V Bhaskar
Biographic Data
| ID | 4552570 |
|---|---|
| NAME | V Bhaskar |
| GIVEN NAMES | V |
| FAMILY NAME | Bhaskar |
| SIGNATURE | BHASKAR V |
| AFFILIATIONS | Professor of Economics, University of Essex, Colchester, United Kingdom. |
| VERIFIED | No |
| TOTAL WORKS | 12 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 56 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 12 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 1990 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2025 |
| H-INDEX | 3 |
Trends in body mass index, nutrient intake and nutritional status of rural adults in India: National Nutrition Monitoring Bureau survey findings (1975–2012)
BMI and overweight/obesity has increased over the periods and are associated with gender, community, education status, and increased fats and oil intakes. The Government of India's initiative like Fit India Movement, NP-NCD, Eat Right, Khelo India, along with strengthening of information, education & communication (IEC) and Health & Nutrition Education will promote healthier lifestyles, better nutrition, physical activities and thus reducing the …
Multidimensional Premarital Investments with Imperfect Commitment
We analyze premarital investments in human capital and housing when individuals are unable to make binding commitments to share their labor income with a prospective spouse. Investments are distorted if there are gender differences in bargaining power over own labor income or marriage market imbalances. Distortions are magnified when ex ante bargaining power favors one sex (e.g., women in China) and ex post bargaining power favors the other (e.g.…
The Demographic Transition and the Position of Women: A Marriage Market Perspective
Secular trends in cohort size cause large marriage market imbalances due to the age gap at marriage between men and women. Positive cohort growth adversely affects women in South Asia and sub-Saharan Africa. Secular decline improves their position in East Asia. I show that the age gap at marriage will not adjust in order to equilibrate the marriage market in response to persistent imbalances, even though it accommodates transitory shocks. This im…
Marriage as a Rat Race: Noisy Premarital Investments with Assortative Matching
We study the incentive to invest to improve marriage prospects, in a frictionless marriage market with non-transferable utility. Stochastic returns to investment eliminate the multiplicity of equilibria in models with deterministic returns, and a unique equilibrium exists under reasonable conditions. Equilibrium investment is efficient when the sexes are symmetric. However, when there is any asymmetry, including an unbalanced sex ratio, investmen…
Parental altruism and child labor: Examining the historical evidence from the United States
Can Observers Predict Trustworthiness
We investigate whether experimental subjects can predict behavior in a prisoner's dilemma played on a TV show. Subjects report probabilistic beliefs that a player cooperates, before and after the players communicate. Subjects correctly predict that women and players who make a voluntary promise are more likely to cooperate. They are able to distinguish truth from lies when a player is asked about her intentions by the host. Subjects are to some e…
Rational Adversaries? Evidence from Randomised Trials in One Day Cricket
In cricket, the right to make an important strategic decision (bat first or field first) is assigned via a coin toss. I use these 'randomised trials' to examine the consistency of choices made by teams with strictly opposed preferences and the effects of these choices upon the outcomes in the game. I find significant evidence of inconsistency, with teams often agreeing on who is to bat first. Estimated treatment effects show that choices are ofte…
Oligopsony and Monopsonistic Competition in Labor Markets
We argue that models of oligopsony or monopsonistic competition provide insights and explanation for many empirical phenomena in labor markets. Using a simple model with job differentiation and preference heterogeneity, we illustrate how such models can be employed to explain the existence of wage dispersion, the persistence of labor market discrimination, market failures in the provision of training and the anomalous employment effects of minimu…
Minimum Wages for Ronald McDonald Monopsonies: A Theory of Monopsonistic Competition
Recent empirical work on the effects of minimum wages has called into question the conventional wisdom that minimum wages invariably reduce employment. We develop a model of monopsonistic competition with free entry to analyse the effects of minimum wages, and our predictions fit the em-pirical results closely. Under monopsonistic competition, we find that a rise in the minimum wage a) raises employment per firm, b) causes firm exit, c) may incre…
On the neutral stability of mixed strategies in asymmetric contests
On the neutral stability of mixed strategies in asymmetric contests
Wage Relativities and the Natural Range of Unemployment
Journal Article Wage Relativities and the Natural Range of Unemployment Get access V. Bhaskar V. Bhaskar Delhi School of Economics and University College, London Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Economic Journal, Volume 100, Issue 400, 1 April 1990, Pages 60–66, https://doi.org/10.2307/2234184 Published: 01 April 1990
Minimum Wages for Ronald McDonald Monopsonies: A Theory of Monopsonistic Competition
Recent empirical work on the effects of minimum wages has called into question the conventional wisdom that minimum wages invariably reduce employment. We develop a model of monopsonistic competition with free entry to analyse the effects of minimum wages, and our predictions fit the em-pirical results closely. Under monopsonistic competition, we find that a rise in the minimum wage a) raises employment per firm, b) causes firm exit, c) may incre…
Oligopsony and Monopsonistic Competition in Labor Markets
We argue that models of oligopsony or monopsonistic competition provide insights and explanation for many empirical phenomena in labor markets. Using a simple model with job differentiation and preference heterogeneity, we illustrate how such models can be employed to explain the existence of wage dispersion, the persistence of labor market discrimination, market failures in the provision of training and the anomalous employment effects of minimu…
Multidimensional Premarital Investments with Imperfect Commitment
We analyze premarital investments in human capital and housing when individuals are unable to make binding commitments to share their labor income with a prospective spouse. Investments are distorted if there are gender differences in bargaining power over own labor income or marriage market imbalances. Distortions are magnified when ex ante bargaining power favors one sex (e.g., women in China) and ex post bargaining power favors the other (e.g.…
Marriage as a Rat Race: Noisy Premarital Investments with Assortative Matching
