Steven Casey
Biographic Data
| ID | 4985745 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Steven Casey |
| GIVEN NAMES | Steven |
| FAMILY NAME | Casey |
| SIGNATURE | CASEY S |
| AFFILIATIONS | London School of Economics and Political Science |
| VERIFIED | No |
| TOTAL WORKS | 36 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 31 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 35 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 1 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2000 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2026 |
| H-INDEX | 3 |
American Journalists in Hitler’s Germany
Kathryn J. McGarr. City of Newsmen
Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2022. Pp. 304. Cloth $30.00.
S amuel F. W ells J r . Fearing the Worst
Ever since the publication of Robert Jervis’s seminal article “The Impact of the Korean War on the Cold War” more than forty years ago, historians have noted how this conflict played a pivotal role in the evolution of US national-security policy, ushering in a new era of big defense budgets, giving a vital boost to the budding NATO alliance, and encouraging the Truman administration to extend commitments to other perceived threatened areas (see J…
The age of Eisenhower
William Hitchcock’s elegantly written and cogently argued account of the Age of Eisenhower could not have been better timed. For one thing, the 34th president clearly had all the qualities that the
Ray Moseley, Reporting the War
The War Beat, Europe
From the North African desert to the bloody stalemate in Italy, from the London blitz to the D-Day beaches, a group of highly courageous and extremely talented American journalists reported the war against Nazi Germany for a grateful audience. Based on a wealth of previously untapped primary sources, War Beat, Europe provides the first comprehensive account of what these reporters witnessed, what they were allowed to publish, and how their report…
Larry Blomstedt. Truman, Congress, and Korea
Between the repeated efforts to legislate neutrality during the 1930s and the Democratic Party’s attempt to restrain Richard Nixon during the latter stages of the Vietnam War, the U.S. Congress rarely played a leading role in foreign policy. This was the era of World War II and the early Cold War consensus, the era of the so-called imperial presidency, when legislators largely bowed to the White House’s wishes. The Korean War erupted in the middl…
The Cambridge History of the Second World War
War is often described as an extension of politics by violent means. With contributions from twenty-eight eminent historians, Volume 2 of The Cambridge History of the Second World War examines the relationship between ideology and politics in the war's origins, dynamics and consequences. Part I examines the ideologies of the combatants and shows how the war can be understood as a struggle of words, ideas and values with the rival powers expressin…
John Lewis Gaddis, George F. Kennan
Atlantis Lost
The historiography on United States–French relations during the de Gaulle era is a crowded field. But Sebastian Reyn, a Dutch defence official as well as an impressive scholar, has produced an extremely important book. Rather than the exhaustively-mined French angle, he focuses on the less excavated theme of US perceptions and policies. In contrast to most other works on the American side, he also covers the whole of the de Gaulle presidency from…
The war for Korea, 1950–1951
Allan R. Millett, Lawrence, University Press of Kansas, 2010, xx +644 pp. If Allan Millett's Korean War trilogy is clearly destined to become the magnum opus of one of the United States' leading mi
After Hiroshima
Matthew Jones, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2010, xii+502 pp In September 1954, at the height of the first Offshore Islands crisis, John Foster Dulles remarked that the United States face
Know Your Enemy
Why America Fights
Casualty Reporting and Domestic Support for War
The common argument that public support for war is casualty sensitive ignores the fact that casualty figures are not revealed automatically. While the military decides when, and to whom, to release such information, political elites can question, even condemn, how the government goes about this business. After briefly exploring how the US military operated during the two world wars, this article focuses on American casualty reporting during the K…
Why Korea?
