Agnieszka Rusinowska

Biographic Data

ID4975296
NAMEAgnieszka Rusinowska
GIVEN NAMESAgnieszka
FAMILY NAMERusinowska
SIGNATURERUSINOWSKA A
AFFILIATIONSCentre National de la Recherche Scientifique
ORCID0000-0003-3803-9907
VERIFIEDYes
TOTAL WORKS30
TOTAL CITATIONS6
AUTHOR COUNT30
EDITOR COUNT0
FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR2003
LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR2026
H-INDEX2

  • Formation of international environmental agreements and payoffallocation

    Open AccessMichel Grabisch, Elena Parilina et al.PREPRINTSSRN Electronic Journal2026

    Dealing with climate change requires that all countries engage in costlyefforts to reduce their emissions. Reaching this objective has so far beenelusive because it is in the best interest of each country to let the othersdo the effort and benefit itself from a better environment. The presence ofnegative externalities and strategic behavior have made game theory anatural paradigm to design an international environmental agreement (IEA)that codifi…

  • When social networks polarize

    Open AccessWout de Vos, Michel Grabisch et al.ARTICLEMathematical Social Sciences2026

    In the present paper, we study opinion dynamics in a social network, where individuals only listen to those with opinion not farther away than a given threshold from their own opinion (known as bounded confidence models, proposed by Hegselmann and Krause). It is well known that in bounded confidence models consensus does not always exist, and that agents split in clusters (polarization), with convergence to consensus in each cluster. We are preci…

  • Dynamic Network Formation with Farsighted Players and Limited Capacities

    Open AccessMichel Grabisch, Elena Parilina et al.PREPRINTSSRN Electronic Journal2025

  • Power in plurality voting games

    Open AccessRené Van Den Brink, Dinko Dimitrov et al.ARTICLETheory and Decision2025

    Simple games in partition function form are used to model voting situations where a coalition being winning or losing might depend on the way players outside that coalition organize themselves. Such a game is called a plurality voting game if in every partition there is at least one winning coalition. In the present paper, we introduce an equal impact power index for this class of voting games and provide an axiomatic characterization. This power…

  • Formation of International Environmental Agreements and Payoff Allocation

    Open AccessMichel Grabisch, Elena Parilina et al.PREPRINTSSRN Electronic Journal2025

  • Introduction to the Special Issue in Honor of Michel Grabisch

    Open AccessStéphane Gonzalez, Christophe Labreuche et al.ARTICLETheory and Decision2025

  • Network-based allocation of responsibility for greenhouse gas emissions

    Open AccessRosa van den Ende, Antoine Mandel et al.ARTICLESocial Choice and Welfare2025

    We provide an axiomatic approach to the allocation of responsibility for GHG emissions in supply chains. Considering a set of axioms standardly used in networks and decision theory, and consistent with legal principles underlying responsibility, we show that responsibility measures shall be based on exponential discounting of upstream and downstream emissions. From a network theory perspective, the proposed responsibility measure corresponds to a…

  • Competing for Influence in Networks Through Strategic Targeting

    Open AccessMargherita Comola, Agnieszka Rusinowska et al.ARTICLEGames and Economic Behavior2024

    We experimentally investigate how players with opposing views compete for influence through strategic targeting in networks. We varied the network structure, the relative influence of the opponent, and the heterogeneity of the nodes’initial opinions. Although most players adopted a best-response strategy based on their relative influence, we also observed behaviors deviating from this strategy, such as the tendency to target central nodes and avo…

  • A dynamic analysis of criminal networks

    Open AccessLuca Colombo, Paola Labrecciosa et al.ARTICLEJournal of Economic Theory2024

    We take a novel approach based on differential games to the study of criminal networks. We extend the static crime network game (Ballester et al., 2006, 2010) to a dynamic setting where criminal activities negatively impact the accumulation of total wealth in the economy. We derive a Markov Feedback Equilibrium and show that, unlike in the static crime network game, the vector of equilibrium crime rates is not necessarily proportional to the vect…

