishes between virtuous action and acting virtuously: a virtuous action counts as virtuously performed if done with knowledge, chosen for its own sake, and from a stable character. Since the ‘same’ action can be performed virtuously or non-virtuously, interpreters have concluded that these ‘agential conditions’ are indifferent incidental features with no bearing on the virtuous character of the action. I…
Epistemology (6 works) · Philosophy (5 works) · Philosophy (4 works) · Action (physics (3 works) · Ancient philosophy (3 works) · Classical Philosophy and Thought (3 works) · Law (3 works) · Political science (3 works) · Cognitive science (2 works) · Computer Science (2 works)