J Mckenzie Alexander
Biographic Data
| ID | 460284 |
|---|---|
| NAME | J Mckenzie Alexander |
| GIVEN NAMES | J Mckenzie |
| FAMILY NAME | Alexander |
| SIGNATURE | ALEXANDER J M |
| AFFILIATIONS | London School of Economics and Political Science |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-2663-6993 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 19 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 37 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 18 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 1 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 1977 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2025 |
| H-INDEX | 4 |
Proofs and Research Programmes: Lakatos at 100
This open access book offers new insights into issues raised in philosophy of mathematics and in philosophy of science by Imre Lakatos.
On the Incompleteness of Classical Mechanics
Classical mechanics is often considered to be a quintessential example of a deterministic theory. I present a simple proof, using a construction mathematically analogous to that of the Pasadena game (Nover and Hájek, 2004), to show that classical mechanics is incomplete: there are uncountably many arrangements of objects in an infinite Newtonian space such that, although the system’s initial condition is fully known, it is impossible to calculate…
Evolutionary Game Theory
Evolutionary game theory originated in population biology from the realisation that frequency-dependent fitness introduced a strategic element into evolution. Since its development, evolutionary game theory has been adopted by many social scientists, and philosophers, to analyse interdependent decision problems played by boundedly rational individuals. Its study has led to theoretical innovations of great interest for the biological and social sc…
Accounting for groups: The dynamics of intragroup deliberation
In a highly influential work, List and Pettit (Group Agency: The Possibility, Design, and Status of Corporate Agents, Oxford University Press, 2011) draw upon the theory of judgement aggregation to offer an argument for the existence of nonreductive group agents; they also suggest that nonreductive group agency is a widespread phenomenon. In this paper, we argue for the following two claims. First, that the axioms they consider cannot naturally b…
Epistemic Landscapes, Optimal Search, and the Division of Cognitive Labor
This article examines two questions about scientists’ search for knowledge. First, which search strategies generate discoveries effectively? Second, is it advantageous to diversify search strategies? We argue pace Weisberg and Muldoon, “Epistemic Landscapes and the Division of Cognitive Labor” (this journal, 2009), that, on the first question, a search strategy that deliberately seeks novel research approaches need not be optimal. On the second q…
Cheap Talk, Reinforcement Learning, and the Emergence of Cooperation
Cheap talk has often been thought incapable of supporting the emergence of cooperation because costless signals, easily faked, are unlikely to be reliable. I show how, in a social network model of cheap talk with reinforcement learning, cheap talk does enable the emergence of cooperation, provided that individuals also temporally discount the past. This establishes one mechanism that suffices for moving a population of initially uncooperative ind…
Learning to Signal in a Dynamic World
Sender–receiver games, first introduced by David Lewis ([1969]), have received increased attention in recent years as a formal model for the emergence of communication. Skyrms ([2010]) showed that simple models of reinforcement learning often succeed in forming efficient, albeit not necessarily minimal, signalling systems for a large family of games. Later, Alexander et al. ([2012]) showed that reinforcement learning, combined with forgetting, fr…
Preferential Attachment and the Search for Successful Theories
Multiarm bandit problems have been used to model the selection of competing scientific theories by boundedly rational agents. In this article, I define a variable-arm bandit problem, which allows the set of scientific theories to vary over time. I show that Roth-Erev reinforcement learning, which solves multiarm bandit problems in the limit, cannot solve this problem in a reasonable time. However, social learning via preferential attachment combi…
Structural Evolution of Morality
The Structural Evolution of Morality
It is certainly the case that morality governs the interactions that take place between individuals. But what if morality exists because of these interactions? This book, first published in 2007, argues for the claim that much of the behaviour we view as 'moral' exists because acting in that way benefits each of us to the greatest extent possible, given the socially structured nature of society. Drawing upon aspects of evolutionary game theory, t…
Structural Evolution of Morality
The Evolutionary Foundations of Strong Reciprocity
Strong reciprocators possess two behavioural dispositions: they are willing to bestow benefits on those who have bestowed benefits, and they are willing to punish those who fail to bestow benefits according to some social norm. There is no doubt that peoples' behaviour, in many cases, agrees with what we would expect if people are strong reciprocators, and Fehr and Henrich argue that many people are, in fact, strong reciprocators. They also sugge…
Follow the Leader: Local Interactions with Influence Neighborhoods
We introduce a dynamic model for evolutionary games played on a network where strategy changes are correlated according to degree of influence between players. Unlike the notion of stochastic stability (Foster and Young, 1990), which assumes mutations are stochastically independent and identically distributed, our framework allows for the possibility that agents correlate their strategies with the strategies of those they trust, or those who have…
The Terror of Our Days: Four American Poets Respond to the Holocaust