The massive Chinese intervention also led many Americans to question the wisdom of the Korean War: in January 1951, one Gallup poll even found that two‐thirds of the public wanted to withdraw from Korea altogether. Although the administration had successfully defused the broader debate over Cold War mobilization, it had far more trouble explaining why it was necessary for Americans to continue fighting and dying in faraway Korea. In fact, the gov…
Conclusion
This chapter summarizes the arguments of the book. The Truman administration's efforts to sell the Korean War went through two phases. In the first year, the government was plagued by the problems of selling a limited war. As the fighting progressed, however, officials learned from their mistakes, introduced more effective bureaucratic structures, and stiffened their rhetoric. In both phases, the government's efforts had important consequences: i…
Steady Improvements
The campaign to sell voluntary repatriation was not the administration's only PR success in 1952. As the war persisted, officers and officials at all levels made big improvements in their publicity efforts. Many learned from earlier mistakes. In the Far East, senior officers also established more effective bureaucratic structures and brought in more personnel to help deal with reporters. On the ground in Korea, the changing nature of the war also…
The Macarthur Controversy
Truman's decision to fire MacArthur in April 1951 initially threatened to make the domestic situation even worse. Indeed, Republicans hoped to exploit the opportunity to challenge the administration's whole Asian policy, and perhaps even impeach one or two senior officials. Within weeks, however, the MacArthur controversy worked to the administration's benefit. For the first time in months, senior officials engaged in a sustained and coordinated …
Mobilizing For a Police Action
As news of battlefield defeats hit home, the administration tried to channel the public debate on how America ought to mobilize in this new, more dangerous phase of the Cold War. The instinct of Truman and his senior advisers was to remain cautious: they were still keen to stop the domestic mood from overheating, lest this result in overpowering demands to escalate the Cold War, perhaps even by launching a preventive strike against the Soviet Uni…
The Advent of Eisenhower
Initially, Eisenhower's emergence as the Republican nominee for president also helped to sustain a basic consensus behind the war, for Ike was a moderate who was prepared to defend Truman's decision to intervene in Korea. As the campaign progressed, Eisenhower's comments became more critical. But even his decisive promise to voters to “go to Korea” was ambiguous. It was intended to signal that something new had to be done to end the fighting, whi…
Interminable Truce Talks
With the start of armistice negotiations in the summer of 1951, the Korean War entered a new phase. This chapter explores how officials formulated an information campaign during months of complex and protracted negotiations. At the armistice site, first at Kaesong then at Panmunjom, the military's public information officials had a difficult time trying to divulge enough material to keep the press happy without undermining the government's negoti…
Dealing with the “Disaster School of Journalism”
The long military retreat that followed the Chinese intervention sparked a new round of recriminations between the military and media in the Far East. This chapter examines MacArthur's claims that war correspondents exaggerated the scale of defeat. It then explores the pressures that finally forced MacArthur to accept the need for formal censorship. Yet censorship was no panacea. Although many in the media believed they needed more guidance from …
“Censorship is Abhorrent to General Macarthur”
As soon as the first U.S. troops reached Korea, the U.S. military established guidelines for dealing with war correspondents. MacArthur set the tone. Convinced that he could control media coverage through a mixture of optimistic communiqués and blunt threats, MacArthur rejected a formal censorship regime. But it was a decision that soon caused problems. MacArthur's command was upset by much of the early reporting, which focused on the brutal real…
On The Offensive
In the middle of September 1950, MacArthur's dramatic victory at Inchon transformed the Korean War. This chapter explores the problems thrown up by this victory. In the battlefield theater, the military received scant respite from correspondents, who complained that MacArthur had made it excessively difficult to cover the Inchon campaign. In Washington, the government's efforts to sustain domestic support for a prolonged mobilization campaign app…
Selling the Korean War propaganda, politics, and public opinion in the United States, 1950 - 1953
How presidents spark and sustain support for wars remains an enduring and significant problem. Korea was the first limited war the United States experienced in the contemporary period—the first recent war fought for something less than total victory. This book explores how Truman and then Eisenhower tried to sell it to the American public. Based on primary sources, this book explores the government's selling activities from all angles. It looks a…
Know Your Enemy
White House Publicity Operations During the Korean War, June 1950–June 1951
