M Chirimuuta
Biographic Data
| ID | 459938 |
|---|---|
| NAME | M Chirimuuta |
| GIVEN NAMES | M |
| FAMILY NAME | Chirimuuta |
| SIGNATURE | CHIRIMUUTA M |
| AFFILIATIONS | University of Pittsburgh |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-5967-9105 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 18 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 70 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 18 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2014 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2025 |
| H-INDEX | 4 |
Why are we still suffering from the blind spot
From the Reflex Machine to the Changeable Brain
The brain is exceedingly complex. Neuroscientists have used the tried and tested simplification methods of physics, such as mathematical idealization, in order to deal with neural complexity. This paper queries the appropriateness of certain physics-derived strategies within this biological science by presenting a historical case study (the reflex theory) in which scientists fell into the trap of over-simplifying the brain and nervous system. It …
The Prehistory of the Idea that Thinking is Modelling
This paper examines early expositions of the idea that to think about an object is to construct and manipulate an internal model of that object. The origin of this idea is normally credited to Kenneth Craik (1943) but here I show that it is prefigured in the writings of two nineteenth century physicist-psychologists, Hermann von Helmholtz and Ernst Mach
The Brain Abstracted: Simplification in the History and Philosophy of Neuroscience
An exciting, new framework for interpreting the philosophical significance of neuroscience. All science needs to simplify, but when the object of research is something as complicated as the brain, this challenge can stretch the limits of scientific possibility. In fact, in The Brain Abstracted, an avowedly "opinionated" history of neuroscience, M. Chirimuuta argues that, due to the brain's complexity, neuroscientific theories have only captured p…
Haptic realism for neuroscience
Recent work in philosophy of science has shown how the challenges posed by extremely complex systems require that scientists employ a range of modelling strategies, leading to partial perspectives that make apparently conflicting claims about the target (Mitchell 2009b, Longino 2013). The brain is of course extremely complex, and the same arguments apply here. In this paper I present a variety of perspectivism called haptic realism . This account…
Reflex theory, cautionary tale: Misleading simplicity in early neuroscience
This paper takes an integrated history and philosophy of science approach to the topic of "simplicity out of complexity". The reflex theory was a framework within early twentieth century psychology and neuroscience which aimed to decompose complex behaviours and neural responses into simple reflexes. It was controversial in its time, and did not live up to its own theoretical and empirical ambitions. Examination of this episode poses important qu…
Prediction versus understanding in computationally enhanced neuroscience
Naturalism and the philosophy of colour ontology and perception
Synthesis of contraries: Hughlings Jackson on sensory-motor representation in the brain
Explanation in Computational Neuroscience: Causal and Non-causal
This article examines three candidate cases of non-causal explanation in computational neuroscience. I argue that there are instances of efficient coding explanation that are strongly analogous to examples of non-causal explanation in physics and biology, as presented by Batterman ([2002]), Woodward ([2003]), and Lange ([2013]). By integrating Lange’s and Woodward’s accounts, I offer a new way to elucidate the distinction between causal and non-c…
Hughlings Jackson and the “doctrine of concomitance”: Mind-brain theorising between metaphysics and the clinic
Crash Testing an Engineering Framework in Neuroscience: Does the Idea of Robustness Break Down
In this article, I discuss the concept of robustness in neuroscience. Various mechanisms for making systems robust have been discussed across biology and neuroscience (e.g., redundancy and fail-safes). Many of these notions originate from engineering. I argue that concepts borrowed from engineering aid neuroscientists in (1) operationalizing robustness, (2) formulating hypotheses about mechanisms for robustness, and (3) quantifying robustness. Fu…
Précis of Outside Color
Replies
Why the “stimulus-error” did not go away
Vision, Perspectivism, and Haptic Realism
In this article I examine the perceptual metaphor at the heart of perspectivism, discussing three elements: partiality, interestedness, and interaction. I argue that perspectivists should drop the visual metaphor in favor of a haptic one. Because the sense of touch requires contact and purposeful exploration on the part of the perceiver, it is obvious that with touch one apprehends an extradermal reality in virtue of and not in spite of its inter…
