Michael B Gill
Biographic Data
| ID | 460922 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Michael B Gill |
| GIVEN NAMES | Michael B |
| FAMILY NAME | Gill |
| SIGNATURE | GILL M B |
| AFFILIATIONS | University of Arizona |
| ORCID | 0000-0001-6798-1550 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 15 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 27 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 15 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 1996 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2026 |
| H-INDEX | 3 |
The Non‐Professional Virtues of the Hospice Volunteer
Volunteers have long played a significant role in hospice care. Much of the care volunteers provide consists of weekly hour‐long in‐home visits. Home‐visiting hospice volunteers are not professionals, nor are they strangers or intimates. Hospice volunteers will not typically face moral dilemmas, nor be called upon to make dramatic decisions. Nonetheless, hospice volunteering can exemplify a neglected area of in‐between ethics – a subset of what B…
Humean constructivism and the authoritative ought
What makes it true that we authoritatively ought to perform an action? I examine Humean constructivist answers to that question, according to which what makes it true that we authoritatively ought to perform an action is that we would, were we to reflect properly, have a certain kind of positive response toward performing the action. I distinguish two kinds of Humean constructivist views: substantivist and formalist. Substantivists believe there …
The theoretical and practical arguments against the unilateral withdrawal of life‐sustaining treatment during crisis standards of care: Does the Knobe effect apply to unilateral withdrawal
Some argue that it is ethically justifiable to unilaterally withdraw life‐sustaining treatment during crisis standards of care without the patient's consent in order to reallocate it to another patient with a better chance of survival. This justification has been supported by two lines of argument: the equivalence thesis and the rule of the double effect. We argue that there are theoretical issues with the first and practical ones with the second…
Humean Moral Pluralism
Michael B. Gill offers a new account of Humean moral pluralism: the view that there are different moral reasons for action, which are based on human sentiments. He explores its historical origins, and argues that it offers the most compelling view of our moral experience. Together, pluralism and Humeanism make a philosophically powerful couple
From Cambridge Platonism to Scottish Sentimentalism
The Cambridge Platonists were a group of religious thinkers who attended and taught at Cambridge from the 1640s until the 1660s. The four most important of them were Benjamin Whichcote, John Smith, Ralph Cudworth, and Henry More. The most prominent sentimentalist moral philosophers of the Scottish Enlightenment – Hutcheson, Hume, and Adam Smith – knew of the works of the Cambridge Platonists. But the Scottish sentimentalists typically referred to…
Side Constraints and the Structure of Commonsense Ethics
Moral Phenomenology in Hutcheson and Hume
Moral Phenomenology in Hutcheson and Hume Michael B. Gill (bio) 1. Introduction Moral phenomenology, as i will use the term in this paper, is the study of our experience of morality. It is the study of morality “as experienced from the first-person point of view,”1 the study of the “what-it-is-like features of concrete moral experiences,”2 the study of introspectively accessible features that can be discerned by “a direct examination of the data …
Teaching & Learning Guide for: Moral Rationalism Vs. Moral Sentimentalism: Is Morality More Like Math or Beauty
Author's Introduction In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, British philosophers began to advance the view that morality originated not in the external commands of God or sovereign nor in self‐interest but in a non‐selfish principle internal to human nature. These philosophers disagreed, however, about what that internal principle was. The rationalists (such as Ralph Cudworth, Samuel Clarke, and John Balguy) maintained that morality origin…
Moral Rationalism vs. Moral Sentimentalism: Is Morality More Like Math or Beauty
One of the most significant disputes in early modern philosophy was between the moral rationalists and the moral sentimentalists. The moral rationalists – such as Ralph Cudworth, Samuel Clarke, and John Balguy – held that morality originated in reason alone. The moral sentimentalists – such as Anthony Ashley Cooper, the third Earl of Shaftesbury, Francis Hutcheson, and David Hume – held that morality originated at least partly in sentiment. In ad…
Variability and moral phenomenology
A moral defense of Oregon's physician-assisted suicide law
Since 1998, physician-assisted suicide has been legal in the American state of Oregon. In this paper, I defend Oregon's physician-assisted suicide (PAS) law against two of the most common objections raised against it. First, I try to show that it is not intrinsically wrong for someone with a terminal disease to kill herself. Second, I try to show that it is not intrinsically wrong for physicians to assist someone with a terminal disease who has r…
Picu Prometheus: Ethical issues in the treatment of very sick children in paediatric intensive care
