David Widerker
Biographic Data
| ID | 457700 |
|---|---|
| NAME | David Widerker |
| GIVEN NAMES | David |
| FAMILY NAME | Widerker |
| SIGNATURE | WIDERKER D |
| AFFILIATIONS | Bar-Ilan University |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-9840-4606 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 10 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 13 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 9 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 1 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 1994 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2018 |
| H-INDEX | 1 |
Moral Responsibility and Alternative Possibilities
Moral Responsibility and Alternative Possibilities
Frankfurt-Friendly Libertarianism
This article begins by reviewing a major objection to Frankfurt-type examples made in past writings, called here as the “Dilemma Objection.” It explains why PAP has an initial plausibility for many persons. This plausibility is grounded, the article argues, in a principle called the “principle of reasonable expectations” (PAE): An agent is morally blameworthy for a given act only if, in the circumstances, it would be morally reasonable to expect …
Libertarianism and the Philosophical Significance of Frankfurt Scenarios
Why God's beliefs are not hard-type soft facts
John Fischer has attacked the Ockhamistic solution to the freedom–foreknowledge dilemma by arguing that: (1) God's prior beliefs about the future, though being soft facts about the past, are soft facts of a special sort, what he calls ‘ hard-type soft facts ’, i.e. soft facts, the constitutive properties of which are ‘hard’, or ‘temporally non-relational properties’; (2) in this respect, such facts are like regular past facts which are subject to…
Metaphilosophy and Free Will
Avoidability and Libertarianism
Recently, Widerker has attacked Fischer's contention that one could use Frankfurt-type counterexamples to the principle of alternative possibilities to show that even from a libertarian viewpoint an agent might be morally responsible for a decision that he could not have avoided.Fischer has responded by: (a) arguing that Widerker's criticism presupposes the falsity of Molinism and (b) presenting a version of libertarianism which avoids Widerker's…
Libertarian Freedom and the Avoidability of Decisions
Recently, John Fischer has applied Frankfurt's well-known counter-example to the principle of alternate possibilities to refute the traditional libertarian position which holds that a necessary condition for an agent's decision (choice) to be free in the sense of freedom required for moral responsibility is that the decision not be causally determined, and that the agent could have avoided making it. Fischer's argument has consequently led variou…
Libertarianism and Frankfurt's Attack on the Principle of Alternative Possibilities
challenged.' In this paper, I wish to take a fresh look at Frankfurt's attack on PAP from a libertarian viewpoint. I shall try to show that it does not succeed when applied to mental acts such as deciding, choosing, undertaking, forming an intention, that is, mental acts that for the libertarian constitute the basic loci of moral responsibility. If correct, this result will enable us to formulate a necessary condition for moral responsibility tha…
Providence, Eternity, and Human Freedom
Libertarianism and Frankfurt's Attack on the Principle of Alternative Possibilities
challenged.' In this paper, I wish to take a fresh look at Frankfurt's attack on PAP from a libertarian viewpoint. I shall try to show that it does not succeed when applied to mental acts such as deciding, choosing, undertaking, forming an intention, that is, mental acts that for the libertarian constitute the basic loci of moral responsibility. If correct, this result will enable us to formulate a necessary condition for moral responsibility tha…
Providence, Eternity, and Human Freedom
Libertarian Freedom and the Avoidability of Decisions
Recently, John Fischer has applied Frankfurt's well-known counter-example to the principle of alternate possibilities to refute the traditional libertarian position which holds that a necessary condition for an agent's decision (choice) to be free in the sense of freedom required for moral responsibility is that the decision not be causally determined, and that the agent could have avoided making it. Fischer's argument has consequently led variou…
Libertarianism and Frankfurt's Attack on the Principle of Alternative Possibilities
challenged.' In this paper, I wish to take a fresh look at Frankfurt's attack on PAP from a libertarian viewpoint. I shall try to show that it does not succeed when applied to mental acts such as deciding, choosing, undertaking, forming an intention, that is, mental acts that for the libertarian constitute the basic loci of moral responsibility. If correct, this result will enable us to formulate a necessary condition for moral responsibility tha…
Avoidability and Libertarianism
Recently, Widerker has attacked Fischer's contention that one could use Frankfurt-type counterexamples to the principle of alternative possibilities to show that even from a libertarian viewpoint an agent might be morally responsible for a decision that he could not have avoided.Fischer has responded by: (a) arguing that Widerker's criticism presupposes the falsity of Molinism and (b) presenting a version of libertarianism which avoids Widerker's…
Metaphilosophy and Free Will
Why God's beliefs are not hard-type soft facts
John Fischer has attacked the Ockhamistic solution to the freedom–foreknowledge dilemma by arguing that: (1) God's prior beliefs about the future, though being soft facts about the past, are soft facts of a special sort, what he calls ‘ hard-type soft facts ’, i.e. soft facts, the constitutive properties of which are ‘hard’, or ‘temporally non-relational properties’; (2) in this respect, such facts are like regular past facts which are subject to…
Libertarianism and the Philosophical Significance of Frankfurt Scenarios
Frankfurt-Friendly Libertarianism
This article begins by reviewing a major objection to Frankfurt-type examples made in past writings, called here as the “Dilemma Objection.” It explains why PAP has an initial plausibility for many persons. This plausibility is grounded, the article argues, in a principle called the “principle of reasonable expectations” (PAE): An agent is morally blameworthy for a given act only if, in the circumstances, it would be morally reasonable to expect …
Moral Responsibility and Alternative Possibilities
Moral Responsibility and Alternative Possibilities
Epistemology (9 works) · Philosophy (9 works) · Contemporary philosophy (4 works) · Libertarianism (4 works) · Theology and Philosophy of Evil (4 works) · Political Philosophy and Ethics (3 works) · Sociology (3 works) · Analytic philosophy (2 works) · Dilemma (2 works) · Environmental ethics (2 works)