Minimal models and canonical neural computations: The distinctness of computational explanation in neuroscience
Psychophysical Methods and the Evasion of Introspection
In this paper I argue that certain methodological conventions within psychophysics reflect a continued uncertainty over the reliability of subjects’ introspective judgements. Firstly, different psychophysical methods do not rely equally on the introspective capabilities of experimental subjects. I contrast “minimally introspective” tasks with “introspection-reliant” ones. It is only in the latter that introspection can be said to have a nontrivia…
Minimal models and canonical neural computations: The distinctness of computational explanation in neuroscience
Explanation in Computational Neuroscience: Causal and Non-causal
This article examines three candidate cases of non-causal explanation in computational neuroscience. I argue that there are instances of efficient coding explanation that are strongly analogous to examples of non-causal explanation in physics and biology, as presented by Batterman ([2002]), Woodward ([2003]), and Lange ([2013]). By integrating Lange’s and Woodward’s accounts, I offer a new way to elucidate the distinction between causal and non-c…
The Brain Abstracted: Simplification in the History and Philosophy of Neuroscience
An exciting, new framework for interpreting the philosophical significance of neuroscience. All science needs to simplify, but when the object of research is something as complicated as the brain, this challenge can stretch the limits of scientific possibility. In fact, in The Brain Abstracted, an avowedly "opinionated" history of neuroscience, M. Chirimuuta argues that, due to the brain's complexity, neuroscientific theories have only captured p…
Vision, Perspectivism, and Haptic Realism
In this article I examine the perceptual metaphor at the heart of perspectivism, discussing three elements: partiality, interestedness, and interaction. I argue that perspectivists should drop the visual metaphor in favor of a haptic one. Because the sense of touch requires contact and purposeful exploration on the part of the perceiver, it is obvious that with touch one apprehends an extradermal reality in virtue of and not in spite of its inter…
Psychophysical Methods and the Evasion of Introspection
In this paper I argue that certain methodological conventions within psychophysics reflect a continued uncertainty over the reliability of subjects’ introspective judgements. Firstly, different psychophysical methods do not rely equally on the introspective capabilities of experimental subjects. I contrast “minimally introspective” tasks with “introspection-reliant” ones. It is only in the latter that introspection can be said to have a nontrivia…
Naturalism and the philosophy of colour ontology and perception
Why the “stimulus-error” did not go away
Haptic realism for neuroscience
Recent work in philosophy of science has shown how the challenges posed by extremely complex systems require that scientists employ a range of modelling strategies, leading to partial perspectives that make apparently conflicting claims about the target (Mitchell 2009b, Longino 2013). The brain is of course extremely complex, and the same arguments apply here. In this paper I present a variety of perspectivism called haptic realism . This account…
Reflex theory, cautionary tale: Misleading simplicity in early neuroscience
This paper takes an integrated history and philosophy of science approach to the topic of "simplicity out of complexity". The reflex theory was a framework within early twentieth century psychology and neuroscience which aimed to decompose complex behaviours and neural responses into simple reflexes. It was controversial in its time, and did not live up to its own theoretical and empirical ambitions. Examination of this episode poses important qu…
Prediction versus understanding in computationally enhanced neuroscience
Synthesis of contraries: Hughlings Jackson on sensory-motor representation in the brain
Hughlings Jackson and the “doctrine of concomitance”: Mind-brain theorising between metaphysics and the clinic
Minimal models and canonical neural computations: The distinctness of computational explanation in neuroscience
Psychophysical Methods and the Evasion of Introspection
In this paper I argue that certain methodological conventions within psychophysics reflect a continued uncertainty over the reliability of subjects’ introspective judgements. Firstly, different psychophysical methods do not rely equally on the introspective capabilities of experimental subjects. I contrast “minimally introspective” tasks with “introspection-reliant” ones. It is only in the latter that introspection can be said to have a nontrivia…
