Manuel Garcia-Carpintero
Biographic Data
| ID | 490450 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Manuel Garcia-Carpintero |
| GIVEN NAMES | Manuel |
| FAMILY NAME | Garcia-Carpintero |
| SIGNATURE | GARCIA-CARPINTERO M |
| AFFILIATIONS | Universitat de Barcelona |
| ORCID | 0000-0001-7674-4944 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 35 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 62 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 33 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 2 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 1996 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2025 |
| H-INDEX | 4 |
Is conscious thought immune to error through misidentification
Wittgenstein distinguished between two uses of “I”, one “as object” and the other “as subject”, a distinction that Shoemaker elucidated in terms of a notion of immunity to error through misidentification (“IEM”); first-personal claims are IEM in the use “as subject”, but not in the other use. Shoemaker argued that memory judgments based on “personal”, episodic memory are not strictly speaking IEM; Gareth Evans disputed this. Similar issues have b…
Memory-based reference and immunity to error through misidentification
Wittgenstein distinguished between two uses of ‘I’, one “as object” and the other “as subject”, a distinction that Shoemaker elucidated in terms of a notion of immunity to error through misidentification (‘IEM’); in their use “as subject”, first-personal claims are IEM, but not in their use “as object”. Shoemaker argued that memory judgments based on “personal”, episodic memory are only de facto IEM, not strictly speaking IEM, while Gareth Evans …
The Real Guarantee in De Se thought: How to characterize it
Castañeda, Perry and Lewis argued that, among singular thoughts in general, thoughts about oneself ‘as oneself’—first-personal thoughts, which Lewis aptly called de se—have a distinctive character that traditional views of contents cannot characterize. Drawing on Anscombe, Annalisa Coliva has argued that a feature she calls Real Guarantee marks apart de se thoughts—as opposed to others including Immunity to Error through Misidentification that ha…
The semantics of fiction
The paper reviews proposals by Abell, Predelli, and others on the semantics of fiction, focusing on the discourse through which fictions are created. Predelli develops the radical fictionalism of former writers like Kripke and van Inwagen, according to which that discourse is contentless and does not express propositions. This paper offers reasons to doubt these claims. It then explores realist proposals like Abell's in which singular terms in fi…
Lying versus misleading, with language and pictures: The adverbial account
We intuitively make a distinction between lying and misleading . On the explanation of this phenomenon favored here—the adverbial account—the distinction tracks whether the content and its truth-committing force are literally conveyed. On an alternative commitment account, the difference between lying and misleading is predicated instead on the strength of assertoric commitment. One lies when one presents with full assertoric commitment what one …
How to Understand Rule-Constituted Kinds
What do propositions explain? Inflationary vs. deflationary perspectives and the case of singular propositions
In this paper we take up the question of the explanatory significance of the notion of propositional content. Our first goal is to disentangle two types of approach: According to what we call inflationism , propositions should be taken seriously enough to expect explanatory payoffs from them. The alternative deflationary approach rejects this claim. Our second goal is to explore the inflationism vs. deflationism contrast in depth by focusing on t…
Truth in Fiction' Reprised
The paper surveys recent appraisals of David Lewis's seminal paper on truth in fiction. It examines variations on standard criticisms of Lewis's account, aiming to show that, if developed as Lewis suggests in his 1983 Postscript A, his proposals on the topic are-as Hanley puts it-'as good as it gets'. Thus elaborated, Lewis's account can resist the objections, and it offers a better picture of fictional discourse than recent resurrections of othe…
Documentaries and the fiction/nonfiction divide
This paper rehearses a debate with Stacie Friend on the nature of the fiction/non-fiction divide. The paper first puts in a sharper focus the dividing issue, arguing that it is ontological in character. It focuses on how the distinction emerges in films, by contrasting fiction films with documentaries; Friend has also discussed films, even though the debate has mostly studied the literary case. The medium does not affect the main issues, but it r…
