Jerry A Fodor

Biographic Data

ID499093
NAMEJerry A Fodor
GIVEN NAMESJerry A
FAMILY NAMEFodor
SIGNATUREFODOR J A
AFFILIATIONSRutgers, the State University of New Jersey
VERIFIEDNo
TOTAL WORKS46
TOTAL CITATIONS251
AUTHOR COUNT46
EDITOR COUNT0
FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR1962
LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR2008
H-INDEX6

  • Lot 2: The Language of Thought Revisited

    Jerry A FodorBOOKLOT 22008

    This book presents a new development of the famous Language of Thought hypothesis, which has since the 1970s been at the centre of interdisciplinary debate about how the mind works. The book defends and extends the groundbreaking idea that thinking is couched in a symbolic system realized in the brain. This idea is central to the representational theory of mind which has been established as a key reference point in modern philosophy, psychology, …

  • Pourquoi les porcs n'ont pas d'ailes

    Jerry A FodorARTICLELe Débat2008

  • Brandom Beleaguered

    Open AccessJerry A Fodor, Jerry Fodor et al.ARTICLEPhilosophy and Phenomenological…2007Cited by: 6References: 1

  • How the mind works: What we still don't know

    Open AccessJerry A Fodor, Jerry FodorARTICLEDaedalus2006Cited by: 3References: 1

    Daedalus Summer 2006 One could make a case that the history of cognitive science, insofar as it’s been any sort of success, has consisted largely of 1⁄2nding more and more things about cognition that we didn’t know and didn’t know that we didn’t. ‘Throwing some light on how much dark there is,’ as I’ve put it elsewhere. The professional cognitive scientist has a lot of perplexity to endure, but he can be pretty sure that he’s gotten in on the gro…

  • Brandom's Burdens: Compositionality and Inferentialism

    Jerry A Fodor, Jerry Fodor et al.ARTICLEPhilosophy and Phenomenological…2001Cited by: 2

  • The Mind Doesn't Work That Way: The Scope and Limits of Computational Psychology

    Jerry A FodorBOOKMind Doesn't Work That Way2000

    In this engaging book, Jerry Fodor argues against the widely held view that mental processes are largely computations, that the architecture of cognition is massively modular, and that the explanation of our innate mental structure is basically Darwinian. Although Fodor has praised the computational theory of mind as the best theory of cognition that we have got, he considers it to be only a fragment of the truth. In fact, he claims, cognitive sc…

  • The mind doesn't work that way: The Scope and Limits of Computational Psychology

    Jerry A FodorBOOKThe mind doesn't work that way2000

    In this engaging book, Jerry Fodor argues against the widely held view that mental processes are largely computations, that the architecture of cognition is massively modular, and that the explanation of our innate mental structure is basically Darwinian. Although Fodor has praised the computational theory of mind as the best theory of cognition that we have got, he considers it to be only a fragment of the truth. In fact, he claims, cognitive sc…

  • All at Sea in Semantic Space: Churchland on Meaning Similarity

    Jerry A Fodor, Jerry Fodor et al.ARTICLEThe Journal of Philosophy1999

  • Impossible Words

    Jerry A Fodor, Jerry Fodor et al.ARTICLELinguistic Inquiry1999Cited by: 6

    July 01 1999 Impossible Words? In Special Collection: CogNet Jerry Fodor, Jerry Fodor Center for Cognitive Science, Rutgers University, Psychology (Annex), Busch Campus, New Brunswick, New Jersey 08903, [email protected] Search for other works by this author on: This Site Google Scholar Ernie Lepore Ernie Lepore Center for Cognitive Science, Rutgers University, Psychology (Annex), Busch Campus, New Brunswick, New Jersey 08903, lepore@ruccs.…

  • Concepts: Where Cognitive Science Went Wrong

    Jerry A FodorBOOKConcepts1998

    Jerry Fodor presents a strikingly original theory of the basic constituents of thought. He suggests that the heart of a cognitive science is its theory of concepts, and that cognitive scientists have gone badly wrong in many areas because their assumptions about concepts have been seriously mistaken. Fodor argues compellingly for an atomistic theory of concepts, and maintains that future work on human cognition should build upon new foundations. …

  • In Critical Condition: Polemical Essays on Cognitive Science and the Philosophy of Mind

    Jerry A FodorBOOKIn Critical Condition1998

    In this book Jerry Fodor contrasts his views about the mind with those of a number of well-known philosophers and cognitive scientists, including John McDowell, Christopher Peacocke, Paul Churchland, Daniel Dennett, Paul Smolensky, and Richard Dawkins. In this book Jerry Fodor contrasts his views about the mind with those of a number of well-known philosophers and cognitive scientists, including John McDowell, Christopher Peacocke, Paul Churchlan…

