Donnchadh O'Conaill
Biographic Data
| ID | 4574957 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Donnchadh O'Conaill |
| GIVEN NAMES | Donnchadh |
| FAMILY NAME | O'Conaill |
| SIGNATURE | CONAILL D Ó |
| AFFILIATIONS | Film Independent |
| VERIFIED | No |
| TOTAL WORKS | 5 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 3 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 5 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2014 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2026 |
| H-INDEX | 1 |
The Argument From Revelation and the Metaphysics of Properties
Arguments from revelation against physicalism appeal to the special knowledge of phenomenal properties which one can have on the basis of having experiences. In a nutshell, the idea is that by having experiences one can come to know the nature or essence of certain phenomenal properties and thereby learn that they are not physical. This argument is intuitively appealing, but a proper defense of it against physicalist objections requires exploring…
Infinite Regresses, Ground Conditions, and Metaphysical Satisfaction
In this paper we clarify a regress argument for metaphysical foundationalism, distinguishing strong and modest versions of this argument. We suggest that while the strong version is open to objection, the modest version is much more plausible and it supports a methodological stance: one ought to refrain from assuming that anti-foundationalism is metaphysically possible. This modest stance follows from our argument that currently we lack reasons t…
Substance
In Defence of Facts
A common conception of facts is as worldly entities, complexes made upof non-factual constituents such as properties, relations andproperty-bearers. Understood in this way facts face the unityproblem, the problem of explaining why various constituents arecombined to form a fact. In many cases the constituents could haveexisted without being unified in the fact---so in virtue of what arethey so unified? I shall present a new approach to the unity …
Ontic Structural Realism and Concrete Objects
Ontic structural realism (OSR) claims that reality is fundamentally structural. One way of developing this position is the claim that the identities of objects are determined by their positions in the structures to which they belong. This raises worries particularly with regard to the identity of concrete objects. In this paper, I examine whether the structures on which concrete objects are dependent should themselves be thought of as concrete or…
Ontic Structural Realism and Concrete Objects
Ontic structural realism (OSR) claims that reality is fundamentally structural. One way of developing this position is the claim that the identities of objects are determined by their positions in the structures to which they belong. This raises worries particularly with regard to the identity of concrete objects. In this paper, I examine whether the structures on which concrete objects are dependent should themselves be thought of as concrete or…
Ontic Structural Realism and Concrete Objects
Ontic structural realism (OSR) claims that reality is fundamentally structural. One way of developing this position is the claim that the identities of objects are determined by their positions in the structures to which they belong. This raises worries particularly with regard to the identity of concrete objects. In this paper, I examine whether the structures on which concrete objects are dependent should themselves be thought of as concrete or…
In Defence of Facts
A common conception of facts is as worldly entities, complexes made upof non-factual constituents such as properties, relations andproperty-bearers. Understood in this way facts face the unityproblem, the problem of explaining why various constituents arecombined to form a fact. In many cases the constituents could haveexisted without being unified in the fact---so in virtue of what arethey so unified? I shall present a new approach to the unity …
Substance
Infinite Regresses, Ground Conditions, and Metaphysical Satisfaction
In this paper we clarify a regress argument for metaphysical foundationalism, distinguishing strong and modest versions of this argument. We suggest that while the strong version is open to objection, the modest version is much more plausible and it supports a methodological stance: one ought to refrain from assuming that anti-foundationalism is metaphysically possible. This modest stance follows from our argument that currently we lack reasons t…
The Argument From Revelation and the Metaphysics of Properties
Arguments from revelation against physicalism appeal to the special knowledge of phenomenal properties which one can have on the basis of having experiences. In a nutshell, the idea is that by having experiences one can come to know the nature or essence of certain phenomenal properties and thereby learn that they are not physical. This argument is intuitively appealing, but a proper defense of it against physicalist objections requires exploring…
Epistemology (3 works) · Metaphysics (3 works) · Philosophy (3 works) · Appeal (2 works) · Argument (complex analysis) (2 works) · Computer Science (2 works) · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics (2 works) · Philosophy and Theoretical Science (2 works) · Philosophy of mind (2 works) · Property (philosophy) (2 works)