Truman was the first modern president to face the challenge of selling a limited war. Based on a wide range of primary sources, this article explores the impact that the Korean War had on Truman's publicity operations. Whereas all wars place important new demands on presidents to speak out more frequently and forcefully, limited wars place significant constraints on what presidents can say and do. During the Korean War, Truman refused to go publi…
Franklin D. Roosevelt, Ernst ‘Putzi’ Hanfstaengl and the ‘S-Project’, June 1942–June 1944
Between June 1942 and September 1944, Ernst ‘Putzi’ Hanfstaengl was employed by the Roosevelt administration as an intelligence analyst and psychological warfare adviser. This article not only explores the President's exact motivations for bringing a former confidant of Hitler to Washington in the midst of war, but also uses this curious episode to highlight some broader, and frequently neglected, themes of American wartime diplomacy, including: …
Red, White, and Bush
Selling NSC-68
In the spring of 1950, as the joint study group charged with producing a reassessment of U.S. national security policy circulated a draft plan that would dramatically increase defense spending, the problem of how to sell such a lavish program to the American public dominated everyone's thinking. "Cohesion in our democracy is basic to U.S. security," insisted one consultant, "and the government was going to need assistance in getting public suppor…
White House Publicity Operations During the Korean War, June 1950–June 1951
Truman was the first modern president to face the challenge of selling a limited war. Based on a wide range of primary sources, this article explores the impact that the Korean War had on Truman's publicity operations. Whereas all wars place important new demands on presidents to speak out more frequently and forcefully, limited wars place significant constraints on what presidents can say and do. During the Korean War, Truman refused to go publi…
The Campaign to Sell a Harsh Peace for Germany to the American Public, 1944-1948
In the spring of 1944, a group of prominent US opinion-makers launched a campaign aimed at convincing the American public of the need for enforcing a harsh peace on Germany. By exploring the dynamics of this campaign, which revolved around the activities of the Writers’ War Board and the Society for the Prevention of World War III, this article focuses on an episode that has generally been neglected in the historiography of US post-war plans for …
U.S. Intelligence and the Nazis By Richard Breitman, Norman J. W. Goda, Timothy Naftali and Robert Wolfe
Why Korea?
The massive Chinese intervention also led many Americans to question the wisdom of the Korean War: in January 1951, one Gallup poll even found that two‐thirds of the public wanted to withdraw from Korea altogether. Although the administration had successfully defused the broader debate over Cold War mobilization, it had far more trouble explaining why it was necessary for Americans to continue fighting and dying in faraway Korea. In fact, the gov…
Conclusion
This chapter summarizes the arguments of the book. The Truman administration's efforts to sell the Korean War went through two phases. In the first year, the government was plagued by the problems of selling a limited war. As the fighting progressed, however, officials learned from their mistakes, introduced more effective bureaucratic structures, and stiffened their rhetoric. In both phases, the government's efforts had important consequences: i…
Steady Improvements
The campaign to sell voluntary repatriation was not the administration's only PR success in 1952. As the war persisted, officers and officials at all levels made big improvements in their publicity efforts. Many learned from earlier mistakes. In the Far East, senior officers also established more effective bureaucratic structures and brought in more personnel to help deal with reporters. On the ground in Korea, the changing nature of the war also…
The Macarthur Controversy
Truman's decision to fire MacArthur in April 1951 initially threatened to make the domestic situation even worse. Indeed, Republicans hoped to exploit the opportunity to challenge the administration's whole Asian policy, and perhaps even impeach one or two senior officials. Within weeks, however, the MacArthur controversy worked to the administration's benefit. For the first time in months, senior officials engaged in a sustained and coordinated …
Mobilizing For a Police Action
As news of battlefield defeats hit home, the administration tried to channel the public debate on how America ought to mobilize in this new, more dangerous phase of the Cold War. The instinct of Truman and his senior advisers was to remain cautious: they were still keen to stop the domestic mood from overheating, lest this result in overpowering demands to escalate the Cold War, perhaps even by launching a preventive strike against the Soviet Uni…
The Advent of Eisenhower
Initially, Eisenhower's emergence as the Republican nominee for president also helped to sustain a basic consensus behind the war, for Ike was a moderate who was prepared to defend Truman's decision to intervene in Korea. As the campaign progressed, Eisenhower's comments became more critical. But even his decisive promise to voters to “go to Korea” was ambiguous. It was intended to signal that something new had to be done to end the fighting, whi…
