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Laura Pierret

Biographic Data

ID4970480
NAMELaura Pierret
GIVEN NAMESLaura
FAMILY NAMEPierret
SIGNATUREPIERRET L
AFFILIATIONSEuropean University Institute
ORCID0000-0003-2001-6221
VERIFIEDYes
TOTAL WORKS6
TOTAL CITATIONS13
AUTHOR COUNT6
EDITOR COUNT0
FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR2023
LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR2026
H-INDEX2
  • Discussing Pax Germanica: The rise and limits of German hegemony in European integration

    Open Access•Laura Pierret•ARTICLE•International Affairs•2026

  • Beyond the German obsession: Moral hazard and power in European economic governance

    Open Access•Laura Pierret•ARTICLE•Comparative European Politics•2025•References: 16

    The concept of moral hazard has acquired political power in the European Union (EU); attempts to address it have the effect of limiting public risk sharing and of increasing constraints on behaviour. Yet, despite the potential negative implications of such effects in terms of social welfare and fairness, and that moral hazard is in the realm of uncertainty, the politics of moral hazard’s use in European economic governance has rarely been the sub…

  • Superpower Europe: The European Union's silent revolution

    Open Access•Laura Pierret•ARTICLE•International Affairs•2025

  • From Menace to Mundane: Moral Hazard and the Politics of the European Central Bank's Government Bond Purchases

    Open Access•Michele Chang, David Howarth et al.•ARTICLE•JCMS Journal of Common Market…•2025•Cited by: 4•References: 18

    During the Eurozone's sovereign debt crisis, the ideational consensus that shaped the foundation of Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) was destabilized by disagreement on unconventional monetary policies (UMPs), specifically government bond purchases. In the ECB's 2021 strategy review, however, UMPs were confirmed as standard elements of the European Central Bank's (ECB) toolbox. What happened? One argument frequently presented to question the leg…

  • To play or not to play the ‘moral hazard card’: Germany and the European Union’s response to the Covid-19 crisis

    Open Access•Laura Pierret, David Howarth•ARTICLE•Journal of European Public Policy•2023•Cited by: 2•References: 24

    Avoiding moral hazard is a recurrent argument of those seeking to limit the development of European financial support mechanisms. Germany has been the traditional leader of this coalition of actors in the European Union (EU). However, in reaction to the Covid-19 pandemic, Germany supported an EU response which included grants and massive debt issuance. What was previously presented as unacceptable – because of moral hazard – became appropriate. T…

  • Moral Hazard, central bankers, and Banking Union: Professional dissensus and the politics of European financial system stability

    Open Access•Laura Pierret, David Howarth•ARTICLE•Journal of European Integration•2023•Cited by: 7•References: 14

    Banking Union was a major policy response to the financial crisis that began in 2007 and the subsequent Eurozone crisis. Moral hazard has frequently been presented as a major cause of these crises. Therefore, Banking Union can be understood as a response to moral hazard in relation to banks and sovereigns. Yet, moral hazard was an acknowledged and supposedly managed problem prior to these events. Paradoxically, moral hazard has been used to justi…

  • Moral Hazard, central bankers, and Banking Union: Professional dissensus and the politics of European financial system stability

    Open Access•Laura Pierret, David Howarth•ARTICLE•Journal of European Integration•2023•Cited by: 7•References: 14

    Banking Union was a major policy response to the financial crisis that began in 2007 and the subsequent Eurozone crisis. Moral hazard has frequently been presented as a major cause of these crises. Therefore, Banking Union can be understood as a response to moral hazard in relation to banks and sovereigns. Yet, moral hazard was an acknowledged and supposedly managed problem prior to these events. Paradoxically, moral hazard has been used to justi…

  • From Menace to Mundane: Moral Hazard and the Politics of the European Central Bank's Government Bond Purchases

    Open Access•Michele Chang, David Howarth et al.•ARTICLE•JCMS Journal of Common Market…•2025•Cited by: 4•References: 18