Pretense, cancellation, and the act theory of propositions
Several philosophers advance substantive theories of propositions to deal with several issues they raise in connection with a concern with a long pedigree in philosophy, the problem of the unity of propositions. The qualification ‘substantive’ is meant to contrast with ‘minimal’ or ‘deflationary’ – roughly, views that reject that propositions have a hidden nature, worth investigating. Substantive views appear to create spurious problems by charac…
Lying vs. misleading: The adverbial account
We intuitively make a distinction between lying and misleading . As several philosophers have pointed out, on the account of this distinction favored here – the adverbial account, as I’ll call it – it provides evidence on the theoretical notion of what is said and the related theoretical distinction between semantics and pragmatics. For, on that account, the distinction tracks whether or not the content and the assertoric force with which it is p…
The Language of Touch: Philosophical Examinations in Linguistics and Haptic Studies
Offering an in-depth analysis of the relationship between touch and language through the history of philosophy, this book revitalizes the field of haptic studies, providing new insights into the philosophy of language and ontological nature of touch. The Language of Touch draws together an international team of linguists, anthropologists, and philosophers to demonstrate from a variety of disciplinary perspectives that the experience of touch is i…
Introduction: Primitivism versus reductionism about the problem of the unity of the proposition
On the Nature of Fiction-Making: Austin or Grice
Only Imagine is a wonderful book. Clear and tersely written, it provides a compelling defence of a rather unpopular view (indeed, one usually dismissed without serious appraisal as a non-contender): namely, extreme intentionalism about the determination of fictional content and the nature of fictionality. It thus unquestionably advances the philosophical debate. It is also a pleasure to read for those of us who like fictions and not just the phil…
Conventions and Constitutive Norms
The paper addresses a popular argument that accounts of assertion in terms of constitutive norms are incompatible with conventionalism about assertion. The argument appeals to an alleged modal asymmetry: constitutive rules are essential to the acts they characterize, and therefore the obligations they impose necessarily apply to every instance; conventions are arbitrary, and thus can only contingently regulate the practices they establish. The pa…
Sneaky Assertions
Some speech acts are made indirectly. It is thus natural to think that assertions could also be made indirectly. Grice's conversational implicatures appear to be just a case of this, in which one indirectly makes an assertion or a related constative act by means of a declarative sentence. Several arguments, however, have been given against indirect assertions, by Davis (1999), Fricker (2012), Green (2007, 2015), Lepore & Stone (2010, 2015) and ot…
De se thoughts and immunity to error through misidentification
Co‐Identification and Fictional Names
Stacie Friend raises a problem of “co‐identification” involving fictional names such as ‘Hamlet’ or ‘Odysseus’: how to explain judgments that different uses of these names are “about the same object”, on the assumption of irrealism about fictional characters on which such expressions do not refer. To deal with this issue, she contrasts a Kripke‐inspired “name‐centric” approach, pursued among others by Sainsbury, with an Evans‐inspired “info‐centr…
Las normas y su puesta en vigor: Respuesta a Josep Corbí
En su discusión “Obras de ficción, formas de conciencia y literatura”, Josep Corbí formula una serie de críticas certeras a mis ideas sobre la distinción que he hecho entre ficción y no ficción en Relatar lo ocurrido como invención (2016). En esta nota de respuesta expongo primero de forma sucinta el núcleo de esas ideas y después proporciono las que considero las razones más decisivas para adoptarlas, a pesar de las dificultades que señala Corbí
De Se Thought
Empty Representations
The contents of linguistic and mental representations may seem to be individuated by what they are about. But a problem arises with regard to representation of the non-existent - words and thoughts that are about things that don't exist. Fourteen new essays get to grips with this much-debated problem.
