Mohammad Saleh Zarepour
Biographic Data
| ID | 460392 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Mohammad Saleh Zarepour |
| GIVEN NAMES | Mohammad Saleh |
| FAMILY NAME | Zarepour |
| SIGNATURE | ZAREPOUR M S |
| AFFILIATIONS | University of Manchester |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-5356-1691 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 17 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 3 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 17 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2016 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2025 |
| H-INDEX | 1 |
‘I Am Darkness’: On Liar-Style Anti-Dualist Arguments in Kalām
In the medieval Islamic world, dualism—i.e. the view that reality is constituted of two incompatible ultimate substances, the light and the darkness—was sometimes criticised by appealing to liar-style paradoxes. Here, I discuss three of such criticisms developed in the tradition of classical Islamic Kalām at around the same time by Abū Bakr al-Baqillānī (d. 1013), Qāḍī ʿAbd al-Jabbār (d. 1025), and ʿAbd al-Qāhir al-Baghdādī (d. 1037)
No Easy Road to PSR
Rehabilitating an argument originally proposed by Leibniz, Michael Della Rocca has offered a new argument for the Principle of Sufficient Reason. A crucial element of this argument is that, for every x, the fact that x does not brutely fail to exist is an untrivial requisite of x’s existence. Criticising this claim, I show that the new argument for PSR fails
PSR , Modal Collapse, and Open Future in Ibn Sīnā's Philosophy
It has been contended that the Principle of Sufficient Reason (PSR) implies necessitarianism—that is, the view that everything occurs out of necessity. Discussing a well‐known argument for this claim developed by contemporary metaphysicians, I show that Ibn Sīnā has anticipated a counterpart of this argument, and that is precisely why he is usually described as a necessitarian. This raises a puzzle because he also appears to endorse the existence…
Avicenna on empty intentionality: A case study in analytical Avicennianism
Appealing to some analytic tools developed by contemporary analytic philosophers, I discuss Avicenna’s views regarding the problem(s) of linguistic and mental reference to non-existents, also known as the problem(s) of ‘empty intentionality’. I argue that, according to Avicenna, being in an intentional state directed towards an existing thing involves three elements: (1) an indirect relation to that thing, (2) a direct relation to a mental repres…
Dashtakī's Solution to the Liar Paradox: A Synthesis of the Earlier Solutions Proposed by Ṭūsī and Samarqandī
Ṣadr al-Dīn al-Dashtakī (d. 1498) has proposed a solution to the liar paradox according to which the liar sentence is a self-referential sentence in which the predicate ‘false’ is iterated. Discussing the conditions for the truth-aptness of the sentences with nested and iterated instances of the predicates ‘true’ and/or ‘false’, Dashtakī argued that the liar sentence is not truth-apt at all. In the tradition of Arabic logic, the central elements …
Islamic Philosophy of Religion: Essays from Analytic Perspectives
Counting to infinity, successive addition, and the length of the past
The Successive Addition Argument (SAA) is one of the arguments proposed by the defenders of the Kalām Cosmological Argument to support the claim that the universe has a beginning. The main premise of SAA states that a collection formed by successive addition cannot be an actual infinite. This premise is challenged by an argument originally proposed by Fred Dretske. According to Dretske’s Argument (DA), the scenario of a counter who starts countin…
The Existence and Nature of Deities
An abstract is not available for this content. As you have access to this content, full HTML content is provided on this page. A PDF of this content is also available in through the ‘Save PDF’ action button
Relationality of intentionality
At face value, intentionality is a relational notion. There are, however, arguments intended to show that it is not. I categorize the strongest arguments against the relationality of intentionality into three major groups: Brentanian arguments, Fregean arguments, and Quinean arguments. I argue that, despite their prima facie plausibility, none of these arguments eventually succeeds. I then conclude that, in the absence of defeating evidence again…
Abharī’s Solution to the Liar Paradox: A Logical Analysis
The medieval Islamic solutions to the liar paradox can be categorized into three different families. According to the solutions of the first family, the liar sentences are not well-formed truth-apt sentences. The solutions of the second family are based on a violation of the classical principles of logic (e.g. the principle of non-contradiction). Finally, the solutions of the third family render the liar sentences as simply false without any cont…
Infinite Magnitudes, Infinite Multitudes, and the Beginning of the Universe
W.L. Craig has argued that the universe has a beginning because (1) the infinitude of the past entails the existence of actual infinite multitudes of past intervals of time, and (2) the existence of actual infinite multitudes is impossible. Puryear has rejected (1) and argued that what the infinitude of the past entails is only the existence of an actual infinite magnitude of past time. But this does not preclude the infinitude of the past, Purye…
Avicenna on Grasping Mathematical Concepts