    During the Eurozone's sovereign debt crisis, the ideational consensus that shaped the foundation of Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) was destabilized by disagreement on unconventional monetary policies (UMPs), specifically government bond purchases. In the ECB's 2021 strategy review, however, UMPs were confirmed as standard elements of the European Central Bank's (ECB) toolbox. What happened? One argument frequently presented to question the leg…

  • To play or not to play the ‘moral hazard card’: Germany and the European Union’s response to the Covid-19 crisis

    Open Access•Laura Pierret, David Howarth•ARTICLE•Journal of European Public Policy•2023•Cited by: 2•References: 24

    Avoiding moral hazard is a recurrent argument of those seeking to limit the development of European financial support mechanisms. Germany has been the traditional leader of this coalition of actors in the European Union (EU). However, in reaction to the Covid-19 pandemic, Germany supported an EU response which included grants and massive debt issuance. What was previously presented as unacceptable – because of moral hazard – became appropriate. T…

  • To play or not to play the ‘moral hazard card’: Germany and the European Union’s response to the Covid-19 crisis

    Open Access•Laura Pierret, David Howarth•ARTICLE•Journal of European Public Policy•2023•Cited by: 2•References: 24

    Avoiding moral hazard is a recurrent argument of those seeking to limit the development of European financial support mechanisms. Germany has been the traditional leader of this coalition of actors in the European Union (EU). However, in reaction to the Covid-19 pandemic, Germany supported an EU response which included grants and massive debt issuance. What was previously presented as unacceptable – because of moral hazard – became appropriate. T…

  • Moral Hazard, central bankers, and Banking Union: Professional dissensus and the politics of European financial system stability

    Open Access•Laura Pierret, David Howarth•ARTICLE•Journal of European Integration•2023•Cited by: 7•References: 14

    Banking Union was a major policy response to the financial crisis that began in 2007 and the subsequent Eurozone crisis. Moral hazard has frequently been presented as a major cause of these crises. Therefore, Banking Union can be understood as a response to moral hazard in relation to banks and sovereigns. Yet, moral hazard was an acknowledged and supposedly managed problem prior to these events. Paradoxically, moral hazard has been used to justi…

  • Beyond the German obsession: Moral hazard and power in European economic governance

    Open Access•Laura Pierret•ARTICLE•Comparative European Politics•2025•References: 16

    The concept of moral hazard has acquired political power in the European Union (EU); attempts to address it have the effect of limiting public risk sharing and of increasing constraints on behaviour. Yet, despite the potential negative implications of such effects in terms of social welfare and fairness, and that moral hazard is in the realm of uncertainty, the politics of moral hazard’s use in European economic governance has rarely been the sub…

  • Superpower Europe: The European Union's silent revolution

    Open Access•Laura Pierret•ARTICLE•International Affairs•2025

  • From Menace to Mundane: Moral Hazard and the Politics of the European Central Bank's Government Bond Purchases

    Open Access•Michele Chang, David Howarth et al.•ARTICLE•JCMS Journal of Common Market…•2025•Cited by: 4•References: 18

    During the Eurozone's sovereign debt crisis, the ideational consensus that shaped the foundation of Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) was destabilized by disagreement on unconventional monetary policies (UMPs), specifically government bond purchases. In the ECB's 2021 strategy review, however, UMPs were confirmed as standard elements of the European Central Bank's (ECB) toolbox. What happened? One argument frequently presented to question the leg…

  • Discussing Pax Germanica: The rise and limits of German hegemony in European integration

    Open Access•Laura Pierret•ARTICLE•International Affairs•2026

Economics (5 works) · European union (5 works) · Law (5 works) · Law (5 works) · Political science (5 works) · European Union Policy and Governance (4 works) · Market economy (4 works) · Moral hazard (4 works) · Political economy (4 works) · Politics (4 works)

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