Emily Adlam
Biographic Data
| ID | 462065 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Emily Adlam |
| GIVEN NAMES | Emily |
| FAMILY NAME | Adlam |
| SIGNATURE | ADLAM E |
| AFFILIATIONS | Chapman University |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-5998-7685 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 12 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 8 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 12 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2014 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2026 |
| H-INDEX | 2 |
How Do We Observe Relational Observables
In theories with a diffeomorphism symmetry, such as general relativity and canonical quantum gravity, it is often proposed that the empirical content is encoded in relational observables. But how do relational observables actually make contact with experience? I argue that this question can only be answered by providing a schematization of the observer which is appropriate for the context of a diffeomorphism-invariant theory. I suggest that this …
Relational observables, quiddities, and structural realism
In this article, I argue that modern spacetime physics causes problems for a number of traditional accounts of modality, but also offers important new ideas about the connection between modal and non-modal features of reality. I suggest that recent work on relational observables in general relativity and quantum gravity can help us understand how non-modal features of reality could arise from modal features of reality within some form of modal on…
Moderate Physical Perspectivalism
Recent developments in the foundations of physics have given rise to a class of views suggesting that physically meaningful descriptions must always be relativized to a physical perspective. In this article, I distinguish between strong physical perspectivalism, which maintains that all facts must be relativized to a perspective, and moderate physical perspectivalism, which maintains that all empirically meaningful descriptions must be relativize…
Quantum field theory and the limits of reductionism
I suggest that the current situation in quantum field theory (QFT) provides some reason to question the universal validity of ontological reductionism. I argue that the renormalization group flow is reversible except at fixed points, which makes the relation between large and small distance scales quite symmetric in QFT, opening up at least the technical possibility of a non-reductionist approach to QFT. I suggest that some conceptual problems en…
Against Self-Location
I distinguish between pure self-locating credences and superficially self-locating credences, and argue that there is never any rationally compelling way to assign pure self-locating credences. I first argue that from a practical point of view, pure self-locating credences simply encode our pragmatic goals, and thus pragmatic rationality does not dictate how they must be set. I then use considerations motivated by Bertrand's paradox to argue that…
Is there causation in fundamental physics? New insights from process matrices and quantum causal modelling
The Temporal Asymmetry of Influence Is Not Statistical
I argue that the temporal asymmetry of influence is not merely the result of thermodynamics: it is a consequence of the fact that the modal structure of the universe must admit only processes that cannot give rise to contradictions. I appeal to the process matrix formalism developed in the field of quantum foundations to characterize processes that are compatible with local free will while ruling out contradictions, and I argue that this gives ri…
Disappearing without a Trace: The Arrows of Time in Kent's Solution to the Lorentzian Quantum Reality Problem
Most existing proposals to explain the temporal asymmetries we see around us are sited within an approach to physics based on time evolution, and thus they typically put the asymmetry in at the beginning of time in the form of a special initial state. But there may be other possibilities for explaining temporal asymmetries if we don’t presuppose the time-evolution paradigm. In this article, I explore one such possibility, based on Kent’s ‘final-m…
Two roads to retrocausality
Does science need intersubjectivity? The problem of confirmation in orthodox interpretations of quantum mechanics
Operational theories as structural realism
The problem of confirmation in the Everett interpretation
Is there causation in fundamental physics? New insights from process matrices and quantum causal modelling
Two roads to retrocausality
Does science need intersubjectivity? The problem of confirmation in orthodox interpretations of quantum mechanics
Against Self-Location
I distinguish between pure self-locating credences and superficially self-locating credences, and argue that there is never any rationally compelling way to assign pure self-locating credences. I first argue that from a practical point of view, pure self-locating credences simply encode our pragmatic goals, and thus pragmatic rationality does not dictate how they must be set. I then use considerations motivated by Bertrand's paradox to argue that…
Operational theories as structural realism
The problem of confirmation in the Everett interpretation
Two roads to retrocausality
Does science need intersubjectivity? The problem of confirmation in orthodox interpretations of quantum mechanics
Operational theories as structural realism
Is there causation in fundamental physics? New insights from process matrices and quantum causal modelling
The Temporal Asymmetry of Influence Is Not Statistical
I argue that the temporal asymmetry of influence is not merely the result of thermodynamics: it is a consequence of the fact that the modal structure of the universe must admit only processes that cannot give rise to contradictions. I appeal to the process matrix formalism developed in the field of quantum foundations to characterize processes that are compatible with local free will while ruling out contradictions, and I argue that this gives ri…
Disappearing without a Trace: The Arrows of Time in Kent's Solution to the Lorentzian Quantum Reality Problem
Most existing proposals to explain the temporal asymmetries we see around us are sited within an approach to physics based on time evolution, and thus they typically put the asymmetry in at the beginning of time in the form of a special initial state. But there may be other possibilities for explaining temporal asymmetries if we don’t presuppose the time-evolution paradigm. In this article, I explore one such possibility, based on Kent’s ‘final-m…
Quantum field theory and the limits of reductionism
I suggest that the current situation in quantum field theory (QFT) provides some reason to question the universal validity of ontological reductionism. I argue that the renormalization group flow is reversible except at fixed points, which makes the relation between large and small distance scales quite symmetric in QFT, opening up at least the technical possibility of a non-reductionist approach to QFT. I suggest that some conceptual problems en…
Against Self-Location
I distinguish between pure self-locating credences and superficially self-locating credences, and argue that there is never any rationally compelling way to assign pure self-locating credences. I first argue that from a practical point of view, pure self-locating credences simply encode our pragmatic goals, and thus pragmatic rationality does not dictate how they must be set. I then use considerations motivated by Bertrand's paradox to argue that…
Relational observables, quiddities, and structural realism
In this article, I argue that modern spacetime physics causes problems for a number of traditional accounts of modality, but also offers important new ideas about the connection between modal and non-modal features of reality. I suggest that recent work on relational observables in general relativity and quantum gravity can help us understand how non-modal features of reality could arise from modal features of reality within some form of modal on…
Moderate Physical Perspectivalism
Recent developments in the foundations of physics have given rise to a class of views suggesting that physically meaningful descriptions must always be relativized to a physical perspective. In this article, I distinguish between strong physical perspectivalism, which maintains that all facts must be relativized to a perspective, and moderate physical perspectivalism, which maintains that all empirically meaningful descriptions must be relativize…
How Do We Observe Relational Observables
In theories with a diffeomorphism symmetry, such as general relativity and canonical quantum gravity, it is often proposed that the empirical content is encoded in relational observables. But how do relational observables actually make contact with experience? I argue that this question can only be answered by providing a schematization of the observer which is appropriate for the context of a diffeomorphism-invariant theory. I suggest that this …
Epistemology (10 works) · Philosophy (10 works) · Quantum Mechanics and Applications (9 works) · Philosophy and History of Science (8 works) · Philosophy of science (7 works) · Physics (7 works) · Theoretical physics (7 works) · Philosophy and Theoretical Science (6 works) · Quantum mechanics (6 works) · Computer Science (5 works)