J J Cunningham
Biographic Data
| ID | 4705 |
|---|---|
| NAME | J J Cunningham |
| GIVEN NAMES | J J |
| FAMILY NAME | Cunningham |
| SIGNATURE | CUNNINGHAM J J |
| AFFILIATIONS | Jesus College, University of Oxford |
| ORCID | 0000-0003-2832-3824 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 8 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 6 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 8 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 1971 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2025 |
| H-INDEX | 1 |
Factivism Defended
[email protected] a recent article, Nathan Howard argues that normative reasons for action are to be identified not with facts, but with fact/goal pairs. For example, on Howard’s view, the reason in favor of me cooking the meal is not the fact that I promised—rather, it is that fact PLUS the goal to honor my promises. Howard supplies three arguments for his preferred view. In this reply I aim to do two things. The first is to unde…
The matter of motivating reasons
It is now standard in the literature on reasons and rationality to distinguish normative reasons from motivating reasons. Two issues have dominated philosophical theorising concerning the latter: (i) whether we should think of them as certain (nonfactive) psychological states of the agent—the dispute over Psychologism; and (ii) whether we should say that the agent can φ for the reason that p only if p—the dispute over Factivism. This paper first …
Moral Worth and Knowing How to Respond to Reasons
It's one thing to do the right thing. It's another to be creditable for doing the right thing. Being creditable for doing the right thing requires that one does the right thing out of a morally laudable motive and that there is a non‐accidental fit between those two elements. This paper argues that the two main views of morally creditable action – the Right‐Making Features View and the Rightness Itself View – fail to capture that non‐accidentalit…
Determined by Reasons
Is believing for a normative reason a composite condition
Here is a surprisingly neglected question in contemporary epistemology: what is it for an agent to believe that p in response to a normative reason for them to believe that p? On one style of answer, believing for the normative reason that q factors into believing that p in the light of the apparent reason that q, where one can be in that kind of state even if q is false, in conjunction with further independent conditions such as q’s being a norm…
The Formulation of Disjunctivism About φ-ing for a Reason
We can contrast rationalising explanations of the form S φs because p with those of the form S φs because S believes that p. According the Common Kind View, the two sorts of explanation are the same. The Disjunctive View denies this. This paper sets out to elucidate the sense in which the Common Kind Theorist asserts, but the Disjunctivist denies, that the two explanations are the same. I suggest that, in the light of the distinction between kind…
Field teaching
Development of field teaching as an alternative form of education is an extension of the effort to provide formal education for handicapped and gifted children and adults who have been excluded from appropriate education in the United States. This effort is a continuing expression of the social movements generated by Dorthea Dix, Samuel Gridley Howe, and Jane Addams. One contemporary effort in the development of this alternative was conducted at …
Test, label, and crunch
Field teaching
Development of field teaching as an alternative form of education is an extension of the effort to provide formal education for handicapped and gifted children and adults who have been excluded from appropriate education in the United States. This effort is a continuing expression of the social movements generated by Dorthea Dix, Samuel Gridley Howe, and Jane Addams. One contemporary effort in the development of this alternative was conducted at …
Moral Worth and Knowing How to Respond to Reasons
It's one thing to do the right thing. It's another to be creditable for doing the right thing. Being creditable for doing the right thing requires that one does the right thing out of a morally laudable motive and that there is a non‐accidental fit between those two elements. This paper argues that the two main views of morally creditable action – the Right‐Making Features View and the Rightness Itself View – fail to capture that non‐accidentalit…
Determined by Reasons
Is believing for a normative reason a composite condition
Here is a surprisingly neglected question in contemporary epistemology: what is it for an agent to believe that p in response to a normative reason for them to believe that p? On one style of answer, believing for the normative reason that q factors into believing that p in the light of the apparent reason that q, where one can be in that kind of state even if q is false, in conjunction with further independent conditions such as q’s being a norm…
The Formulation of Disjunctivism About φ-ing for a Reason
We can contrast rationalising explanations of the form S φs because p with those of the form S φs because S believes that p. According the Common Kind View, the two sorts of explanation are the same. The Disjunctive View denies this. This paper sets out to elucidate the sense in which the Common Kind Theorist asserts, but the Disjunctivist denies, that the two explanations are the same. I suggest that, in the light of the distinction between kind…
Test, label, and crunch
Field teaching
Development of field teaching as an alternative form of education is an extension of the effort to provide formal education for handicapped and gifted children and adults who have been excluded from appropriate education in the United States. This effort is a continuing expression of the social movements generated by Dorthea Dix, Samuel Gridley Howe, and Jane Addams. One contemporary effort in the development of this alternative was conducted at …
Is believing for a normative reason a composite condition
Here is a surprisingly neglected question in contemporary epistemology: what is it for an agent to believe that p in response to a normative reason for them to believe that p? On one style of answer, believing for the normative reason that q factors into believing that p in the light of the apparent reason that q, where one can be in that kind of state even if q is false, in conjunction with further independent conditions such as q’s being a norm…
The Formulation of Disjunctivism About φ-ing for a Reason
We can contrast rationalising explanations of the form S φs because p with those of the form S φs because S believes that p. According the Common Kind View, the two sorts of explanation are the same. The Disjunctive View denies this. This paper sets out to elucidate the sense in which the Common Kind Theorist asserts, but the Disjunctivist denies, that the two explanations are the same. I suggest that, in the light of the distinction between kind…
Determined by Reasons
Moral Worth and Knowing How to Respond to Reasons
It's one thing to do the right thing. It's another to be creditable for doing the right thing. Being creditable for doing the right thing requires that one does the right thing out of a morally laudable motive and that there is a non‐accidental fit between those two elements. This paper argues that the two main views of morally creditable action – the Right‐Making Features View and the Rightness Itself View – fail to capture that non‐accidentalit…
The matter of motivating reasons
It is now standard in the literature on reasons and rationality to distinguish normative reasons from motivating reasons. Two issues have dominated philosophical theorising concerning the latter: (i) whether we should think of them as certain (nonfactive) psychological states of the agent—the dispute over Psychologism; and (ii) whether we should say that the agent can φ for the reason that p only if p—the dispute over Factivism. This paper first …
Factivism Defended
[email protected] a recent article, Nathan Howard argues that normative reasons for action are to be identified not with facts, but with fact/goal pairs. For example, on Howard’s view, the reason in favor of me cooking the meal is not the fact that I promised—rather, it is that fact PLUS the goal to honor my promises. Howard supplies three arguments for his preferred view. In this reply I aim to do two things. The first is to unde…
Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics (6 works) · Epistemology (5 works) · Philosophical Ethics and Theory (5 works) · Free Will and Agency (4 works) · Normative (4 works) · Philosophy (4 works) · Psychology (4 works) · Sociology (4 works) · Computer Science (3 works) · Philosophy (3 works)