Jonathan M Weinberg
Biographic Data
| ID | 459481 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Jonathan M Weinberg |
| GIVEN NAMES | Jonathan M |
| FAMILY NAME | Weinberg |
| SIGNATURE | WEINBERG J M |
| AFFILIATIONS | Indiana University Bloomington |
| ORCID | 0000-0001-9075-4727 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 12 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 88 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 12 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2001 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2026 |
| H-INDEX | 5 |
Overfitting and Heuristics in Philosophy
In Overfitting and Heuristics in Philosophy, Timothy Williamson presents his latest set of tools for constructing intellectually respectable philosophical escape hatches when one’s preferred theory becomes trapped by inconvenient data. The chief innovation, which I will focus on here, is his invocation of two notions whose primary home is the empirical sciences rather than philosophy—as it says on the label, overfitting and heuristics. Briefly: I…
Middlebrow Aesthetics: An Explanation and Defense
We offer a philosophical account of the middlebrow as a theoretical category to do explanatory and critical work in aesthetics. On our account, the middlebrow ought to be understood as aspirational popular art. That is, it is art which aspires both to be popular (in a distinctive sense), and at the same time to be something more than popular. Although, as we will discuss, there are many different sorts of “something more” to which middlebrow art …
Standing Up for Philosophy: Armchairs, Experiments, and the Case for Methodological Reform
In Standing Up for Philosophy, Jonathan Weinberg and Joshua Alexander seek to radically reformulate the debate over the method of cases, and whether results in experimental philosophy have shown that the armchair version of that method should perhaps be abandoned. Experimental philosophy ("X-phi") seems to indicate that our verdicts about thought experiments are vulnerable to demographic variation and unconscious contextual influences. Yet experi…
Experimental Philosophy
The x-phi(les): Unusual insights into the nature of inquiry
The Instability of Philosophical Intuitions: Running Hot and Cold on Truetemp
A growing body of empirical literature challenges philosophers’ reliance on intuitions as evidence based on the fact that intuitions vary according to factors such as cultural and educational background, and socio‐economic status. Our research extends this challenge, investigating Lehrer’s appeal to the Truetemp Case as evidence against reliabilism. We found that intuitions in response to this case vary according to whether, and which, other thou…
Analytic Epistemology and Experimental Philosophy
It has been standard philosophical practice in analytic philosophy to employ intuitions generated in response to thought-experiments as evidence in the evaluation of philosophical claims. In part as a response to this practice, an exciting new movement -experimental philosophy- has recently emerged. This movement is unified behind both a common methodology and a common aim: the application of methods of experimental psychology to the study of the…
Puzzling over the Imagination: Philosophical Problems, Architectural Solutions
This chapter addresses three distinct philosophical issues concerning the imagination: the puzzle of emotions and fiction, imaginative resistance, and the distinction between imagination and supposition. Standard approaches to these issues, which restrict themselves to the resources of folk psychology and metaphysics, are shown to be inadequate. Instead, an alternative approach rooted in careful exploration of the cognitive architecture of the im…
Innateness as Closed Process Invariance
Controversies over the innateness of cognitive structures play a persistent role in driving research in philosophy as well as cognitive science, but the appropriate way to understand the category of the innate remains in dispute. The invariantist approaches of Stich and Sober face counterexample cases of traits that, though developing invariantly across different environments, nonetheless are not held by nativism partisans to count as innate. App…
Emotions, Fiction, and Cognitive Architecture
Journal Article Emotions, Fiction, and Cognitive Architecture Get access Aaron Meskin, Aaron Meskin Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Jonathan M. Weinberg Jonathan M. Weinberg Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The British Journal of Aesthetics, Volume 43, Issue 1, January 2003, Pages 18–34, https://doi.org/10.1093/bjaesthetics/43.1.18 Published: 01 January 2003
Normativity and Epistemic Intuitions
Jackson's Empirical Assumptions
The Instability of Philosophical Intuitions: Running Hot and Cold on Truetemp
A growing body of empirical literature challenges philosophers’ reliance on intuitions as evidence based on the fact that intuitions vary according to factors such as cultural and educational background, and socio‐economic status. Our research extends this challenge, investigating Lehrer’s appeal to the Truetemp Case as evidence against reliabilism. We found that intuitions in response to this case vary according to whether, and which, other thou…
Analytic Epistemology and Experimental Philosophy
It has been standard philosophical practice in analytic philosophy to employ intuitions generated in response to thought-experiments as evidence in the evaluation of philosophical claims. In part as a response to this practice, an exciting new movement -experimental philosophy- has recently emerged. This movement is unified behind both a common methodology and a common aim: the application of methods of experimental psychology to the study of the…
