Michel Grabisch
Biographic Data
| ID | 4867839 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Michel Grabisch |
| GIVEN NAMES | Michel |
| FAMILY NAME | Grabisch |
| SIGNATURE | GRABISCH M |
| AFFILIATIONS | Centre d'Économie de la Sorbonne |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-3283-1496 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 18 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 4 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 18 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2005 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2026 |
| H-INDEX | 1 |
Formation of international environmental agreements and payoffallocation
Dealing with climate change requires that all countries engage in costlyefforts to reduce their emissions. Reaching this objective has so far beenelusive because it is in the best interest of each country to let the othersdo the effort and benefit itself from a better environment. The presence ofnegative externalities and strategic behavior have made game theory anatural paradigm to design an international environmental agreement (IEA)that codifi…
When social networks polarize
In the present paper, we study opinion dynamics in a social network, where individuals only listen to those with opinion not farther away than a given threshold from their own opinion (known as bounded confidence models, proposed by Hegselmann and Krause). It is well known that in bounded confidence models consensus does not always exist, and that agents split in clusters (polarization), with convergence to consensus in each cluster. We are preci…
Dynamic Network Formation with Farsighted Players and Limited Capacities
Formation of International Environmental Agreements and Payoff Allocation
Professor Peter Sudhölter (1957–2024)
Diffusion in large networks
Anti-Conformism in the threshold Model of Collective Behavior
A model of anonymous influence with anti-conformist agents
Monotone decomposition of 2-additive Generalized Additive Independence models
On a Class of Vertices of the Core
Characterizations of solutions for games with precedence constraints
Bases and linear transforms of TU-games and cooperation systems
Preserving coalitional rationality for non-balanced games
Anonymous social influence
A model of influence based on aggregation functions
Values on regular games under Kirchhoff’s laws
Representation of preferences over a finite scale by a mean operator
Axiomatic structure of k-additive capacities
Axiomatic structure of k-additive capacities
Representation of preferences over a finite scale by a mean operator
Values on regular games under Kirchhoff’s laws
Anonymous social influence
A model of influence based on aggregation functions
Preserving coalitional rationality for non-balanced games
Characterizations of solutions for games with precedence constraints
Bases and linear transforms of TU-games and cooperation systems
On a Class of Vertices of the Core
Monotone decomposition of 2-additive Generalized Additive Independence models
Anti-Conformism in the threshold Model of Collective Behavior
A model of anonymous influence with anti-conformist agents
Diffusion in large networks
Professor Peter Sudhölter (1957–2024)
Dynamic Network Formation with Farsighted Players and Limited Capacities
Formation of International Environmental Agreements and Payoff Allocation
Formation of international environmental agreements and payoffallocation
Dealing with climate change requires that all countries engage in costlyefforts to reduce their emissions. Reaching this objective has so far beenelusive because it is in the best interest of each country to let the othersdo the effort and benefit itself from a better environment. The presence ofnegative externalities and strategic behavior have made game theory anatural paradigm to design an international environmental agreement (IEA)that codifi…
When social networks polarize
In the present paper, we study opinion dynamics in a social network, where individuals only listen to those with opinion not farther away than a given threshold from their own opinion (known as bounded confidence models, proposed by Hegselmann and Krause). It is well known that in bounded confidence models consensus does not always exist, and that agents split in clusters (polarization), with convergence to consensus in each cluster. We are preci…
Mathematical economics (14 works) · Mathematics (13 works) · Computer Science (10 works) · Game Theory and Applications (9 works) · Game Theory and Voting Systems (7 works) · Opinion Dynamics and Social Influence (7 works) · Complex Network Analysis Techniques (6 works) · Economics (6 works) · Game theory (4 works) · Multi-Criteria Decision Making (4 works)