William G Lycan

Biographic Data

ID486029
NAMEWilliam G Lycan
GIVEN NAMESWilliam G
FAMILY NAMELycan
SIGNATURELYCAN W G
AFFILIATIONSUniversity of North Carolina at Chapel Hill
ORCID0009-0000-2500-7565
VERIFIEDYes
TOTAL WORKS36
TOTAL CITATIONS33
AUTHOR COUNT36
EDITOR COUNT0
FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR1969
LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR2026
H-INDEX4

  • Philosophy of Language: A Contemporary Introduction

    William G LycanBOOKPhilosophy of Language2026

    Now in its fourth edition, Philosophy of Language: A Contemporary Introduction introduces students to the main issues and theories in twenty-first-century philosophy of language, focusing specifically on linguistic phenomena. Author William G. Lycan structures the book’s thirteen chapters into four general parts. Part I, Reference and referring, includes topics such as Russell’s Theory of Descriptions (and its failings), Donnellan’s distinction, …

  • Explanationist Seeking Agreement with Bergmann

    Open AccessWilliam G LycanARTICLECanadian Journal of Philosophy2024

    This paper expresses extensive agreement with Michael Bergmann’s position in Radical Skepticism and Epistemic Intuition , but (i) offers a simpler response to the skeptic, (ii) takes issue with Bergmann’s strong claim that an “evil demon” hypothesis is as good an explanation of our sensory experiences as is the natural realist explanation, and (iii) corrects a misunderstanding about explanationists’ canons of theory preference

  • Can a Moral Judgment Be Moorean?

    William G LycanCHAPTEROxford Handbook of Moral Realism2023

    G. E. Moore claimed to refute versions of idealism and skepticism by citing plain truths of “common sense,” such as that he had his breakfast before he had lunch, or that he has hands. Assuming arguendo that he succeeded against at least some of his opponents, are there moral judgments that can similarly overturn one or more varieties of moral antirealism? This chapter argues that if Moore did ever succeed, parallel appeals to commonsense moral j…

  • On Evidence in Philosophy

    William G LycanBOOKOn Evidence in Philosophy2019

  • Slurs and lexical presumption

    Open AccessWilliam G LycanARTICLELanguage Sciences2015Cited by: 1References: 17

  • Desire Considered as a Propositional Attitude

    Open AccessWilliam G LycanARTICLEPhilosophical Perspectives2012Cited by: 3References: 7

  • Philosophy of Language: A Contemporary Introduction

    William G LycanBOOKPhilosophy of Language2008

  • Berger on Fictional Names

    Open AccessWilliam G LycanARTICLEPhilosophy and Phenomenological…2006

  • Philosophy of Mind

    Open AccessWilliam G LycanOTHERThe Blackwell Companion to…2002

    This chapter contains sections titled: Mind-Body Dualism Behaviourism The Identity Theory Machine Functionalism Cognitive Psychology Artificial Intelligence and the Computer Model of the Mind Homuncular Functionalism and Other Teleological Theories Problems with Qualia and Consciousness Problems with Intentionality The ‘Language of Thought’ Hypothesis Instrumentalism Eliminativism and Neurophilosophy The Status of ‘Folk Psychology’

  • Real Conditionals

    Brian Weatherson, William G LycanARTICLEThe Philosophical Review2002

  • Consciousness as Internal Monitoring, I: The Third Philosophical Perspectives Lecture

    William G LycanARTICLEPhilosophical Perspectives1995Cited by: 5

    William G. Lycan, Consciousness as Internal Monitoring, I: The Third Philosophical Perspectives Lecture, Philosophical Perspectives, Vol. 9, AI, Connectionism and Philosophical Psychology (1995), pp. 1-14

  • Consciousness (Bradford Books)

    William G LycanBOOKConsciousness (Bradford Books)1995

  • Sartwell's minimalist analysis of knowing

    Open AccessWilliam G LycanARTICLEPhilosophical Studies1994

  • MPP, Rip

    William G LycanARTICLEPhilosophical Perspectives1993Cited by: 2

  • Consciousness Explained

    William G LycanREVIEWThe Philosophical Review1993Cited by: 5

  • Judgement and Justification

    Jonathan Vogel, William G LycanARTICLEPhilosophy and Phenomenological…1993Cited by: 1

  • XII—Two—No, Three—Concepts of Possible Worlds

    William G LycanARTICLEProceedings of the Aristotelian…1991

    XII—Two—No, Three—Concepts of Possible Worlds Get access William G. Lycan William G. Lycan Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 91, Issue 1, 1 June 1991, Pages 215–228, https://doi.org/10.1093/aristotelian/91.1.215 Published: 09 September 2015

  • Judgment and Justification

    Lynne Rudder Baker, William G LycanARTICLEThe Philosophical Review1991

  • Why We Should Care Whether Our Beliefs Are True

    William G LycanARTICLEPhilosophy and Phenomenological…1991

    Stephen Stich has issued a compelling multiple challenge to all of epistemology, both traditional and -contemporary. Volumes of response are called for; here I want only to comment on chapter 5, Do We Really Care Whether Our Beliefs are True? Stich is certainly right in two of his main contentions: Traditional epistemology has obsessively tied doxastic justification to the notion of truth; and once we see just what is and once it has been compare…

  • What is the "Subjectivity" of the Mental

    William G LycanARTICLEPhilosophical Perspectives1990Cited by: 2

    If materialism is true, then human beings are large collections of small physical objects, and ontologically nothing more than that. It follows that any human being could be described, and described completely,2 in purely scientific terms. Such a description could in principle be written out by another, second human being, in the third person, and could be understood and verified by yet a third human being, ditto. Anti-materialists and would-be m…

  • Consciousness

    Willem A Devries, William G LycanARTICLEThe Philosophical Review1990

  • Knowing Who

    Carol Rovane, Carol A Rovane et al.ARTICLEThe Philosophical Review1989

  • Logical form in Natural Language

    Jay David Atlas, William G LycanARTICLELanguage1988

  • Logical Form in Natural Language

    Samuel Guttenplan, S D Guttenplan et al.ARTICLEThe Philosophical Quarterly1988

    Journal Article Book Reviews Get access Logical Form in Natural Language. By W. G. Lycan. (Cambridge, Mass. and London: MIT Press, 1984. Pp. xii + 348. Price £28.75.) Eva Schaper Eva Schaper Birkbeck College Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Philosophical Quarterly, Volume 38, Issue 153, October 1988, Pages 538–543, https://doi.org/10.2307/2219720 Published: 01 October 1988

  • Phenomenal Objects: A Backhanded Defense

    William G LycanARTICLEPhilosophical Perspectives1987References: 3