Jackson's Empirical Assumptions
Emotions, Fiction, and Cognitive Architecture
Journal Article Emotions, Fiction, and Cognitive Architecture Get access Aaron Meskin, Aaron Meskin Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Jonathan M. Weinberg Jonathan M. Weinberg Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The British Journal of Aesthetics, Volume 43, Issue 1, January 2003, Pages 18–34, https://doi.org/10.1093/bjaesthetics/43.1.18 Published: 01 January 2003
Innateness as Closed Process Invariance
Controversies over the innateness of cognitive structures play a persistent role in driving research in philosophy as well as cognitive science, but the appropriate way to understand the category of the innate remains in dispute. The invariantist approaches of Stich and Sober face counterexample cases of traits that, though developing invariantly across different environments, nonetheless are not held by nativism partisans to count as innate. App…
The x-phi(les): Unusual insights into the nature of inquiry
Normativity and Epistemic Intuitions
Jackson's Empirical Assumptions
Emotions, Fiction, and Cognitive Architecture
Journal Article Emotions, Fiction, and Cognitive Architecture Get access Aaron Meskin, Aaron Meskin Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Jonathan M. Weinberg Jonathan M. Weinberg Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The British Journal of Aesthetics, Volume 43, Issue 1, January 2003, Pages 18–34, https://doi.org/10.1093/bjaesthetics/43.1.18 Published: 01 January 2003
Puzzling over the Imagination: Philosophical Problems, Architectural Solutions
This chapter addresses three distinct philosophical issues concerning the imagination: the puzzle of emotions and fiction, imaginative resistance, and the distinction between imagination and supposition. Standard approaches to these issues, which restrict themselves to the resources of folk psychology and metaphysics, are shown to be inadequate. Instead, an alternative approach rooted in careful exploration of the cognitive architecture of the im…
Innateness as Closed Process Invariance
Controversies over the innateness of cognitive structures play a persistent role in driving research in philosophy as well as cognitive science, but the appropriate way to understand the category of the innate remains in dispute. The invariantist approaches of Stich and Sober face counterexample cases of traits that, though developing invariantly across different environments, nonetheless are not held by nativism partisans to count as innate. App…
Analytic Epistemology and Experimental Philosophy
It has been standard philosophical practice in analytic philosophy to employ intuitions generated in response to thought-experiments as evidence in the evaluation of philosophical claims. In part as a response to this practice, an exciting new movement -experimental philosophy- has recently emerged. This movement is unified behind both a common methodology and a common aim: the application of methods of experimental psychology to the study of the…
The Instability of Philosophical Intuitions: Running Hot and Cold on Truetemp
A growing body of empirical literature challenges philosophers’ reliance on intuitions as evidence based on the fact that intuitions vary according to factors such as cultural and educational background, and socio‐economic status. Our research extends this challenge, investigating Lehrer’s appeal to the Truetemp Case as evidence against reliabilism. We found that intuitions in response to this case vary according to whether, and which, other thou…
The x-phi(les): Unusual insights into the nature of inquiry
Experimental Philosophy
Middlebrow Aesthetics: An Explanation and Defense
We offer a philosophical account of the middlebrow as a theoretical category to do explanatory and critical work in aesthetics. On our account, the middlebrow ought to be understood as aspirational popular art. That is, it is art which aspires both to be popular (in a distinctive sense), and at the same time to be something more than popular. Although, as we will discuss, there are many different sorts of “something more” to which middlebrow art …
Standing Up for Philosophy: Armchairs, Experiments, and the Case for Methodological Reform
In Standing Up for Philosophy, Jonathan Weinberg and Joshua Alexander seek to radically reformulate the debate over the method of cases, and whether results in experimental philosophy have shown that the armchair version of that method should perhaps be abandoned. Experimental philosophy ("X-phi") seems to indicate that our verdicts about thought experiments are vulnerable to demographic variation and unconscious contextual influences. Yet experi…
Overfitting and Heuristics in Philosophy
In Overfitting and Heuristics in Philosophy, Timothy Williamson presents his latest set of tools for constructing intellectually respectable philosophical escape hatches when one’s preferred theory becomes trapped by inconvenient data. The chief innovation, which I will focus on here, is his invocation of two notions whose primary home is the empirical sciences rather than philosophy—as it says on the label, overfitting and heuristics. Briefly: I…
Philosophy (9 works) · Epistemology (7 works) · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics (7 works) · Computer Science (5 works) · Psychology (5 works) · Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment (5 works) · Law (4 works) · Philosophy of science (4 works) · Political science (4 works) · Cognition (3 works)