Empty Representations: Reference and Non-Existence
Norms of Fiction-Making
I provide a variation on ideas presented by Walton and Currie, elaborating the view that fictive utterances are characterized by a specific form of illocutionary force in the family of directives – a proposal or invitation to imagine. I make some points on the relation between the proposal and the current debates on intentionalist and conventionalist views, and I discuss interesting recent objections made by Stacie Friend to the related, but cruc…
Explicit performatives revisited
Foundational Semantics II: Normative Accounts
Descriptive semantic theories purport to characterize the meanings of the expressions of languages in whatever complexity they might have. Foundational semantics purports to identify the kind of considerations relevant to establish that a given descriptive semantics accurately characterizes the language used by a given individual or community. Foundational Semantics I presents three contrasting approaches to the foundational matters, and the main…
Norms of Fiction-Making
I provide a variation on ideas presented by Walton and Currie, elaborating the view that fictive utterances are characterized by a specific form of illocutionary force in the family of directives – a proposal or invitation to imagine. I make some points on the relation between the proposal and the current debates on intentionalist and conventionalist views, and I discuss interesting recent objections made by Stacie Friend to the related, but cruc…
On the Nature of Fiction-Making: Austin or Grice
Only Imagine is a wonderful book. Clear and tersely written, it provides a compelling defence of a rather unpopular view (indeed, one usually dismissed without serious appraisal as a non-contender): namely, extreme intentionalism about the determination of fictional content and the nature of fictionality. It thus unquestionably advances the philosophical debate. It is also a pleasure to read for those of us who like fictions and not just the phil…
Sneaky Assertions
Some speech acts are made indirectly. It is thus natural to think that assertions could also be made indirectly. Grice's conversational implicatures appear to be just a case of this, in which one indirectly makes an assertion or a related constative act by means of a declarative sentence. Several arguments, however, have been given against indirect assertions, by Davis (1999), Fricker (2012), Green (2007, 2015), Lepore & Stone (2010, 2015) and ot…
Co‐Identification and Fictional Names
Stacie Friend raises a problem of “co‐identification” involving fictional names such as ‘Hamlet’ or ‘Odysseus’: how to explain judgments that different uses of these names are “about the same object”, on the assumption of irrealism about fictional characters on which such expressions do not refer. To deal with this issue, she contrasts a Kripke‐inspired “name‐centric” approach, pursued among others by Sainsbury, with an Evans‐inspired “info‐centr…
Lying vs. misleading: The adverbial account
We intuitively make a distinction between lying and misleading . As several philosophers have pointed out, on the account of this distinction favored here – the adverbial account, as I’ll call it – it provides evidence on the theoretical notion of what is said and the related theoretical distinction between semantics and pragmatics. For, on that account, the distinction tracks whether or not the content and the assertoric force with which it is p…
De se thoughts and immunity to error through misidentification
Explicit performatives revisited
Gricean Rational Reconstructions And The Semantics/Pragmatics Distinction
Conventions and Constitutive Norms
The paper addresses a popular argument that accounts of assertion in terms of constitutive norms are incompatible with conventionalism about assertion. The argument appeals to an alleged modal asymmetry: constitutive rules are essential to the acts they characterize, and therefore the obligations they impose necessarily apply to every instance; conventions are arbitrary, and thus can only contingently regulate the practices they establish. The pa…
The Conventional and the Analytic
Introduction: Primitivism versus reductionism about the problem of the unity of the proposition
Qualia that It Is Right to Quine
Dennett (1988) provides a much discussed argument for the nonexistence of qualia, as conceived by philosophers like Block, Chalmers, Loar and Searle. My goal in this paper is to vindicate Dennett's argument, construed in a certain way. The argument supports the claim that qualia are constitutively representational. Against Block and Chalmers, the argument rejects the detachment of phenomenal from information‐processing consciousness; and against …
The model-theoretic argument: Another turn of the screw
Memory-based reference and immunity to error through misidentification
Wittgenstein distinguished between two uses of ‘I’, one “as object” and the other “as subject”, a distinction that Shoemaker elucidated in terms of a notion of immunity to error through misidentification (‘IEM’); in their use “as subject”, first-personal claims are IEM, but not in their use “as object”. Shoemaker argued that memory judgments based on “personal”, episodic memory are only de facto IEM, not strictly speaking IEM, while Gareth Evans …
Truth in Fiction' Reprised
The paper surveys recent appraisals of David Lewis's seminal paper on truth in fiction. It examines variations on standard criticisms of Lewis's account, aiming to show that, if developed as Lewis suggests in his 1983 Postscript A, his proposals on the topic are-as Hanley puts it-'as good as it gets'. Thus elaborated, Lewis's account can resist the objections, and it offers a better picture of fictional discourse than recent resurrections of othe…
Foundational Semantics II: Normative Accounts
Descriptive semantic theories purport to characterize the meanings of the expressions of languages in whatever complexity they might have. Foundational semantics purports to identify the kind of considerations relevant to establish that a given descriptive semantics accurately characterizes the language used by a given individual or community. Foundational Semantics I presents three contrasting approaches to the foundational matters, and the main…
Foundational Semantics I: Descriptive Accounts
Descriptive semantic theories purport to characterize the meanings of the expressions of languages in whatever complexity they might have. Foundational semantics purports to identify the kind of considerations relevant to establish that a given descriptive semantics accurately characterizes the language used by a given individual or community. Foundational Semantics I presents three contrasting approaches to the foundational matters, and the main…
What is a Tarskian definition of truth?
