Michael Silberstein
Biographic Data
| ID | 461099 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Michael Silberstein |
| GIVEN NAMES | Michael |
| FAMILY NAME | Silberstein |
| SIGNATURE | SILBERSTEIN M |
| AFFILIATIONS | Elizabethtown College |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-3690-0356 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 8 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 85 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 7 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 1 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 1995 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2022 |
| H-INDEX | 3 |
Emergence in Context: A Treatise in Twenty-First Century Natural Philosophy
This is a book about the multidisciplinary topic of emergence. Science, philosophy of science, and metaphysics have long been concerned with the question of how order, stability, and novelty are possible and how they happen. How can order come out of disorder? We provide a new account of emergence, contextual emergence, that attempts to answer these questions. Contextual emergence is grounded primarily in the sciences, as opposed to logic or meta…
Constraints on Localization and Decomposition as Explanatory Strategies in the Biological Sciences
Several articles have recently appeared arguing that there really are no viable alternatives to mechanistic explanation in the biological sciences (Kaplan and Bechtel; Kaplan and Craver). We argue that mechanistic explanation is defined by localization and decomposition. We argue further that systems neuroscience contains explanations that violate both localization and decomposition. We conclude that the mechanistic model of explanation needs to …
Blackwell Guide to the Philosophy of Science
Why quantum mechanics favors adynamical and acausal interpretations such as relational blockworld over backwardly causal and time-symmetric rivals
After the Philosophy of Mind: Replacing Scholasticism with Science
We provide a taxonomy of the two most important debates in the philosophy of the cognitive and neural sciences. The first debate is over methodological individualism: is the object of the cognitive and neural sciences the brain, the whole animal, or the animal—environment system? The second is over explanatory style: should explanation in cognitive and neural science be reductionist-mechanistic, interlevel mechanistic, or dynamical? After setting…
The Blackwell Guide to the Philosophy of Science
The Search for Ontological Emergence
We survey and clarify some recent appearances of the term ‘emergence’. We distinguish epistemological emergence, which is merely a limitation of descriptive apparatus, from ontological emergence, which should involve causal features of a whole system not reducible to the properties of its parts, thus implying the failure of part/whole reductionism and of mereological supervenience for that system. Are there actually any plausible cases of the lat…
For whom the Bell arguments toll
After the Philosophy of Mind: Replacing Scholasticism with Science
We provide a taxonomy of the two most important debates in the philosophy of the cognitive and neural sciences. The first debate is over methodological individualism: is the object of the cognitive and neural sciences the brain, the whole animal, or the animal—environment system? The second is over explanatory style: should explanation in cognitive and neural science be reductionist-mechanistic, interlevel mechanistic, or dynamical? After setting…
Constraints on Localization and Decomposition as Explanatory Strategies in the Biological Sciences
Several articles have recently appeared arguing that there really are no viable alternatives to mechanistic explanation in the biological sciences (Kaplan and Bechtel; Kaplan and Craver). We argue that mechanistic explanation is defined by localization and decomposition. We argue further that systems neuroscience contains explanations that violate both localization and decomposition. We conclude that the mechanistic model of explanation needs to …
The Search for Ontological Emergence
We survey and clarify some recent appearances of the term ‘emergence’. We distinguish epistemological emergence, which is merely a limitation of descriptive apparatus, from ontological emergence, which should involve causal features of a whole system not reducible to the properties of its parts, thus implying the failure of part/whole reductionism and of mereological supervenience for that system. Are there actually any plausible cases of the lat…
Emergence in Context: A Treatise in Twenty-First Century Natural Philosophy
This is a book about the multidisciplinary topic of emergence. Science, philosophy of science, and metaphysics have long been concerned with the question of how order, stability, and novelty are possible and how they happen. How can order come out of disorder? We provide a new account of emergence, contextual emergence, that attempts to answer these questions. Contextual emergence is grounded primarily in the sciences, as opposed to logic or meta…
For whom the Bell arguments toll
For whom the Bell arguments toll
The Search for Ontological Emergence
We survey and clarify some recent appearances of the term ‘emergence’. We distinguish epistemological emergence, which is merely a limitation of descriptive apparatus, from ontological emergence, which should involve causal features of a whole system not reducible to the properties of its parts, thus implying the failure of part/whole reductionism and of mereological supervenience for that system. Are there actually any plausible cases of the lat…
The Blackwell Guide to the Philosophy of Science
Blackwell Guide to the Philosophy of Science
Why quantum mechanics favors adynamical and acausal interpretations such as relational blockworld over backwardly causal and time-symmetric rivals
After the Philosophy of Mind: Replacing Scholasticism with Science
We provide a taxonomy of the two most important debates in the philosophy of the cognitive and neural sciences. The first debate is over methodological individualism: is the object of the cognitive and neural sciences the brain, the whole animal, or the animal—environment system? The second is over explanatory style: should explanation in cognitive and neural science be reductionist-mechanistic, interlevel mechanistic, or dynamical? After setting…
Constraints on Localization and Decomposition as Explanatory Strategies in the Biological Sciences
Several articles have recently appeared arguing that there really are no viable alternatives to mechanistic explanation in the biological sciences (Kaplan and Bechtel; Kaplan and Craver). We argue that mechanistic explanation is defined by localization and decomposition. We argue further that systems neuroscience contains explanations that violate both localization and decomposition. We conclude that the mechanistic model of explanation needs to …
Emergence in Context: A Treatise in Twenty-First Century Natural Philosophy
This is a book about the multidisciplinary topic of emergence. Science, philosophy of science, and metaphysics have long been concerned with the question of how order, stability, and novelty are possible and how they happen. How can order come out of disorder? We provide a new account of emergence, contextual emergence, that attempts to answer these questions. Contextual emergence is grounded primarily in the sciences, as opposed to logic or meta…
Epistemology (7 works) · Philosophy (7 works) · Philosophy and History of Science (4 works) · Quantum Mechanics and Applications (4 works) · Mathematics (3 works) · Metaphysics (3 works) · Philosophy of science (3 works) · Psychology (3 works) · Reductionism (3 works) · Cognitive science (2 works)