Journal Article The Terror of Our Days: Four American Poets Respond to the Holocaust Get access Jonathan M. Alexander Jonathan M. Alexander Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Holocaust and Genocide Studies, Volume 18, Issue 1, Spring 2004, Pages 130–132, https://doi.org/10.1093/hgs/dch052 Published: 01 January 2004
Random Boolean Networks and Evolutionary Game Theory
Recent years have seen increased interest in the question of whether it is possible to provide an evolutionary game-theoretic explanation for certain kinds of social norms. I sketch a proof of a general representation theorem for a large class of evolutionary game-theoretic models played on a social network, in hope that this will contribute to a greater understanding of the long-term evolutionary dynamics of such models, and hence the evolution …
PSA 2000 Symposium Paper Volume Introduction
An abstract is not available for this content so a preview has been provided. Please use the Get access link above for information on how to access this content
PSA 2000 Contributed Paper Volume Introduction
An abstract is not available for this content so a preview has been provided. Please use the Get access link above for information on how to access this content
Evolutionary Explanations of Distributive Justice
Evolutionary game theoretic accounts of justice attempt to explain our willingness to follow certain principles of justice by appealing to robustness properties possessed by those principles. Skyrms (1996) offers one sketch of how such an account might go for divide-the-dollar, the simplest version of the Nash bargaining game, using the replicator dynamics of Taylor and Jonker (1978). In a recent article, D'Arms et al. (1998) criticize his accoun…
A conservative in the lodge: Malcolm Fraser's first twelve months
Epistemic Landscapes, Optimal Search, and the Division of Cognitive Labor
This article examines two questions about scientists’ search for knowledge. First, which search strategies generate discoveries effectively? Second, is it advantageous to diversify search strategies? We argue pace Weisberg and Muldoon, “Epistemic Landscapes and the Division of Cognitive Labor” (this journal, 2009), that, on the first question, a search strategy that deliberately seeks novel research approaches need not be optimal. On the second q…
Preferential Attachment and the Search for Successful Theories
Multiarm bandit problems have been used to model the selection of competing scientific theories by boundedly rational agents. In this article, I define a variable-arm bandit problem, which allows the set of scientific theories to vary over time. I show that Roth-Erev reinforcement learning, which solves multiarm bandit problems in the limit, cannot solve this problem in a reasonable time. However, social learning via preferential attachment combi…
Learning to Signal in a Dynamic World
Sender–receiver games, first introduced by David Lewis ([1969]), have received increased attention in recent years as a formal model for the emergence of communication. Skyrms ([2010]) showed that simple models of reinforcement learning often succeed in forming efficient, albeit not necessarily minimal, signalling systems for a large family of games. Later, Alexander et al. ([2012]) showed that reinforcement learning, combined with forgetting, fr…
Random Boolean Networks and Evolutionary Game Theory
Recent years have seen increased interest in the question of whether it is possible to provide an evolutionary game-theoretic explanation for certain kinds of social norms. I sketch a proof of a general representation theorem for a large class of evolutionary game-theoretic models played on a social network, in hope that this will contribute to a greater understanding of the long-term evolutionary dynamics of such models, and hence the evolution …
Follow the Leader: Local Interactions with Influence Neighborhoods
We introduce a dynamic model for evolutionary games played on a network where strategy changes are correlated according to degree of influence between players. Unlike the notion of stochastic stability (Foster and Young, 1990), which assumes mutations are stochastically independent and identically distributed, our framework allows for the possibility that agents correlate their strategies with the strategies of those they trust, or those who have…
The Evolutionary Foundations of Strong Reciprocity
Strong reciprocators possess two behavioural dispositions: they are willing to bestow benefits on those who have bestowed benefits, and they are willing to punish those who fail to bestow benefits according to some social norm. There is no doubt that peoples' behaviour, in many cases, agrees with what we would expect if people are strong reciprocators, and Fehr and Henrich argue that many people are, in fact, strong reciprocators. They also sugge…
A conservative in the lodge: Malcolm Fraser's first twelve months
Evolutionary Explanations of Distributive Justice
Evolutionary game theoretic accounts of justice attempt to explain our willingness to follow certain principles of justice by appealing to robustness properties possessed by those principles. Skyrms (1996) offers one sketch of how such an account might go for divide-the-dollar, the simplest version of the Nash bargaining game, using the replicator dynamics of Taylor and Jonker (1978). In a recent article, D'Arms et al. (1998) criticize his accoun…
PSA 2000 Contributed Paper Volume Introduction
An abstract is not available for this content so a preview has been provided. Please use the Get access link above for information on how to access this content
PSA 2000 Symposium Paper Volume Introduction
An abstract is not available for this content so a preview has been provided. Please use the Get access link above for information on how to access this content
Random Boolean Networks and Evolutionary Game Theory
Recent years have seen increased interest in the question of whether it is possible to provide an evolutionary game-theoretic explanation for certain kinds of social norms. I sketch a proof of a general representation theorem for a large class of evolutionary game-theoretic models played on a social network, in hope that this will contribute to a greater understanding of the long-term evolutionary dynamics of such models, and hence the evolution …