  • Concepts: Where Cognitive Science Went Wrong

    Jerry A FodorBOOKConcepts1998

  • In critical condition: Polemical Essays on Cognitive Science and the Philosophy of Mind

    Jerry A FodorBOOKIn critical condition1998

    Doing philosophy, according to Jerry Fodor, is like piloting: The trick is to find an object of known position and locate yourself with respect to it. In this book, Fodor contrasts his views about the mind with those of a number of well-known philosophers and cognitive scientists, including John McDowell, Christopher Peacocke, Paul Churchland, Daniel Dennett, Paul Smolensky, and Richard Dawkins. Fodor constructs a version of the representational …

  • The Emptiness of the Lexicon: Reflections on James Pustejovsky's The Generative Lexicon

    Jerry A Fodor, Ernie LeporeARTICLELinguistic Inquiry1998Cited by: 6References: 3

    We consider Pustejovsky's account of the semantic lexicon. We discuss and reject his argument that the complexity of lexical entries is required to account for lexical generativity. Finally, we defend a sort of lexical atomism: though, strictly speaking, we concede that lexical entries are typically complex, still we claim that their complexity does not jeopardize either the thesis that lexical meaning is atomistic or the identification of lexica…

  • The Elm and the Expert

    Steven Horst, Jerry A Fodor et al.ARTICLEThe Philosophical Quarterly1996

    Journal Article Book Reviews Get access The Elm and the Expert. By Jerry Fodor. (MIT Press, 1994. Pp. xii + 129. Price $19-95-) Steven Horst Steven Horst Wesleyan University Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Philosophical Quarterly, Volume 46, Issue 183, April 1996, Pages 243–246, https://doi.org/10.2307/2956393 Published: 01 April 1996

  • The Elm and the Expert: Mentalese and Its Semantics

    Katarzyna Jaszczolt, Katarzyna M Jaszczolt et al.ARTICLELanguage1995

  • Is Radical Interpretation Possible

    Jerry A Fodor, Ernie LeporeARTICLEPhilosophical Perspectives1994References: 2

    Argument form T 1. No language would be interpretable at all unless it were radically interpretable;2 that is, unless it were interpretable from the epistemic position of a radical interpreter. 2. No language would be radically interpretable unless it were F.3 3. (Natural) languages are actually interpreted (for example, by children who learn them and field linguists who translate them); hence, natural languages are radically interpretable. 4. Th…

  • What Is The Connection Principle

    Jerry A Fodor, Jerry Fodor et al.ARTICLEPhilosophy and Phenomenological…1994References: 1

    The Connection Principle (hereafter, CP) says that there is some kind of internal relation between a state's having intentional content (aspectual shape) and its being (at least potentially) conscious. Searle's argument for the principle is just that potential consciousness is the only thing he can think of that would distinguish original intentionality from ersatz (Searle, 1992, pp. 84, 155 and passim. All Searle references are to 1992). Cogniti…

  • Reply to Critics

    Ernest Lepore, Jerry A Fodor et al.ARTICLEPhilosophy and Phenomenological…1993

  • Precis of Holism: A Shopper's Guide

    Ernest Lepore, Jerry A Fodor et al.ARTICLEPhilosophy and Phenomenological…1993Cited by: 1

  • Holism: A Shopper's Guide

    Michael Morris, Jerry A Fodor et al.ARTICLEThe Philosophical Quarterly1993Cited by: 2

    Journal Article Book Reviews Get access Holism: a Shopper’s Guide. By Jerry Fodor and Ernest Lepore. (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1991. Pp. xiv + 274. Price £30.00 h/b, £9.95 p/b.) Michael Morris Michael Morris University of Sussex Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Philosophical Quarterly, Volume 43, Issue 172, July 1993, Pages 394–396, https://doi.org/10.2307/2219912 Published: 01 July 1993

  • A Theory of Content and Other Essays

    Greg N Carlson, Jerry A FodorARTICLELanguage1992

  • A Theory of Content and Other Essays

    Ruth Garrett Millikan, Jerry A FodorARTICLEThe Philosophical Review1992

  • A Theory of Content and Other Essays

    Alan Millar, Jerry A FodorARTICLEThe Philosophical Quarterly1992

    Journal Article Critical Notice Get access A Theory qfConlent and Other Essays. By Jerry A. Fodor. (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1990. Pp. xii + 270. Price £26.95.) Alan Millar Alan Millar University of Stirling Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Philosophical Quarterly, Volume 42, Issue 168, July 1992, Pages 367–372, https://doi.org/10.2307/2219687 Published: 01 July 1992

  • Psychosemantics: The Problem of Meaning in the Philosophy of Mind

    Dan Lloyd, Jerry A FodorARTICLEThe Philosophical Review1991