According to Avicenna, some of the objects of mathematics exist and some do not. Every existing mathematical object is a non-sensible connotational attribute of a physical object and can be perceived by the faculty of estimation. Non-existing mathematical objects can be represented and perceived by the faculty of imagination through separating and combining parts of the images of existing mathematical objects that are previously perceived by esti…
Avicenna on Mathematical Infinity
Avicenna believed in mathematical finitism. He argued that magnitudes and sets of ordered numbers and numbered things cannot be actually infinite. In this paper, I discuss his arguments against the actuality of mathematical infinity. A careful analysis of the subtleties of his main argument, i. e., The Mapping Argument , shows that, by employing the notion of correspondence as a tool for comparing the sizes of mathematical infinities, he arrived …
God's propositional omniscience: A defence of the strictly restricted account
By discussing three different understandings of the notion of God's propositional omniscience from a theistic point of view, I show that the strictly restricted account (SPO) – according to which God knows all true propositions that He can know – is preferable to the two other candidates as the standard interpretation of God's propositional omniscience. To establish this conclusion, I argue that Pruss's argument that strictly restricted omniscien…
Avicenna against Mathematical Platonism
In this paper I investigate Avicenna’s criticisms of the separateness of mathematical objects and of the view that they are principles for natural things. These two theses form the core of Plato’s view of mathematics; i.e., mathematical Platonism . Surprisingly, Avicenna does not consider his arguments against these theses as attacks on Plato. This is because his understanding of Plato’s philosophy of mathematics differs from both Plato’s origina…
Concept originalism, reference-shift and belief reports
Concept originalism, recently introduced and defended by Sainsbury and Tye (S&T) (Proc Aristotelian Soc Suppl Vol 85:101–124, 2011, Seven puzzles of thought and how to solve them: an originalist theory of concepts. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2012), Tye (in Brogaard, Does perception have content? Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2014), and Sainsbury (Erkenntnis 80:195–214, 2015), holds that “atomic concepts are to be individuated by their hi…
Avicenna on the Nature of Mathematical Objects
Some authors have proposed that Avicenna considers mathematical objects, i.e., geometric shapes and numbers, to be mental existents completely separated from matter. In this paper, I will show that this description, though not completely wrong, is misleading. Avicenna endorses, I will argue, some sort of literalism, potentialism, and finitism
Avicenna on the Nature of Mathematical Objects
Some authors have proposed that Avicenna considers mathematical objects, i.e., geometric shapes and numbers, to be mental existents completely separated from matter. In this paper, I will show that this description, though not completely wrong, is misleading. Avicenna endorses, I will argue, some sort of literalism, potentialism, and finitism
Concept originalism, reference-shift and belief reports
Concept originalism, recently introduced and defended by Sainsbury and Tye (S&T) (Proc Aristotelian Soc Suppl Vol 85:101–124, 2011, Seven puzzles of thought and how to solve them: an originalist theory of concepts. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2012), Tye (in Brogaard, Does perception have content? Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2014), and Sainsbury (Erkenntnis 80:195–214, 2015), holds that “atomic concepts are to be individuated by their hi…
Avicenna against Mathematical Platonism
In this paper I investigate Avicenna’s criticisms of the separateness of mathematical objects and of the view that they are principles for natural things. These two theses form the core of Plato’s view of mathematics; i.e., mathematical Platonism . Surprisingly, Avicenna does not consider his arguments against these theses as attacks on Plato. This is because his understanding of Plato’s philosophy of mathematics differs from both Plato’s origina…
Avicenna on Mathematical Infinity
Avicenna believed in mathematical finitism. He argued that magnitudes and sets of ordered numbers and numbered things cannot be actually infinite. In this paper, I discuss his arguments against the actuality of mathematical infinity. A careful analysis of the subtleties of his main argument, i. e., The Mapping Argument , shows that, by employing the notion of correspondence as a tool for comparing the sizes of mathematical infinities, he arrived …
God's propositional omniscience: A defence of the strictly restricted account
By discussing three different understandings of the notion of God's propositional omniscience from a theistic point of view, I show that the strictly restricted account (SPO) – according to which God knows all true propositions that He can know – is preferable to the two other candidates as the standard interpretation of God's propositional omniscience. To establish this conclusion, I argue that Pruss's argument that strictly restricted omniscien…
Relationality of intentionality