The model-theoretic argument: Another turn of the screw
Una nueva solución a la paradoja de Cartwright
The paper offers a new solution to a paradox introduced by Richard Cartwright and discussed by Kaplan. The paradox is, in a nutshell, as follows. Suppose that we name with '(1)' the statement 'the last word of (1) is obscene', and with '(2)' the statement 'the last word of (1) is obscene'. It seems that, although under these stipulations (1) = (2), (2) has a modal property which (1) lacks, to wit: it can be turned into a truth by quoting its last…
Gricean Rational Reconstructions And The Semantics/Pragmatics Distinction
Qualia that It Is Right to Quine
Dennett (1988) provides a much discussed argument for the nonexistence of qualia, as conceived by philosophers like Block, Chalmers, Loar and Searle. My goal in this paper is to vindicate Dennett's argument, construed in a certain way. The argument supports the claim that qualia are constitutively representational. Against Block and Chalmers, the argument rejects the detachment of phenomenal from information‐processing consciousness; and against …
Recanati on the Semantics/Pragmatics Distinction
One of the hottest philosophical debates in recent years concerns the nature of the semantics/pragmatics divide. Some writers have expressed the reserve that this might be merely terminological, but in my view it ultimately concerns a substantive issue with empirical implications: the scope and limits of a serious scientific undertaking, formal semantics. In this critical note I discuss two arguments by Recanati: his main methodological argument …
Homophonic Prejudices
I critically discuss some aspects of Mark Sainsbury’s Reference without Referents, from an otherwise sympathetic viewpoint. My objections focus on the adequacy of the truth-conditional framework that Sainsbury presupposes. I argue that, as semantic theories, truth-conditional accounts are both too ambitious, and too austere to be fully explanatory, and that both problems have consequences for anaccount of reference.The latter problem has to do wi…
The Conventional and the Analytic
Manuel Pérez Otero, Esbozo de la filosofía de Kripke
Manuel Pérez Otero, Esbozo de la filosofía de Kripke, Montesinos, Barcelona, 2006, 276 pp
Foundational Semantics II: Normative Accounts
Descriptive semantic theories purport to characterize the meanings of the expressions of languages in whatever complexity they might have. Foundational semantics purports to identify the kind of considerations relevant to establish that a given descriptive semantics accurately characterizes the language used by a given individual or community. Foundational Semantics I presents three contrasting approaches to the foundational matters, and the main…
Foundational Semantics I: Descriptive Accounts
Descriptive semantic theories purport to characterize the meanings of the expressions of languages in whatever complexity they might have. Foundational semantics purports to identify the kind of considerations relevant to establish that a given descriptive semantics accurately characterizes the language used by a given individual or community. Foundational Semantics I presents three contrasting approaches to the foundational matters, and the main…
Norms of Fiction-Making
I provide a variation on ideas presented by Walton and Currie, elaborating the view that fictive utterances are characterized by a specific form of illocutionary force in the family of directives – a proposal or invitation to imagine. I make some points on the relation between the proposal and the current debates on intentionalist and conventionalist views, and I discuss interesting recent objections made by Stacie Friend to the related, but cruc…
Explicit performatives revisited
Empty Representations
The contents of linguistic and mental representations may seem to be individuated by what they are about. But a problem arises with regard to representation of the non-existent - words and thoughts that are about things that don't exist. Fourteen new essays get to grips with this much-debated problem.
