David Killoren
Biographic Data
| ID | 4503189 |
|---|---|
| NAME | David Killoren |
| GIVEN NAMES | David |
| FAMILY NAME | Killoren |
| SIGNATURE | KILLOREN D |
| AFFILIATIONS | University of Wisconsin–Madison |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-3986-7803 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 6 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 0 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 5 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 1 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2010 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2023 |
| H-INDEX | 0 |
Three and a half ways to a hybrid view in animal ethics
The Ethics of Deliberate Exposure to Sars‐CoV‐2 to Induce Immunity
We explore the ethics of deliberately exposing consenting adults to SARS‐CoV‐2 to induce immunity to the virus (‘DEI’ for short). We explain what a responsible DEI program might look like. We explore a consequentialist argument for DEI according to which DEI is a viable harm‐reduction strategy. Then we consider a nonconsequentialist argument for DEI that draws on the moral significance of consent. Additionally, we consider arguments for the view …
An Occasionalist Response to Korman and Locke
Dan Korman and Dustin Locke argue that non-naturalists are rationally committed to withhold moral belief. A main principle in their argument, which they call EC*, can be read in either of two ways, which I call EC*-narrow and EC*-wide. I show that EC*-narrow is implausible. Then I show that, if Korman and Locke rely on EC*-wide to critique non-naturalism, then the critique fails. I explain how the availability of a view that I like to call moral …
Ethics in Politics
Noah’s Other Son
Moral Intuitions, Reliability and Disagreement
There is an ancient, yet still lively, debate in moral epistemology about the epistemic significance of disagreement. One of the important questions in that debate is whether, and to what extent, the prevalence and persistence of disagreement between our moral intuitions causes problems for those who seek to rely on intuitions in order to make moral decisions, issue moral judgments, and craft moral theories. Meanwhile, in general epistemology, th…
No prominent works on this page.
Moral Intuitions, Reliability and Disagreement
There is an ancient, yet still lively, debate in moral epistemology about the epistemic significance of disagreement. One of the important questions in that debate is whether, and to what extent, the prevalence and persistence of disagreement between our moral intuitions causes problems for those who seek to rely on intuitions in order to make moral decisions, issue moral judgments, and craft moral theories. Meanwhile, in general epistemology, th…
Noah’s Other Son
Ethics in Politics
The Ethics of Deliberate Exposure to Sars‐CoV‐2 to Induce Immunity
We explore the ethics of deliberately exposing consenting adults to SARS‐CoV‐2 to induce immunity to the virus (‘DEI’ for short). We explain what a responsible DEI program might look like. We explore a consequentialist argument for DEI according to which DEI is a viable harm‐reduction strategy. Then we consider a nonconsequentialist argument for DEI that draws on the moral significance of consent. Additionally, we consider arguments for the view …
An Occasionalist Response to Korman and Locke
Dan Korman and Dustin Locke argue that non-naturalists are rationally committed to withhold moral belief. A main principle in their argument, which they call EC*, can be read in either of two ways, which I call EC*-narrow and EC*-wide. I show that EC*-narrow is implausible. Then I show that, if Korman and Locke rely on EC*-wide to critique non-naturalism, then the critique fails. I explain how the availability of a view that I like to call moral …
Three and a half ways to a hybrid view in animal ethics
Philosophy (5 works) · Sociology (4 works) · Epistemology (3 works) · Political science (3 works) · Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment (3 works) · Environmental ethics (2 works) · Ethics in medical practice (2 works) · Law (2 works) · 2019-20 coronavirus outbreak (1 work) · Animal ethics (1 work)