We study the incentive to invest to improve marriage prospects, in a frictionless marriage market with non-transferable utility. Stochastic returns to investment eliminate the multiplicity of equilibria in models with deterministic returns, and a unique equilibrium exists under reasonable conditions. Equilibrium investment is efficient when the sexes are symmetric. However, when there is any asymmetry, including an unbalanced sex ratio, investmen…
Wage Relativities and the Natural Range of Unemployment
Journal Article Wage Relativities and the Natural Range of Unemployment Get access V. Bhaskar V. Bhaskar Delhi School of Economics and University College, London Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Economic Journal, Volume 100, Issue 400, 1 April 1990, Pages 60–66, https://doi.org/10.2307/2234184 Published: 01 April 1990
The Demographic Transition and the Position of Women: A Marriage Market Perspective
Secular trends in cohort size cause large marriage market imbalances due to the age gap at marriage between men and women. Positive cohort growth adversely affects women in South Asia and sub-Saharan Africa. Secular decline improves their position in East Asia. I show that the age gap at marriage will not adjust in order to equilibrate the marriage market in response to persistent imbalances, even though it accommodates transitory shocks. This im…
Rational Adversaries? Evidence from Randomised Trials in One Day Cricket
In cricket, the right to make an important strategic decision (bat first or field first) is assigned via a coin toss. I use these 'randomised trials' to examine the consistency of choices made by teams with strictly opposed preferences and the effects of these choices upon the outcomes in the game. I find significant evidence of inconsistency, with teams often agreeing on who is to bat first. Estimated treatment effects show that choices are ofte…
Wage Relativities and the Natural Range of Unemployment
Journal Article Wage Relativities and the Natural Range of Unemployment Get access V. Bhaskar V. Bhaskar Delhi School of Economics and University College, London Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Economic Journal, Volume 100, Issue 400, 1 April 1990, Pages 60–66, https://doi.org/10.2307/2234184 Published: 01 April 1990
On the neutral stability of mixed strategies in asymmetric contests
On the neutral stability of mixed strategies in asymmetric contests
Minimum Wages for Ronald McDonald Monopsonies: A Theory of Monopsonistic Competition
Recent empirical work on the effects of minimum wages has called into question the conventional wisdom that minimum wages invariably reduce employment. We develop a model of monopsonistic competition with free entry to analyse the effects of minimum wages, and our predictions fit the em-pirical results closely. Under monopsonistic competition, we find that a rise in the minimum wage a) raises employment per firm, b) causes firm exit, c) may incre…
Oligopsony and Monopsonistic Competition in Labor Markets
We argue that models of oligopsony or monopsonistic competition provide insights and explanation for many empirical phenomena in labor markets. Using a simple model with job differentiation and preference heterogeneity, we illustrate how such models can be employed to explain the existence of wage dispersion, the persistence of labor market discrimination, market failures in the provision of training and the anomalous employment effects of minimu…
Rational Adversaries? Evidence from Randomised Trials in One Day Cricket
In cricket, the right to make an important strategic decision (bat first or field first) is assigned via a coin toss. I use these 'randomised trials' to examine the consistency of choices made by teams with strictly opposed preferences and the effects of these choices upon the outcomes in the game. I find significant evidence of inconsistency, with teams often agreeing on who is to bat first. Estimated treatment effects show that choices are ofte…
Parental altruism and child labor: Examining the historical evidence from the United States
Can Observers Predict Trustworthiness
We investigate whether experimental subjects can predict behavior in a prisoner's dilemma played on a TV show. Subjects report probabilistic beliefs that a player cooperates, before and after the players communicate. Subjects correctly predict that women and players who make a voluntary promise are more likely to cooperate. They are able to distinguish truth from lies when a player is asked about her intentions by the host. Subjects are to some e…
Marriage as a Rat Race: Noisy Premarital Investments with Assortative Matching
We study the incentive to invest to improve marriage prospects, in a frictionless marriage market with non-transferable utility. Stochastic returns to investment eliminate the multiplicity of equilibria in models with deterministic returns, and a unique equilibrium exists under reasonable conditions. Equilibrium investment is efficient when the sexes are symmetric. However, when there is any asymmetry, including an unbalanced sex ratio, investmen…
The Demographic Transition and the Position of Women: A Marriage Market Perspective
Secular trends in cohort size cause large marriage market imbalances due to the age gap at marriage between men and women. Positive cohort growth adversely affects women in South Asia and sub-Saharan Africa. Secular decline improves their position in East Asia. I show that the age gap at marriage will not adjust in order to equilibrate the marriage market in response to persistent imbalances, even though it accommodates transitory shocks. This im…
Multidimensional Premarital Investments with Imperfect Commitment
We analyze premarital investments in human capital and housing when individuals are unable to make binding commitments to share their labor income with a prospective spouse. Investments are distorted if there are gender differences in bargaining power over own labor income or marriage market imbalances. Distortions are magnified when ex ante bargaining power favors one sex (e.g., women in China) and ex post bargaining power favors the other (e.g.…
Trends in body mass index, nutrient intake and nutritional status of rural adults in India: National Nutrition Monitoring Bureau survey findings (1975–2012)
BMI and overweight/obesity has increased over the periods and are associated with gender, community, education status, and increased fats and oil intakes. The Government of India's initiative like Fit India Movement, NP-NCD, Eat Right, Khelo India, along with strengthening of information, education & communication (IEC) and Health & Nutrition Education will promote healthier lifestyles, better nutrition, physical activities and thus reducing the …
Economics (10 works) · Labour economics (5 works) · Microeconomics (5 works) · Computer Science (4 works) · Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies (4 works) · Gender, Labor, and Family Dynamics (4 works) · Mathematics (4 works) · Wage (4 works) · Labor market dynamics and wage inequality (3 works) · Law (3 works)