James S Corum
Biographic Data
| ID | 457759 |
|---|---|
| NAME | James S Corum |
| GIVEN NAMES | James S |
| FAMILY NAME | Corum |
| SIGNATURE | CORUM J S |
| AFFILIATIONS | Maxwell Air Force Base |
| VERIFIED | No |
| TOTAL WORKS | 20 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 10 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 20 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 1993 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2007 |
| H-INDEX | 2 |
Rethinking US Army Counter-insurgency Doctrine
This article examines the US Army's approach to counter-insurgency (COIN) doctrine from the Vietnam War to the present. COIN doctrine was largely neglected in the mainstream army after the Vietnam War and the success of high-tech warfare against Iraq in 1991 reinforced the cultural tendency of the US Army to ignore the lower end of the conflict scale. Since 2001, the army has had to relearn the basics of COIN; however, many aspects of insurgency …
Training Indigenous Forces in Counterinsurgency
Counterinsurgency is manpower intensive, and nearly all major counterinsurgency campaigns of the last century have relied heavily on indigenous police and military forces. Indeed, there have been few counterinsurgency situations in which the indigenous security forces were not the primary forces employed on the government side in the conflict, at least in terms of numbers. Although the importance of training indigenous police and military forces …
Uncharted Waters
The 1940 Norway campaign was the first truly modern joint operation in which ground, sea and air forces all played major roles. With three services involved over a huge theater of war, the normal friction in obtaining and disseminating intelligence and information that one finds in a joint operation was multiplied. As the two sides were fairly evenly matched, effective use of intelligence and information provided a decisive advantage. This paper …
Building A New Luftwaffe
Rearming Germany was a long and complicated process. It was especially difficult to create a new German air force. The army generals who dominated the Bundeswehr cadre did not even want an air force but rather a small arm air corps. Moreover, Adenauer's defense staff failed to adequately budget or plan for a new air force. As rearmament began, US Air Force leaders, working closely with the small Luftwaffe staff in West Germany's shadow Defense Mi…
Entscheidungsschlacht "Invasion" 1944? Prognosen und Diagnosen
Combined Arms Warfare in the Twentieth Century
For centuries, the world has witnessed the development and use of increasingly complex and powerful military systems and technologies. In the process, the of has truly become the art of combined arms warfare, in which infantry, artillery, air support, intelligence, and other key elements are all coordinated for maximum effect. Nowhere has this trend been more visible than in the history of twentieth-century warfare. This title covers among other …
Tomorrow the World
The Panzer Legions
La Flak 1914-1918
The Luftwaffe's Way of War
The Luftwaffe
The Spanish Civil War
The Luftwaffe
The German campaign in Norway 1940 as a joint operation
The German invasion in Norway in April 1940 was unique in that it was the first major ‘triphibious’ campaign. It was an operation that was equally dependent upon naval, air and ground forces for success. Norway had long been of interest to German strategists, especially naval thinkers. However, no serious Wehrmacht plans for occupying Norway were even started until December 1939. A small group of staff officers of the three services put together …
From Biplanes to Blitzkreig
The Luftwaffe's Army Support Doctrine, 1918-1941
The Luftwaffe and the coalition air war in Spain, 1936–1939
(1995). The Luftwaffe and the coalition air war in Spain, 1936–1939. Journal of Strategic Studies: Vol. 18, Air Power Theory and Practice, pp. 68-90
Moltke on the Art of War
The Roots of Blitzkrieg
The Roots of Blitzkrieg
Training Indigenous Forces in Counterinsurgency
Counterinsurgency is manpower intensive, and nearly all major counterinsurgency campaigns of the last century have relied heavily on indigenous police and military forces. Indeed, there have been few counterinsurgency situations in which the indigenous security forces were not the primary forces employed on the government side in the conflict, at least in terms of numbers. Although the importance of training indigenous police and military forces …
Rethinking US Army Counter-insurgency Doctrine
This article examines the US Army's approach to counter-insurgency (COIN) doctrine from the Vietnam War to the present. COIN doctrine was largely neglected in the mainstream army after the Vietnam War and the success of high-tech warfare against Iraq in 1991 reinforced the cultural tendency of the US Army to ignore the lower end of the conflict scale. Since 2001, the army has had to relearn the basics of COIN; however, many aspects of insurgency …
The Roots of Blitzkrieg
The Roots of Blitzkrieg
The Roots of Blitzkrieg
Moltke on the Art of War
The Luftwaffe's Army Support Doctrine, 1918-1941
The Luftwaffe and the coalition air war in Spain, 1936–1939
(1995). The Luftwaffe and the coalition air war in Spain, 1936–1939. Journal of Strategic Studies: Vol. 18, Air Power Theory and Practice, pp. 68-90
From Biplanes to Blitzkreig
The Spanish Civil War
The Luftwaffe
The German campaign in Norway 1940 as a joint operation
The German invasion in Norway in April 1940 was unique in that it was the first major ‘triphibious’ campaign. It was an operation that was equally dependent upon naval, air and ground forces for success. Norway had long been of interest to German strategists, especially naval thinkers. However, no serious Wehrmacht plans for occupying Norway were even started until December 1939. A small group of staff officers of the three services put together …
The Luftwaffe's Way of War
The Luftwaffe
La Flak 1914-1918
Combined Arms Warfare in the Twentieth Century
For centuries, the world has witnessed the development and use of increasingly complex and powerful military systems and technologies. In the process, the of has truly become the art of combined arms warfare, in which infantry, artillery, air support, intelligence, and other key elements are all coordinated for maximum effect. Nowhere has this trend been more visible than in the history of twentieth-century warfare. This title covers among other …
Tomorrow the World
The Panzer Legions
Entscheidungsschlacht "Invasion" 1944? Prognosen und Diagnosen
Uncharted Waters
The 1940 Norway campaign was the first truly modern joint operation in which ground, sea and air forces all played major roles. With three services involved over a huge theater of war, the normal friction in obtaining and disseminating intelligence and information that one finds in a joint operation was multiplied. As the two sides were fairly evenly matched, effective use of intelligence and information provided a decisive advantage. This paper …
Building A New Luftwaffe
Rearming Germany was a long and complicated process. It was especially difficult to create a new German air force. The army generals who dominated the Bundeswehr cadre did not even want an air force but rather a small arm air corps. Moreover, Adenauer's defense staff failed to adequately budget or plan for a new air force. As rearmament began, US Air Force leaders, working closely with the small Luftwaffe staff in West Germany's shadow Defense Mi…
Training Indigenous Forces in Counterinsurgency
Counterinsurgency is manpower intensive, and nearly all major counterinsurgency campaigns of the last century have relied heavily on indigenous police and military forces. Indeed, there have been few counterinsurgency situations in which the indigenous security forces were not the primary forces employed on the government side in the conflict, at least in terms of numbers. Although the importance of training indigenous police and military forces …
Rethinking US Army Counter-insurgency Doctrine
This article examines the US Army's approach to counter-insurgency (COIN) doctrine from the Vietnam War to the present. COIN doctrine was largely neglected in the mainstream army after the Vietnam War and the success of high-tech warfare against Iraq in 1991 reinforced the cultural tendency of the US Army to ignore the lower end of the conflict scale. Since 2001, the army has had to relearn the basics of COIN; however, many aspects of insurgency …
Political science (19 works) · History (14 works) · European history and politics (10 works) · Archaeology (7 works) · Engineering (7 works) · German (7 works) · History (7 works) · Law (7 works) · Communism, Protests, Social Movements (6 works) · Ancient history (5 works)