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Jason Kawall

Biographic Data

ID4974258
NAMEJason Kawall
GIVEN NAMESJason
FAMILY NAMEKawall
SIGNATUREKAWALL J
AFFILIATIONSColgate University
ORCID0000-0001-7661-4023
VERIFIEDYes
TOTAL WORKS10
TOTAL CITATIONS8
AUTHOR COUNT9
EDITOR COUNT1
FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR1999
LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR2024
H-INDEX2
  • Epistemic Autonomy and the Shaping of Our Epistemic Lives

    Open Access•Jason Kawall•ARTICLE•Social Epistemology•2024

    I present an account of epistemic autonomy as a distinctively wideranging epistemic virtue, one that helps us to understand a range of phenomena that might otherwise seem quite disparate -from the appropriate selection of epistemic methods, stances and topics of inquiry, to the harms of epistemic oppression, gaslighting and related phenomena.The account draws on four elements commonly incorporated into accounts of personal autonomy: (i) self-gove…

  • The Virtues of Sustainability

    Jason Kawall•BOOK•Virtues of Sustainability•2021

    With a growing recognition of the potentially catastrophic impacts of human actions on current and future generations, people around the world are urgently seeking new, sustainable ways of life for themselves and their communities. What do these calls for a sustainable future mean for our current values and ways of life, and what kind of people will we need to become? Approaches to ethical living that emphasize good character and virtue are recen…

  • In Defense of the Primacy of the Virtues

    Open Access•Jason Kawall•ARTICLE•Journal of Ethics and Social…•2009

    In this paper I respond to a set of basic objections often raised against those virtue theories in ethics which maintain that moral properties such rightness and goodness (and their corresponding concepts) are to be explained and understood in terms of the virtues or the virtuous. The objections all rest on a strongly-held intuition that the virtues (and the virtuous) simply must be derivative in some way from either right actions or good states …

  • The Epistemic Demands of Environmental Virtue

    Open Access•Jason Kawall•ARTICLE•Journal of Agricultural and…•2009•References: 1

  • Ethics and the Environment

    Jason Kawall•ARTICLE•Environmental Ethics•2009

  • On Behalf of Biocentric Individualism

    Jason Kawall•ARTICLE•Environmental Ethics•2008

  • Grounded Knowledge, Place and Epistemic Virtue

    Jason Kawall•ARTICLE•Ethics Place & Environment•2005•Cited by: 1

  • Reverence for Life as a Viable Environmental Virtue

    Jason Kawall•ARTICLE•Environmental Ethics•2003•Cited by: 2

    There have been several recent defenses of biocentric individualism, the position that all living beings have at least some moral standing, simply insofar as they are alive.I develop a virtuebased version of biocentric individualism, focusing on a virtue of reverence for life.In so doing, I attempt to show that such an approach avoids certain problems that afflict other, rival biocentric individualisms.More broadly, I attempt to show that a virtu…

  • Self‐Regarding Supererogatory Actions

    Open Access•Jason Kawall•ARTICLE•Journal of Social Philosophy•2003•Cited by: 5

    Many philosophers, in discussing supererogation, maintain that supererogatory actions must be done for the benefit of others (among other conditions). Most others, while not explicitly embracing such a requirement, typically use examples which involve agents risking their own well-being (or indeed sacrificing their own well-being) for the sake of others. On the other hand, some have allowed that agents can perform supererogatory actions without a…

  • The Experience Machine and Mental State Theories of Well-being

    Open Access•Jason Kawall•ARTICLE•The Journal of Value Inquiry•1999

  • Self‐Regarding Supererogatory Actions

    Open Access•Jason Kawall•ARTICLE•Journal of Social Philosophy•2003•Cited by: 5

    Many philosophers, in discussing supererogation, maintain that supererogatory actions must be done for the benefit of others (among other conditions). Most others, while not explicitly embracing such a requirement, typically use examples which involve agents risking their own well-being (or indeed sacrificing their own well-being) for the sake of others. On the other hand, some have allowed that agents can perform supererogatory actions without a…