  • Network-Based Allocation of Responsibility for GHG-Emissions

    Open AccessRosa van den Ende, Antoine Mandel et al.ARTICLESSRN Electronic Journal2023

  • Diffusion in large networks

    Open AccessMichel Grabisch, Agnieszka Rusinowska et al.ARTICLEJournal of Economic Dynamics and…2022

  • Ingratiation and Favoritism in Organizations

    Agnieszka Rusinowska, Vassili VergopoulosARTICLEJournal of Institutional and…2020

    We study within one theoretical framework two related phenomena - ingratiation by subordinates and favoritism of superiors towards their employees. We express ingratiation by opinion conformity of the worker when reporting his opinion to the manager. Favoritism of the manager is inferred from a bias when reporting toa firm her observation of the worker's performance. We show interdependences of favoritism and ingratiation by investigating their i…

  • Winning coalitions in plurality voting democracies

    Open AccessRené Van Den Brink, Dinko Dimitrov et al.ARTICLESocial Choice and Welfare2020

    We consider plurality voting games being simple games in partition function form such that in every partition there is at least one winning coalition. Such a game is said to be weighted if it is possible to assign weights to the players in such a way that a winning coalition in a partition is always one for which the sum of the weights of its members is maximal over all coalitions in the partition. A plurality game is called decisive if in every …

  • Winning Coalitions in Plurality Voting Democracies

    Open AccessRené Van Den Brink, Dinko Dimitrov et al.ARTICLESSRN Electronic Journal2019

  • Opinion Formation and Targeting When Persuaders Have Extreme and Centrist Opinions

    Open AccessAgnieszka Rusinowska, Akylai TaalaibekovaARTICLESSRN Electronic Journal2019

  • A model of anonymous influence with anti-conformist agents

    Open AccessMichel Grabisch, Alexis Poindron et al.ARTICLEJournal of Economic Dynamics and…2019Cited by: 2References: 13

  • Bargaining Foundation for Ratio Equilibrium in Public Good Economies

    Open AccessAnne Van Den Nouweland, Agnieszka RusinowskaARTICLESSRN Electronic Journal2018

  • Competition for the access to and use of information in networks

    Open AccessPhilipp Möhlmeier, Philipp Moehlmeier et al.ARTICLEMathematical Social Sciences2018References: 15

  • The Degree Measure as Utility Function over Positions in Networks

    Open AccessRené Van Den Brink, Agnieszka RusinowskaARTICLESSRN Electronic Journal2017

  • A Degree-Distance-Based Connections Model with Negative and Positive Externalities

    Open AccessPhilipp Möhlmeier, Agnieszka Rusinowska et al.ARTICLESSRN Electronic Journal2013

  • A Degree-Distance-Based Connections Model with Negative and Positive Externalities

    Open AccessPhilipp Möhlmeier, Agnieszka Rusinowska et al.ARTICLESSRN Electronic Journal2013

  • Anonymous social influence

    Open AccessManuel Förster, Michel Grabisch et al.ARTICLEGames and Economic Behavior2013

  • Measuring Power and Satisfaction in Societies with Opinion Leaders

    Open AccessRené Van Den Brink, Agnieszka Rusinowska et al.ARTICLERePEc: Research Papers in Economics2013

    Opinion leaders are actors who have some power over their followers as they are able to influence their followers' choice of action in certain instances. In van den Brink et al. (Homo Oeconomicus 28:161-185, 2011) we proposed a two-action model for societies with opinion leaders. We introduced a power and a satisfaction score and studied some common properties. In this paper we strengthen two of these properties and present two further properties…

  • Ingratiation

    Stéphane Robin, Agnieszka Rusinowska et al.ARTICLEEuropean Economic Review2013

  • A model of influence based on aggregation functions

    Open AccessMichel Grabisch, Agnieszka RusinowskaARTICLEMathematical Social Sciences2013Cited by: 1References: 22