Tapas Kundu
Biographic Data
| ID | 4619640 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Tapas Kundu |
| GIVEN NAMES | Tapas |
| FAMILY NAME | Kundu |
| SIGNATURE | KUNDU T |
| AFFILIATIONS | UiT The Arctic University of Norway |
| ORCID | 0000-0003-1814-7230 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 4 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 0 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 4 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2014 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2025 |
| H-INDEX | 0 |
Investment incentives in contests
Competition among rivals is often modeled as a contest in which the probability of winning is increasing in own effort. We consider incentives for players to attempt to influence their winning chances by undertaking a pre-contest investment. Investment costs are private information, and the outcome is stochastic. We characterize equilibrium by a threshold of the cost parameter that determines investment, and delineate cases where all players inve…
Investing to get a head start in contests
On rational forward-looking behavior in economic geography
This paper adapts the canonical New Economic Geography model for experimental testing of the model's behavioral assumptions by developing a finite-player, finite-horizon dynamic game of migration. Our analysis gives distinctive predictions when migration is consistent with myopic behavior (MB) and when it is consistent with sequentially rational or perfect forward-looking behavior (FB). These alternatives are tested in an economic laboratory expe…
Resistance, redistribution and investor-friendliness
No prominent works on this page.
Resistance, redistribution and investor-friendliness
On rational forward-looking behavior in economic geography
This paper adapts the canonical New Economic Geography model for experimental testing of the model's behavioral assumptions by developing a finite-player, finite-horizon dynamic game of migration. Our analysis gives distinctive predictions when migration is consistent with myopic behavior (MB) and when it is consistent with sequentially rational or perfect forward-looking behavior (FB). These alternatives are tested in an economic laboratory expe…
Investment incentives in contests
Competition among rivals is often modeled as a contest in which the probability of winning is increasing in own effort. We consider incentives for players to attempt to influence their winning chances by undertaking a pre-contest investment. Investment costs are private information, and the outcome is stochastic. We characterize equilibrium by a threshold of the cost parameter that determines investment, and delineate cases where all players inve…
Investing to get a head start in contests
Economic Policies and Impacts (2 works) · Economics (2 works) · Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies (2 works) · Incentive (2 works) · Attractiveness (1 works) · Business (1 works) · Computer Science (1 works) · CONTEST (1 works) · Econometrics (1 works) · Economic surplus (1 works)