Michael Finus
Biographic Data
| ID | 4686160 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Michael Finus |
| GIVEN NAMES | Michael |
| FAMILY NAME | Finus |
| SIGNATURE | FINUS M |
| AFFILIATIONS | FernUniversität in Hagen |
| ORCID | 0000-0001-8248-2768 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 6 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 5 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 6 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 1998 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2025 |
| H-INDEX | 1 |
Institution formation in weakest-link games
We study the role of endogenous formation of institutions in overcoming coordination failures in weakest-link games with fixed neighborhoods. In our setting, institutions are weak and only form and make decisions by unanimity. Experimental results show that such institutions are formed and mitigate the coordination problem, raising equilibrium provision levels, but falling short of providing Pareto-optimal contributions. Given the multiplicity of…
Is the risk of North–South technology transfer failure an obstacle to a cooperative climate change agreement
Measures to enhance the success of global climate treaties
A Micro Foundation of Core Stability in Positive-Externality Coalition Games
We argue that the new approach for studying coalitions has some advantages over the classical approach: it is better at capturing externalities between coalitions and provides a micro foundation of the coalition formation process that can be related to the design of an agreement. However, we also recognize that the core is an appealing concept of the classical approach. Therefore, we develop a H-game in the spirit of the Δ- and Γ-games of Hart an…
The effect of membership rules and voting schemes on the success of international climate agreements
Toward a positive theory of coalition formation and endogenous instrumental choice in global pollution control
Toward a positive theory of coalition formation and endogenous instrumental choice in global pollution control
The effect of membership rules and voting schemes on the success of international climate agreements
A Micro Foundation of Core Stability in Positive-Externality Coalition Games
We argue that the new approach for studying coalitions has some advantages over the classical approach: it is better at capturing externalities between coalitions and provides a micro foundation of the coalition formation process that can be related to the design of an agreement. However, we also recognize that the core is an appealing concept of the classical approach. Therefore, we develop a H-game in the spirit of the Δ- and Γ-games of Hart an…
Measures to enhance the success of global climate treaties
Is the risk of North–South technology transfer failure an obstacle to a cooperative climate change agreement
Institution formation in weakest-link games
We study the role of endogenous formation of institutions in overcoming coordination failures in weakest-link games with fixed neighborhoods. In our setting, institutions are weak and only form and make decisions by unanimity. Experimental results show that such institutions are formed and mitigate the coordination problem, raising equilibrium provision levels, but falling short of providing Pareto-optimal contributions. Given the multiplicity of…
Climate Change Policy and Economics (5 works) · Computer Science (5 works) · Economics (5 works) · Political science (5 works) · Fiscal Policy and Economic Growth (4 works) · Law (4 works) · Microeconomics (4 works) · Law (3 works) · Business (2 works) · Climate change (2 works)