Through a focus on one child's extended stay in a Pediatric Intensive Care Unit, I raise four general questions about pediatric medicine: How should physicians communicate with parents of very sick children? How should physicians involve parents of very sick children in treatment decisions? How should care be coordinated when a child is being treated by different medical teams with rotating personnel? Should the guidelines for making judgments of…
Shaftesbury's Two Accounts of the Reason to be Virtuous
1. Anthony Ashley Cooper, the third Earl of Shaftesbury (1671-1713), was the founder of the moral sense school, or the first British philosopher to develop the position that moral distinctions originate in sentiment and not in reason alone. Shaftesbury thus struck the initial blow in the battle waged by sentimentalists such as Hutcheson and Hume against rationalists such as Cudworth and Clarke. Such is a common view of Shaftesbury's place in the …
Relativity and the Concept of Morality
A Philosopher in his Closet: Reflexivity and Justification in Hume's Moral Theory
When a man of business enters into life and action, he is more apt to consider the characters of men, as they have relation to his interest, than as they stand in themselves; and has his judgement warped on every occasion by the violence of his passion. When a philosopher contemplates characters and manners in his closet, the general abstract view of the objects leaves the mind so cold and unmoved, that the sentiments of nature have no room to pl…
A Philosopher in his Closet: Reflexivity and Justification in Hume's Moral Theory
When a man of business enters into life and action, he is more apt to consider the characters of men, as they have relation to his interest, than as they stand in themselves; and has his judgement warped on every occasion by the violence of his passion. When a philosopher contemplates characters and manners in his closet, the general abstract view of the objects leaves the mind so cold and unmoved, that the sentiments of nature have no room to pl…
Humean Moral Pluralism
Michael B. Gill offers a new account of Humean moral pluralism: the view that there are different moral reasons for action, which are based on human sentiments. He explores its historical origins, and argues that it offers the most compelling view of our moral experience. Together, pluralism and Humeanism make a philosophically powerful couple
Side Constraints and the Structure of Commonsense Ethics
From Cambridge Platonism to Scottish Sentimentalism
The Cambridge Platonists were a group of religious thinkers who attended and taught at Cambridge from the 1640s until the 1660s. The four most important of them were Benjamin Whichcote, John Smith, Ralph Cudworth, and Henry More. The most prominent sentimentalist moral philosophers of the Scottish Enlightenment – Hutcheson, Hume, and Adam Smith – knew of the works of the Cambridge Platonists. But the Scottish sentimentalists typically referred to…
Moral Phenomenology in Hutcheson and Hume
Moral Phenomenology in Hutcheson and Hume Michael B. Gill (bio) 1. Introduction Moral phenomenology, as i will use the term in this paper, is the study of our experience of morality. It is the study of morality “as experienced from the first-person point of view,”1 the study of the “what-it-is-like features of concrete moral experiences,”2 the study of introspectively accessible features that can be discerned by “a direct examination of the data …
Variability and moral phenomenology
Shaftesbury's Two Accounts of the Reason to be Virtuous
1. Anthony Ashley Cooper, the third Earl of Shaftesbury (1671-1713), was the founder of the moral sense school, or the first British philosopher to develop the position that moral distinctions originate in sentiment and not in reason alone. Shaftesbury thus struck the initial blow in the battle waged by sentimentalists such as Hutcheson and Hume against rationalists such as Cudworth and Clarke. Such is a common view of Shaftesbury's place in the …
A Philosopher in his Closet: Reflexivity and Justification in Hume's Moral Theory
When a man of business enters into life and action, he is more apt to consider the characters of men, as they have relation to his interest, than as they stand in themselves; and has his judgement warped on every occasion by the violence of his passion. When a philosopher contemplates characters and manners in his closet, the general abstract view of the objects leaves the mind so cold and unmoved, that the sentiments of nature have no room to pl…
Relativity and the Concept of Morality
Shaftesbury's Two Accounts of the Reason to be Virtuous
1. Anthony Ashley Cooper, the third Earl of Shaftesbury (1671-1713), was the founder of the moral sense school, or the first British philosopher to develop the position that moral distinctions originate in sentiment and not in reason alone. Shaftesbury thus struck the initial blow in the battle waged by sentimentalists such as Hutcheson and Hume against rationalists such as Cudworth and Clarke. Such is a common view of Shaftesbury's place in the …
A moral defense of Oregon's physician-assisted suicide law
