Reuben Stern
Datos Biográficos
| ID | 4570015 |
|---|---|
| NOMBRE | Reuben Stern |
| NOMBRES | Reuben |
| APELLIDO | Stern |
| FIRMA | STERN R |
| VERIFICADO | No |
| TOTAL DE OBRAS | 6 |
| TOTAL DE CITAS | 21 |
| TOTAL COMO AUTOR | 6 |
| TOTAL COMO EDITOR | 0 |
| PRIMER AÑO DE PUBLICACIÓN | 2017 |
| AÑO MÁS RECIENTE DE PUBLICACIÓN | 2024 |
| ÍNDICE H | 3 |
The Chances of Choices
It is sometimes thought that if we treat decision-theoretic options as interventions, then we can use evidential decision theory to vindicate causal dominance reasoning. This is supposed to be guaranteed by a causal modeling axiom that implies that interventions are probabilistically independent of their non-effects---namely, the Causal Markov Condition. But there are two concerns for this line of reasoning. First, the Causal Markov Condition doe…
Anti-reductionist Interventionism
Kim's causal exclusion argument purports to demonstrate that the non-reductive physicalist must treat mental properties (and macro-level properties in general) as causally inert. A number of authors have attempted to resist Kim's conclusion by utilizing the conceptual resources of Woodward's (2005) interventionist conception of causation. The viability of these responses has been challenged by Gebharter (2017a), who argues that the causal exclusi…
Causal Explanatory Power
Schupbach and Sprenger ([2011]) introduce a novel probabilistic approach to measuring the explanatory power that a given explanans exerts over a corresponding explanandum. Though we are sympathetic to their general approach, we argue that it does not (without revision) adequately capture the way in which the causal explanatory power that c exerts on e varies with background knowledge. We then amend their approach so that it does capture this vari…
In defense of interventionist solutions to exclusion
The Frugal Inference of Causal Relations
Recent approaches to causal modelling rely upon the causal Markov condition, which specifies which probability distributions are compatible with a directed acyclic graph (DAG). Further principles are required in order to choose among the large number of DAGs compatible with a given probability distribution. Here we present a principle that we call frugality. This principle tells one to choose the DAG with the fewest causal arrows. We argue that f…
Interventionist decision theory
Causal Explanatory Power
Schupbach and Sprenger ([2011]) introduce a novel probabilistic approach to measuring the explanatory power that a given explanans exerts over a corresponding explanandum. Though we are sympathetic to their general approach, we argue that it does not (without revision) adequately capture the way in which the causal explanatory power that c exerts on e varies with background knowledge. We then amend their approach so that it does capture this vari…
Interventionist decision theory
Anti-reductionist Interventionism
Kim's causal exclusion argument purports to demonstrate that the non-reductive physicalist must treat mental properties (and macro-level properties in general) as causally inert. A number of authors have attempted to resist Kim's conclusion by utilizing the conceptual resources of Woodward's (2005) interventionist conception of causation. The viability of these responses has been challenged by Gebharter (2017a), who argues that the causal exclusi…
In defense of interventionist solutions to exclusion
The Frugal Inference of Causal Relations
Recent approaches to causal modelling rely upon the causal Markov condition, which specifies which probability distributions are compatible with a directed acyclic graph (DAG). Further principles are required in order to choose among the large number of DAGs compatible with a given probability distribution. Here we present a principle that we call frugality. This principle tells one to choose the DAG with the fewest causal arrows. We argue that f…
Interventionist decision theory
In defense of interventionist solutions to exclusion
The Frugal Inference of Causal Relations
Recent approaches to causal modelling rely upon the causal Markov condition, which specifies which probability distributions are compatible with a directed acyclic graph (DAG). Further principles are required in order to choose among the large number of DAGs compatible with a given probability distribution. Here we present a principle that we call frugality. This principle tells one to choose the DAG with the fewest causal arrows. We argue that f…
Causal Explanatory Power
Schupbach and Sprenger ([2011]) introduce a novel probabilistic approach to measuring the explanatory power that a given explanans exerts over a corresponding explanandum. Though we are sympathetic to their general approach, we argue that it does not (without revision) adequately capture the way in which the causal explanatory power that c exerts on e varies with background knowledge. We then amend their approach so that it does capture this vari…
Anti-reductionist Interventionism
Kim's causal exclusion argument purports to demonstrate that the non-reductive physicalist must treat mental properties (and macro-level properties in general) as causally inert. A number of authors have attempted to resist Kim's conclusion by utilizing the conceptual resources of Woodward's (2005) interventionist conception of causation. The viability of these responses has been challenged by Gebharter (2017a), who argues that the causal exclusi…
The Chances of Choices
It is sometimes thought that if we treat decision-theoretic options as interventions, then we can use evidential decision theory to vindicate causal dominance reasoning. This is supposed to be guaranteed by a causal modeling axiom that implies that interventions are probabilistically independent of their non-effects---namely, the Causal Markov Condition. But there are two concerns for this line of reasoning. First, the Causal Markov Condition doe…
Epistemology (5 obras) · Philosophy (5 obras) · Mathematics (4 obras) · Philosophy and History of Science (4 obras) · Bayesian Modeling and Causal Inference (3 obras) · Computer Science (3 obras) · Mathematical economics (3 obras) · Philosophy (3 obras) · Causal model (2 obras) · Causality (physics) (2 obras)