Empty Representations: Reference and Non-Existence
De Se Thought
Las normas y su puesta en vigor: Respuesta a Josep Corbí
En su discusión “Obras de ficción, formas de conciencia y literatura”, Josep Corbí formula una serie de críticas certeras a mis ideas sobre la distinción que he hecho entre ficción y no ficción en Relatar lo ocurrido como invención (2016). En esta nota de respuesta expongo primero de forma sucinta el núcleo de esas ideas y después proporciono las que considero las razones más decisivas para adoptarlas, a pesar de las dificultades que señala Corbí
Sneaky Assertions
Some speech acts are made indirectly. It is thus natural to think that assertions could also be made indirectly. Grice's conversational implicatures appear to be just a case of this, in which one indirectly makes an assertion or a related constative act by means of a declarative sentence. Several arguments, however, have been given against indirect assertions, by Davis (1999), Fricker (2012), Green (2007, 2015), Lepore & Stone (2010, 2015) and ot…
De se thoughts and immunity to error through misidentification
Co‐Identification and Fictional Names
Stacie Friend raises a problem of “co‐identification” involving fictional names such as ‘Hamlet’ or ‘Odysseus’: how to explain judgments that different uses of these names are “about the same object”, on the assumption of irrealism about fictional characters on which such expressions do not refer. To deal with this issue, she contrasts a Kripke‐inspired “name‐centric” approach, pursued among others by Sainsbury, with an Evans‐inspired “info‐centr…
The Language of Touch: Philosophical Examinations in Linguistics and Haptic Studies
Offering an in-depth analysis of the relationship between touch and language through the history of philosophy, this book revitalizes the field of haptic studies, providing new insights into the philosophy of language and ontological nature of touch. The Language of Touch draws together an international team of linguists, anthropologists, and philosophers to demonstrate from a variety of disciplinary perspectives that the experience of touch is i…
Introduction: Primitivism versus reductionism about the problem of the unity of the proposition
On the Nature of Fiction-Making: Austin or Grice
Only Imagine is a wonderful book. Clear and tersely written, it provides a compelling defence of a rather unpopular view (indeed, one usually dismissed without serious appraisal as a non-contender): namely, extreme intentionalism about the determination of fictional content and the nature of fictionality. It thus unquestionably advances the philosophical debate. It is also a pleasure to read for those of us who like fictions and not just the phil…
Conventions and Constitutive Norms
The paper addresses a popular argument that accounts of assertion in terms of constitutive norms are incompatible with conventionalism about assertion. The argument appeals to an alleged modal asymmetry: constitutive rules are essential to the acts they characterize, and therefore the obligations they impose necessarily apply to every instance; conventions are arbitrary, and thus can only contingently regulate the practices they establish. The pa…
Documentaries and the fiction/nonfiction divide
This paper rehearses a debate with Stacie Friend on the nature of the fiction/non-fiction divide. The paper first puts in a sharper focus the dividing issue, arguing that it is ontological in character. It focuses on how the distinction emerges in films, by contrasting fiction films with documentaries; Friend has also discussed films, even though the debate has mostly studied the literary case. The medium does not affect the main issues, but it r…
Philosophy (32 works) · Epistemology (28 works) · Computer Science (22 works) · Philosophy and Theoretical Science (19 works) · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics (18 works) · Linguistics (16 works) · Sociology (12 works) · Metaphysics (11 works) · Philosophy (11 works) · Psychology (11 works)