The Terror of Our Days: Four American Poets Respond to the Holocaust
Journal Article The Terror of Our Days: Four American Poets Respond to the Holocaust Get access Jonathan M. Alexander Jonathan M. Alexander Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Holocaust and Genocide Studies, Volume 18, Issue 1, Spring 2004, Pages 130–132, https://doi.org/10.1093/hgs/dch052 Published: 01 January 2004
The Evolutionary Foundations of Strong Reciprocity
Strong reciprocators possess two behavioural dispositions: they are willing to bestow benefits on those who have bestowed benefits, and they are willing to punish those who fail to bestow benefits according to some social norm. There is no doubt that peoples' behaviour, in many cases, agrees with what we would expect if people are strong reciprocators, and Fehr and Henrich argue that many people are, in fact, strong reciprocators. They also sugge…
Follow the Leader: Local Interactions with Influence Neighborhoods
We introduce a dynamic model for evolutionary games played on a network where strategy changes are correlated according to degree of influence between players. Unlike the notion of stochastic stability (Foster and Young, 1990), which assumes mutations are stochastically independent and identically distributed, our framework allows for the possibility that agents correlate their strategies with the strategies of those they trust, or those who have…
The Structural Evolution of Morality
It is certainly the case that morality governs the interactions that take place between individuals. But what if morality exists because of these interactions? This book, first published in 2007, argues for the claim that much of the behaviour we view as 'moral' exists because acting in that way benefits each of us to the greatest extent possible, given the socially structured nature of society. Drawing upon aspects of evolutionary game theory, t…
Structural Evolution of Morality
Structural Evolution of Morality
Preferential Attachment and the Search for Successful Theories
Multiarm bandit problems have been used to model the selection of competing scientific theories by boundedly rational agents. In this article, I define a variable-arm bandit problem, which allows the set of scientific theories to vary over time. I show that Roth-Erev reinforcement learning, which solves multiarm bandit problems in the limit, cannot solve this problem in a reasonable time. However, social learning via preferential attachment combi…
Learning to Signal in a Dynamic World
Sender–receiver games, first introduced by David Lewis ([1969]), have received increased attention in recent years as a formal model for the emergence of communication. Skyrms ([2010]) showed that simple models of reinforcement learning often succeed in forming efficient, albeit not necessarily minimal, signalling systems for a large family of games. Later, Alexander et al. ([2012]) showed that reinforcement learning, combined with forgetting, fr…
Epistemic Landscapes, Optimal Search, and the Division of Cognitive Labor
This article examines two questions about scientists’ search for knowledge. First, which search strategies generate discoveries effectively? Second, is it advantageous to diversify search strategies? We argue pace Weisberg and Muldoon, “Epistemic Landscapes and the Division of Cognitive Labor” (this journal, 2009), that, on the first question, a search strategy that deliberately seeks novel research approaches need not be optimal. On the second q…
Cheap Talk, Reinforcement Learning, and the Emergence of Cooperation
Cheap talk has often been thought incapable of supporting the emergence of cooperation because costless signals, easily faked, are unlikely to be reliable. I show how, in a social network model of cheap talk with reinforcement learning, cheap talk does enable the emergence of cooperation, provided that individuals also temporally discount the past. This establishes one mechanism that suffices for moving a population of initially uncooperative ind…
Accounting for groups: The dynamics of intragroup deliberation
In a highly influential work, List and Pettit (Group Agency: The Possibility, Design, and Status of Corporate Agents, Oxford University Press, 2011) draw upon the theory of judgement aggregation to offer an argument for the existence of nonreductive group agents; they also suggest that nonreductive group agency is a widespread phenomenon. In this paper, we argue for the following two claims. First, that the axioms they consider cannot naturally b…
Evolutionary Game Theory
Evolutionary game theory originated in population biology from the realisation that frequency-dependent fitness introduced a strategic element into evolution. Since its development, evolutionary game theory has been adopted by many social scientists, and philosophers, to analyse interdependent decision problems played by boundedly rational individuals. Its study has led to theoretical innovations of great interest for the biological and social sc…
On the Incompleteness of Classical Mechanics
Classical mechanics is often considered to be a quintessential example of a deterministic theory. I present a simple proof, using a construction mathematically analogous to that of the Pasadena game (Nover and Hájek, 2004), to show that classical mechanics is incomplete: there are uncountably many arrangements of objects in an infinite Newtonian space such that, although the system’s initial condition is fully known, it is impossible to calculate…
Proofs and Research Programmes: Lakatos at 100
This open access book offers new insights into issues raised in philosophy of mathematics and in philosophy of science by Imre Lakatos.
Computer Science (11 works) · Sociology (11 works) · Mathematics (9 works) · Epistemology (8 works) · Game Theory and Applications (8 works) · Philosophy (8 works) · Economics (7 works) · Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation (7 works) · Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies (6 works) · Mathematical economics (6 works)