K Lindsey Chambers
Biographic Data
| ID | 4623099 |
|---|---|
| NAME | K Lindsey Chambers |
| GIVEN NAMES | K Lindsey |
| FAMILY NAME | Chambers |
| SIGNATURE | CHAMBERS K L |
| AFFILIATIONS | University of Kentucky |
| ORCID | 0000-0001-8747-2294 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 4 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 0 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 4 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2020 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2026 |
| H-INDEX | 0 |
Enhancement, Autonomy, and the Limits of Beneficence
Procreative enhancement involves someone making a choice about what genetic trait(s) another person will have. Such control over the body (and mind) of another person, even if done for the recipient's benefit, threatens to overstep the moral boundary between persons. The use of genetic interventions to “enhance” one's offspring without their consent may violate that person's future autonomy. Schaefer, Kahane, and Savulescu argue, however, that th…
A Non-Solution to the Non-Identity Problem
Parental Labor as Cooperative Labor
The procreative justice debate asks whether justice, and in particular whether a principle of fair play, requires that non‐parents share in the costs of procreation and child‐rearing. The principle of fair play demands that persons who benefit from the cooperative labor of others share in the burdens of producing that benefit. Non‐parents should share in the costs of procreation and child‐rearing if reproductive and parental labor count as cooper…
It’s Complicated
Many accounts of the morality of abortion assume that early fetuses must all have or lack moral status in virtue of developmental features that they share. Our actual attitudes toward early fetuses don’t reflect this all-or-nothing assumption. If we start with the assumption that our attitudes toward fetuses are accurately tracking their value, then we need an account of fetal moral status that can explain why it is appropriate to love some fetus…
No prominent works on this page.
It’s Complicated
Many accounts of the morality of abortion assume that early fetuses must all have or lack moral status in virtue of developmental features that they share. Our actual attitudes toward early fetuses don’t reflect this all-or-nothing assumption. If we start with the assumption that our attitudes toward fetuses are accurately tracking their value, then we need an account of fetal moral status that can explain why it is appropriate to love some fetus…
A Non-Solution to the Non-Identity Problem
Parental Labor as Cooperative Labor
The procreative justice debate asks whether justice, and in particular whether a principle of fair play, requires that non‐parents share in the costs of procreation and child‐rearing. The principle of fair play demands that persons who benefit from the cooperative labor of others share in the burdens of producing that benefit. Non‐parents should share in the costs of procreation and child‐rearing if reproductive and parental labor count as cooper…
Enhancement, Autonomy, and the Limits of Beneficence
Procreative enhancement involves someone making a choice about what genetic trait(s) another person will have. Such control over the body (and mind) of another person, even if done for the recipient's benefit, threatens to overstep the moral boundary between persons. The use of genetic interventions to “enhance” one's offspring without their consent may violate that person's future autonomy. Schaefer, Kahane, and Savulescu argue, however, that th…
Epistemology (2 works) · Medicine (2 works) · Philosophical Ethics and Theory (2 works) · Philosophy (2 works) · Sociology (2 works) · Abortion (1 work) · Autonomy (1 work) · Beneficence (1 work) · Bioethics (1 work) · Biology (1 work)