Interminable Truce Talks
With the start of armistice negotiations in the summer of 1951, the Korean War entered a new phase. This chapter explores how officials formulated an information campaign during months of complex and protracted negotiations. At the armistice site, first at Kaesong then at Panmunjom, the military's public information officials had a difficult time trying to divulge enough material to keep the press happy without undermining the government's negoti…
Dealing with the “Disaster School of Journalism”
The long military retreat that followed the Chinese intervention sparked a new round of recriminations between the military and media in the Far East. This chapter examines MacArthur's claims that war correspondents exaggerated the scale of defeat. It then explores the pressures that finally forced MacArthur to accept the need for formal censorship. Yet censorship was no panacea. Although many in the media believed they needed more guidance from …
“Censorship is Abhorrent to General Macarthur”
As soon as the first U.S. troops reached Korea, the U.S. military established guidelines for dealing with war correspondents. MacArthur set the tone. Convinced that he could control media coverage through a mixture of optimistic communiqués and blunt threats, MacArthur rejected a formal censorship regime. But it was a decision that soon caused problems. MacArthur's command was upset by much of the early reporting, which focused on the brutal real…
On The Offensive
In the middle of September 1950, MacArthur's dramatic victory at Inchon transformed the Korean War. This chapter explores the problems thrown up by this victory. In the battlefield theater, the military received scant respite from correspondents, who complained that MacArthur had made it excessively difficult to cover the Inchon campaign. In Washington, the government's efforts to sustain domestic support for a prolonged mobilization campaign app…
Mobilizing with the Utmost Speed
In the middle of December, Truman and his senior advisers announced their broader policy response to the Chinese intervention. They would massively expand and expedite the nation's overall Cold War mobilization posture. They also proposed sending additional troops to Europe. And, to drive home the extent of the crisis, the president declared a state of emergency. In Congress, nationalist Republicans immediately challenged this new program, sparki…
An Entirely New War
The massive Chinese intervention in the Korean War in late November 1950 created a new sense of crisis in Washington. Attempting to learn from the mistakes they had made in June, senior officials tried to provide a more forceful lead, reaching out to figures from across the political spectrum in order to foster a new sense of unity. But, initially at least, the administration's public efforts were little short of disastrous. The military situatio…
Keeping the Home Front Cool
This chapter explores the Truman administration's publicity efforts in the first three weeks of the Korean War. Fearful that this new Cold War crisis might escalate into a far bigger conflict with the Soviet Union, the president and his senior advisers sought to keep the home front cool. They made few public statements. And what they did say was carefully restrained. Without a vigorous lead from the government, however, the Washington press corps…
Mental Maps in the Era of Two World Wars
This book explores the 'mental maps' of leading political figures of the era of two world wars. Chapters focus on those giants whose ideas cast a compelling shadow: Lloyd George, Lenin, Mussolini, Hit
Selling the Korean War propaganda, politics, and public opinion in the United States, 1950 - 1953
How presidents spark and sustain support for wars remains an enduring and significant problem. Korea was the first limited war the United States experienced in the contemporary period—the first recent war fought for something less than total victory. This book explores how Truman and then Eisenhower tried to sell it to the American public. Based on primary sources, this book explores the government's selling activities from all angles. It looks a…
Why America Fights
Casualty Reporting and Domestic Support for War
The common argument that public support for war is casualty sensitive ignores the fact that casualty figures are not revealed automatically. While the military decides when, and to whom, to release such information, political elites can question, even condemn, how the government goes about this business. After briefly exploring how the US military operated during the two world wars, this article focuses on American casualty reporting during the K…
The war for Korea, 1950–1951
Allan R. Millett, Lawrence, University Press of Kansas, 2010, xx +644 pp. If Allan Millett's Korean War trilogy is clearly destined to become the magnum opus of one of the United States' leading mi
After Hiroshima
Matthew Jones, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2010, xii+502 pp In September 1954, at the height of the first Offshore Islands crisis, John Foster Dulles remarked that the United States face
Political science (33 works) · Law (30 works) · History (24 works) · Politics (23 works) · Vietnamese History and Culture Studies (18 works) · Sociology (14 works) · Law (11 works) · History (10 works) · Public Administration (10 works) · Spanish Civil War (10 works)