Shay Lavie
Biographic Data
| ID | 4619636 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Shay Lavie |
| GIVEN NAMES | Shay |
| FAMILY NAME | Lavie |
| SIGNATURE | LAVIE S |
| AFFILIATIONS | Tel Aviv University |
| ORCID | 0000-0001-6866-4055 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 4 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 1 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 4 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2023 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2025 |
| H-INDEX | 1 |
Information-signaling in pre-trial bargaining
Winner pays
Many meritorious claims do not reach the courts due to the prohibitive costs that are associated with access to justice. While third-party funding, through nonrecourse loans, is often available, the market cannot help all claims. For instance, where the claim lacks clear monetary value (e.g., an injunction), or has little monetary value, market-based funding seems futile. Inspired by the third-party funding industry, we suggest public, nonrecours…
Judgment-Contingent Penalties
This paper explores judgment-contingent commitments as a signaling device in settings that implicate negative-expected-value (NEV) cases. We present two signaling options in which the informed party promises, in case of a loss at trial, to incur some loss in addition to the judgment. In the first, the additional amount is not transferred to the rival litigant (for example, commitment to pay a charity conditional on losing at trial). In the second…
Stepwise liability
There are two familiar decision rules: the binary, preponderance of the evidence and the continuous, proportional liability rule. This article proposes a thought experiment. Instead of all-or-nothing or a continuous rule, the law can utilise a middle ground—assigning liability stepwise, according to the procedural progression of the case—stepwise liability. Stepwise liability relies on the gradual design of civil procedure. Under the current syst…
Stepwise liability
There are two familiar decision rules: the binary, preponderance of the evidence and the continuous, proportional liability rule. This article proposes a thought experiment. Instead of all-or-nothing or a continuous rule, the law can utilise a middle ground—assigning liability stepwise, according to the procedural progression of the case—stepwise liability. Stepwise liability relies on the gradual design of civil procedure. Under the current syst…
Judgment-Contingent Penalties
This paper explores judgment-contingent commitments as a signaling device in settings that implicate negative-expected-value (NEV) cases. We present two signaling options in which the informed party promises, in case of a loss at trial, to incur some loss in addition to the judgment. In the first, the additional amount is not transferred to the rival litigant (for example, commitment to pay a charity conditional on losing at trial). In the second…
Stepwise liability
There are two familiar decision rules: the binary, preponderance of the evidence and the continuous, proportional liability rule. This article proposes a thought experiment. Instead of all-or-nothing or a continuous rule, the law can utilise a middle ground—assigning liability stepwise, according to the procedural progression of the case—stepwise liability. Stepwise liability relies on the gradual design of civil procedure. Under the current syst…
Winner pays
Many meritorious claims do not reach the courts due to the prohibitive costs that are associated with access to justice. While third-party funding, through nonrecourse loans, is often available, the market cannot help all claims. For instance, where the claim lacks clear monetary value (e.g., an injunction), or has little monetary value, market-based funding seems futile. Inspired by the third-party funding industry, we suggest public, nonrecours…
Information-signaling in pre-trial bargaining
Actuarial science (2 works) · Economics (2 works) · Law and economics (2 works) · Law, Economics, and Judicial Systems (2 works) · Legal and Constitutional Studies (2 works) · Microeconomics (2 works) · Business (1 work) · Civil procedure (1 work) · Computer Science (1 work) · Contrast (vision) (1 work)