Why the “stimulus-error” did not go away
Vision, Perspectivism, and Haptic Realism
In this article I examine the perceptual metaphor at the heart of perspectivism, discussing three elements: partiality, interestedness, and interaction. I argue that perspectivists should drop the visual metaphor in favor of a haptic one. Because the sense of touch requires contact and purposeful exploration on the part of the perceiver, it is obvious that with touch one apprehends an extradermal reality in virtue of and not in spite of its inter…
Hughlings Jackson and the “doctrine of concomitance”: Mind-brain theorising between metaphysics and the clinic
Crash Testing an Engineering Framework in Neuroscience: Does the Idea of Robustness Break Down
In this article, I discuss the concept of robustness in neuroscience. Various mechanisms for making systems robust have been discussed across biology and neuroscience (e.g., redundancy and fail-safes). Many of these notions originate from engineering. I argue that concepts borrowed from engineering aid neuroscientists in (1) operationalizing robustness, (2) formulating hypotheses about mechanisms for robustness, and (3) quantifying robustness. Fu…
Précis of Outside Color
Replies
Explanation in Computational Neuroscience: Causal and Non-causal
This article examines three candidate cases of non-causal explanation in computational neuroscience. I argue that there are instances of efficient coding explanation that are strongly analogous to examples of non-causal explanation in physics and biology, as presented by Batterman ([2002]), Woodward ([2003]), and Lange ([2013]). By integrating Lange’s and Woodward’s accounts, I offer a new way to elucidate the distinction between causal and non-c…
Synthesis of contraries: Hughlings Jackson on sensory-motor representation in the brain
Naturalism and the philosophy of colour ontology and perception
Reflex theory, cautionary tale: Misleading simplicity in early neuroscience
This paper takes an integrated history and philosophy of science approach to the topic of "simplicity out of complexity". The reflex theory was a framework within early twentieth century psychology and neuroscience which aimed to decompose complex behaviours and neural responses into simple reflexes. It was controversial in its time, and did not live up to its own theoretical and empirical ambitions. Examination of this episode poses important qu…
Prediction versus understanding in computationally enhanced neuroscience
Haptic realism for neuroscience
Recent work in philosophy of science has shown how the challenges posed by extremely complex systems require that scientists employ a range of modelling strategies, leading to partial perspectives that make apparently conflicting claims about the target (Mitchell 2009b, Longino 2013). The brain is of course extremely complex, and the same arguments apply here. In this paper I present a variety of perspectivism called haptic realism . This account…
The Brain Abstracted: Simplification in the History and Philosophy of Neuroscience
An exciting, new framework for interpreting the philosophical significance of neuroscience. All science needs to simplify, but when the object of research is something as complicated as the brain, this challenge can stretch the limits of scientific possibility. In fact, in The Brain Abstracted, an avowedly "opinionated" history of neuroscience, M. Chirimuuta argues that, due to the brain's complexity, neuroscientific theories have only captured p…
Why are we still suffering from the blind spot
From the Reflex Machine to the Changeable Brain
The brain is exceedingly complex. Neuroscientists have used the tried and tested simplification methods of physics, such as mathematical idealization, in order to deal with neural complexity. This paper queries the appropriateness of certain physics-derived strategies within this biological science by presenting a historical case study (the reflex theory) in which scientists fell into the trap of over-simplifying the brain and nervous system. It …
The Prehistory of the Idea that Thinking is Modelling
This paper examines early expositions of the idea that to think about an object is to construct and manipulate an internal model of that object. The origin of this idea is normally credited to Kenneth Craik (1943) but here I show that it is prefigured in the writings of two nineteenth century physicist-psychologists, Hermann von Helmholtz and Ernst Mach
Computer Science (14 works) · Philosophy (13 works) · Epistemology (12 works) · Philosophy and History of Science (12 works) · Psychology (12 works) · Cognitive science (10 works) · Artificial Intelligence (7 works) · Neuroscience (7 works) · Artificial Intelligence (6 works) · Philosophy of science (6 works)