  • Reverence for Life as a Viable Environmental Virtue

    Jason Kawall•ARTICLE•Environmental Ethics•2003•Cited by: 2

    There have been several recent defenses of biocentric individualism, the position that all living beings have at least some moral standing, simply insofar as they are alive.I develop a virtuebased version of biocentric individualism, focusing on a virtue of reverence for life.In so doing, I attempt to show that such an approach avoids certain problems that afflict other, rival biocentric individualisms.More broadly, I attempt to show that a virtu…

  • Grounded Knowledge, Place and Epistemic Virtue

    Jason Kawall•ARTICLE•Ethics Place & Environment•2005•Cited by: 1

  • The Experience Machine and Mental State Theories of Well-being

    Open Access•Jason Kawall•ARTICLE•The Journal of Value Inquiry•1999

  • Reverence for Life as a Viable Environmental Virtue

    Jason Kawall•ARTICLE•Environmental Ethics•2003•Cited by: 2

    There have been several recent defenses of biocentric individualism, the position that all living beings have at least some moral standing, simply insofar as they are alive.I develop a virtuebased version of biocentric individualism, focusing on a virtue of reverence for life.In so doing, I attempt to show that such an approach avoids certain problems that afflict other, rival biocentric individualisms.More broadly, I attempt to show that a virtu…

  • Self‐Regarding Supererogatory Actions

    Open Access•Jason Kawall•ARTICLE•Journal of Social Philosophy•2003•Cited by: 5

    Many philosophers, in discussing supererogation, maintain that supererogatory actions must be done for the benefit of others (among other conditions). Most others, while not explicitly embracing such a requirement, typically use examples which involve agents risking their own well-being (or indeed sacrificing their own well-being) for the sake of others. On the other hand, some have allowed that agents can perform supererogatory actions without a…

  • Grounded Knowledge, Place and Epistemic Virtue

    Jason Kawall•ARTICLE•Ethics Place & Environment•2005•Cited by: 1

  • On Behalf of Biocentric Individualism

    Jason Kawall•ARTICLE•Environmental Ethics•2008

  • In Defense of the Primacy of the Virtues

    Open Access•Jason Kawall•ARTICLE•Journal of Ethics and Social…•2009

    In this paper I respond to a set of basic objections often raised against those virtue theories in ethics which maintain that moral properties such rightness and goodness (and their corresponding concepts) are to be explained and understood in terms of the virtues or the virtuous. The objections all rest on a strongly-held intuition that the virtues (and the virtuous) simply must be derivative in some way from either right actions or good states …

  • The Epistemic Demands of Environmental Virtue

    Open Access•Jason Kawall•ARTICLE•Journal of Agricultural and…•2009•References: 1

  • Ethics and the Environment

    Jason Kawall•ARTICLE•Environmental Ethics•2009

  • The Virtues of Sustainability

    Jason Kawall•BOOK•Virtues of Sustainability•2021

    With a growing recognition of the potentially catastrophic impacts of human actions on current and future generations, people around the world are urgently seeking new, sustainable ways of life for themselves and their communities. What do these calls for a sustainable future mean for our current values and ways of life, and what kind of people will we need to become? Approaches to ethical living that emphasize good character and virtue are recen…

  • Epistemic Autonomy and the Shaping of Our Epistemic Lives

    Open Access•Jason Kawall•ARTICLE•Social Epistemology•2024

    I present an account of epistemic autonomy as a distinctively wideranging epistemic virtue, one that helps us to understand a range of phenomena that might otherwise seem quite disparate -from the appropriate selection of epistemic methods, stances and topics of inquiry, to the harms of epistemic oppression, gaslighting and related phenomena.The account draws on four elements commonly incorporated into accounts of personal autonomy: (i) self-gove…

Philosophy (9 works) · Epistemology (8 works) · Environmental ethics (6 works) · Sociology (6 works) · Contemporary philosophy (4 works) · Virtue (4 works) · Applied philosophy (3 works) · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics (3 works) · General interest (3 works) · Law (3 works)

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