Raquel Tebaldi
Biographic Data
| ID | 4789210 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Raquel Tebaldi |
| GIVEN NAMES | Raquel |
| FAMILY NAME | Tebaldi |
| SIGNATURE | TEBALDI R |
| AFFILIATIONS | UNU-MERIT |
| ORCID | 0000-0003-2621-1300 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 3 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 0 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 3 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2024 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2025 |
| H-INDEX | 0 |
Social protection and the climate crisis
The 2024 floods in the state of Rio Grande do Sul, Brazil, prompted the largest and most rapid response to an extreme weather event in the country’s history. Brazil is a compelling case for analysing shock‐responsive and climate‐adaptive social protection because of its high level of decentralization and significant maturity of its social protection system. Brazil is also highly susceptible to climate risks, and as climate change intensifies, bri…
Electoral Rules and the Provision of Early Childhood Education and Care
This paper investigates whether electoral rules impact the expansion of public early childhood education and care (ECEC) services using Brazil as a case study. These services are provided mainly by Brazilian municipalities, and although enrolment for children aged 0 to 3 is not mandatory, it has increased continuously over the last two decades, with large heterogeneity between municipalities. Furthermore, electoral rules in Brazil establish a dua…
Re-election incentives and the adoption of early childhood development programmes
What incentives matter for governments to adopt pro-poor early childhood development (ECD) policies? This paper addresses this question by employing a regression discontinuity design (RDD) to study the effect of mayoral re-election incentives on the adoption of the “Happy Child” ECD Programme in Brazil. The analysis finds that municipalities with first-term mayors (those that were eligible for re-election for another consecutive mandate) had a hi…
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Re-election incentives and the adoption of early childhood development programmes
What incentives matter for governments to adopt pro-poor early childhood development (ECD) policies? This paper addresses this question by employing a regression discontinuity design (RDD) to study the effect of mayoral re-election incentives on the adoption of the “Happy Child” ECD Programme in Brazil. The analysis finds that municipalities with first-term mayors (those that were eligible for re-election for another consecutive mandate) had a hi…
Social protection and the climate crisis
The 2024 floods in the state of Rio Grande do Sul, Brazil, prompted the largest and most rapid response to an extreme weather event in the country’s history. Brazil is a compelling case for analysing shock‐responsive and climate‐adaptive social protection because of its high level of decentralization and significant maturity of its social protection system. Brazil is also highly susceptible to climate risks, and as climate change intensifies, bri…
Electoral Rules and the Provision of Early Childhood Education and Care
This paper investigates whether electoral rules impact the expansion of public early childhood education and care (ECEC) services using Brazil as a case study. These services are provided mainly by Brazilian municipalities, and although enrolment for children aged 0 to 3 is not mandatory, it has increased continuously over the last two decades, with large heterogeneity between municipalities. Furthermore, electoral rules in Brazil establish a dua…
Economic growth (2 works) · Economics (2 works) · Political science (2 works) · Poverty, Education, and Child Welfare (2 works) · Business (1 works) · Child care (1 works) · Child Nutrition and Water Access (1 works) · Climate change (1 works) · Corporate governance (1 works) · Decentralization (1 works)