Evgeni Peev
Biographic Data
| ID | 4789496 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Evgeni Peev |
| GIVEN NAMES | Evgeni |
| FAMILY NAME | Peev |
| SIGNATURE | PEEV E |
| AFFILIATIONS | Institute of Agricultural Economics |
| ORCID | 0000-0003-2925-9326 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 5 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 2 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 5 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 1995 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2013 |
| H-INDEX | 1 |
Determinants of Ultimate Control of Large Firms in Transition Countries: Empirical Evidence
We identify the ultimate ownership structures of the 20 largest firms in 12 transition countries in 1996, and the subsequent patterns of ownership change over 1996-2008. Of the state-controlled companies in 1996 more than half are still in state hands in 2008. Better quality of governmental institutions, larger external but not domestic government debt, smaller company size, and higher company profitability increase the likelihood of privatizatio…
La liaison banques-entreprises sous le régime de Currency Board: Étude empirique pour la Bulgarie
This study of bank loans in the larger context of bank-firm relations under the Bulgarian Currency Board focuses on the 'intersection' between credit supply and demand from the point of view of both banks and firms. Both traditional and new hypotheses are suggested that correspond to specific conditions in Bulgaria: the ownership change, the corruption resulting from the transi- tion and other institutional and political factors. Using a cross-se…
Property rights, managerial strategies and enterprise adjustment: Bulgaria in transition
2000). Property rights, managerial strategies and enterprise adjustment: Bulgaria in transition. Journal of Southern Europe and the Balkans: Vol. 2, No. 1, pp. 39-55
Auswahlbibliographie Bulgarien (1994-1996)
Separation of ownership and control in transition: The case of Bulgaria
SINCE THE BEGINNING OF THE 1990s state enterprise transformation in Bulgaria has encountered three difficulties. First, the unestablished property rights and enterprise autonomy create the conditions for discretionary managerial behaviour. At first glance this is the problem of inefficient insiders. Second, the withdrawal of the state from enterprise control and the lack of new owners generate conditions for strong political influence on the mana…
Separation of ownership and control in transition: The case of Bulgaria
SINCE THE BEGINNING OF THE 1990s state enterprise transformation in Bulgaria has encountered three difficulties. First, the unestablished property rights and enterprise autonomy create the conditions for discretionary managerial behaviour. At first glance this is the problem of inefficient insiders. Second, the withdrawal of the state from enterprise control and the lack of new owners generate conditions for strong political influence on the mana…
Separation of ownership and control in transition: The case of Bulgaria
SINCE THE BEGINNING OF THE 1990s state enterprise transformation in Bulgaria has encountered three difficulties. First, the unestablished property rights and enterprise autonomy create the conditions for discretionary managerial behaviour. At first glance this is the problem of inefficient insiders. Second, the withdrawal of the state from enterprise control and the lack of new owners generate conditions for strong political influence on the mana…
Auswahlbibliographie Bulgarien (1994-1996)
Property rights, managerial strategies and enterprise adjustment: Bulgaria in transition
2000). Property rights, managerial strategies and enterprise adjustment: Bulgaria in transition. Journal of Southern Europe and the Balkans: Vol. 2, No. 1, pp. 39-55
La liaison banques-entreprises sous le régime de Currency Board: Étude empirique pour la Bulgarie
This study of bank loans in the larger context of bank-firm relations under the Bulgarian Currency Board focuses on the 'intersection' between credit supply and demand from the point of view of both banks and firms. Both traditional and new hypotheses are suggested that correspond to specific conditions in Bulgaria: the ownership change, the corruption resulting from the transi- tion and other institutional and political factors. Using a cross-se…
Determinants of Ultimate Control of Large Firms in Transition Countries: Empirical Evidence
We identify the ultimate ownership structures of the 20 largest firms in 12 transition countries in 1996, and the subsequent patterns of ownership change over 1996-2008. Of the state-controlled companies in 1996 more than half are still in state hands in 2008. Better quality of governmental institutions, larger external but not domestic government debt, smaller company size, and higher company profitability increase the likelihood of privatizatio…
Business (4 works) · Economics (4 works) · Banking stability, regulation, efficiency (2 works) · Chemistry (2 works) · Corporate Finance and Governance (2 works) · Management (2 works) · Mathematics (2 works) · Transition (genetics (2 works) · Banking Systems and Strategies (1 works) · Bulgarian (1 works)