At face value, intentionality is a relational notion. There are, however, arguments intended to show that it is not. I categorize the strongest arguments against the relationality of intentionality into three major groups: Brentanian arguments, Fregean arguments, and Quinean arguments. I argue that, despite their prima facie plausibility, none of these arguments eventually succeeds. I then conclude that, in the absence of defeating evidence again…
Abharī’s Solution to the Liar Paradox: A Logical Analysis
The medieval Islamic solutions to the liar paradox can be categorized into three different families. According to the solutions of the first family, the liar sentences are not well-formed truth-apt sentences. The solutions of the second family are based on a violation of the classical principles of logic (e.g. the principle of non-contradiction). Finally, the solutions of the third family render the liar sentences as simply false without any cont…
Infinite Magnitudes, Infinite Multitudes, and the Beginning of the Universe
W.L. Craig has argued that the universe has a beginning because (1) the infinitude of the past entails the existence of actual infinite multitudes of past intervals of time, and (2) the existence of actual infinite multitudes is impossible. Puryear has rejected (1) and argued that what the infinitude of the past entails is only the existence of an actual infinite magnitude of past time. But this does not preclude the infinitude of the past, Purye…
Avicenna on Grasping Mathematical Concepts
According to Avicenna, some of the objects of mathematics exist and some do not. Every existing mathematical object is a non-sensible connotational attribute of a physical object and can be perceived by the faculty of estimation. Non-existing mathematical objects can be represented and perceived by the faculty of imagination through separating and combining parts of the images of existing mathematical objects that are previously perceived by esti…
Counting to infinity, successive addition, and the length of the past
The Successive Addition Argument (SAA) is one of the arguments proposed by the defenders of the Kalām Cosmological Argument to support the claim that the universe has a beginning. The main premise of SAA states that a collection formed by successive addition cannot be an actual infinite. This premise is challenged by an argument originally proposed by Fred Dretske. According to Dretske’s Argument (DA), the scenario of a counter who starts countin…
The Existence and Nature of Deities
An abstract is not available for this content. As you have access to this content, full HTML content is provided on this page. A PDF of this content is also available in through the ‘Save PDF’ action button
Islamic Philosophy of Religion: Essays from Analytic Perspectives
Avicenna on empty intentionality: A case study in analytical Avicennianism
Appealing to some analytic tools developed by contemporary analytic philosophers, I discuss Avicenna’s views regarding the problem(s) of linguistic and mental reference to non-existents, also known as the problem(s) of ‘empty intentionality’. I argue that, according to Avicenna, being in an intentional state directed towards an existing thing involves three elements: (1) an indirect relation to that thing, (2) a direct relation to a mental repres…
Dashtakī's Solution to the Liar Paradox: A Synthesis of the Earlier Solutions Proposed by Ṭūsī and Samarqandī
Ṣadr al-Dīn al-Dashtakī (d. 1498) has proposed a solution to the liar paradox according to which the liar sentence is a self-referential sentence in which the predicate ‘false’ is iterated. Discussing the conditions for the truth-aptness of the sentences with nested and iterated instances of the predicates ‘true’ and/or ‘false’, Dashtakī argued that the liar sentence is not truth-apt at all. In the tradition of Arabic logic, the central elements …
‘I Am Darkness’: On Liar-Style Anti-Dualist Arguments in Kalām
In the medieval Islamic world, dualism—i.e. the view that reality is constituted of two incompatible ultimate substances, the light and the darkness—was sometimes criticised by appealing to liar-style paradoxes. Here, I discuss three of such criticisms developed in the tradition of classical Islamic Kalām at around the same time by Abū Bakr al-Baqillānī (d. 1013), Qāḍī ʿAbd al-Jabbār (d. 1025), and ʿAbd al-Qāhir al-Baghdādī (d. 1037)
No Easy Road to PSR
Rehabilitating an argument originally proposed by Leibniz, Michael Della Rocca has offered a new argument for the Principle of Sufficient Reason. A crucial element of this argument is that, for every x, the fact that x does not brutely fail to exist is an untrivial requisite of x’s existence. Criticising this claim, I show that the new argument for PSR fails
PSR , Modal Collapse, and Open Future in Ibn Sīnā's Philosophy
It has been contended that the Principle of Sufficient Reason (PSR) implies necessitarianism—that is, the view that everything occurs out of necessity. Discussing a well‐known argument for this claim developed by contemporary metaphysicians, I show that Ibn Sīnā has anticipated a counterpart of this argument, and that is precisely why he is usually described as a necessitarian. This raises a puzzle because he also appears to endorse the existence…
Philosophy (16 works) · Epistemology (14 works) · Medieval and Classical Philosophy (11 works) · Mathematics (9 works) · Computer Science (5 works) · Islamic Studies and History (5 works) · Linguistics (5 works) · Families in Therapy and Culture (4 works) · Historical, Religious, and Philosophical Studies (4 works) · Mathematical analysis (4 works)