Since 1998, physician-assisted suicide has been legal in the American state of Oregon. In this paper, I defend Oregon's physician-assisted suicide (PAS) law against two of the most common objections raised against it. First, I try to show that it is not intrinsically wrong for someone with a terminal disease to kill herself. Second, I try to show that it is not intrinsically wrong for physicians to assist someone with a terminal disease who has r…
Picu Prometheus: Ethical issues in the treatment of very sick children in paediatric intensive care
Through a focus on one child's extended stay in a Pediatric Intensive Care Unit, I raise four general questions about pediatric medicine: How should physicians communicate with parents of very sick children? How should physicians involve parents of very sick children in treatment decisions? How should care be coordinated when a child is being treated by different medical teams with rotating personnel? Should the guidelines for making judgments of…
Moral Rationalism vs. Moral Sentimentalism: Is Morality More Like Math or Beauty
One of the most significant disputes in early modern philosophy was between the moral rationalists and the moral sentimentalists. The moral rationalists – such as Ralph Cudworth, Samuel Clarke, and John Balguy – held that morality originated in reason alone. The moral sentimentalists – such as Anthony Ashley Cooper, the third Earl of Shaftesbury, Francis Hutcheson, and David Hume – held that morality originated at least partly in sentiment. In ad…
Variability and moral phenomenology
Teaching & Learning Guide for: Moral Rationalism Vs. Moral Sentimentalism: Is Morality More Like Math or Beauty
Author's Introduction In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, British philosophers began to advance the view that morality originated not in the external commands of God or sovereign nor in self‐interest but in a non‐selfish principle internal to human nature. These philosophers disagreed, however, about what that internal principle was. The rationalists (such as Ralph Cudworth, Samuel Clarke, and John Balguy) maintained that morality origin…
Side Constraints and the Structure of Commonsense Ethics
Moral Phenomenology in Hutcheson and Hume
Moral Phenomenology in Hutcheson and Hume Michael B. Gill (bio) 1. Introduction Moral phenomenology, as i will use the term in this paper, is the study of our experience of morality. It is the study of morality “as experienced from the first-person point of view,”1 the study of the “what-it-is-like features of concrete moral experiences,”2 the study of introspectively accessible features that can be discerned by “a direct examination of the data …
From Cambridge Platonism to Scottish Sentimentalism
The Cambridge Platonists were a group of religious thinkers who attended and taught at Cambridge from the 1640s until the 1660s. The four most important of them were Benjamin Whichcote, John Smith, Ralph Cudworth, and Henry More. The most prominent sentimentalist moral philosophers of the Scottish Enlightenment – Hutcheson, Hume, and Adam Smith – knew of the works of the Cambridge Platonists. But the Scottish sentimentalists typically referred to…
Humean Moral Pluralism
Michael B. Gill offers a new account of Humean moral pluralism: the view that there are different moral reasons for action, which are based on human sentiments. He explores its historical origins, and argues that it offers the most compelling view of our moral experience. Together, pluralism and Humeanism make a philosophically powerful couple
The theoretical and practical arguments against the unilateral withdrawal of life‐sustaining treatment during crisis standards of care: Does the Knobe effect apply to unilateral withdrawal
Some argue that it is ethically justifiable to unilaterally withdraw life‐sustaining treatment during crisis standards of care without the patient's consent in order to reallocate it to another patient with a better chance of survival. This justification has been supported by two lines of argument: the equivalence thesis and the rule of the double effect. We argue that there are theoretical issues with the first and practical ones with the second…
Humean constructivism and the authoritative ought
What makes it true that we authoritatively ought to perform an action? I examine Humean constructivist answers to that question, according to which what makes it true that we authoritatively ought to perform an action is that we would, were we to reflect properly, have a certain kind of positive response toward performing the action. I distinguish two kinds of Humean constructivist views: substantivist and formalist. Substantivists believe there …
The Non‐Professional Virtues of the Hospice Volunteer
Volunteers have long played a significant role in hospice care. Much of the care volunteers provide consists of weekly hour‐long in‐home visits. Home‐visiting hospice volunteers are not professionals, nor are they strangers or intimates. Hospice volunteers will not typically face moral dilemmas, nor be called upon to make dramatic decisions. Nonetheless, hospice volunteering can exemplify a neglected area of in‐between ethics – a subset of what B…
Philosophical Ethics and Theory (11 works) · Epistemology (9 works) · Philosophy (8 works) · Philosophy (6 works) · Psychology (6 works) · Ethics in medical practice (5 works) · Moral psychology (5 works) · Morality (5 works) · Political Philosophy and Ethics (4 works) · History (3 works)